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1.1 Introduction 
In Ethiopia, the end of the cold war brought changes in the political and economic 
systems of the country. Politically, the country was restructured from a unitary 
government to a federal state. The new constitution of Ethiopia, which legitimized 
the federal structure in 1995, also introduced a separation of powers into the 
government structure, in particular between the parliament, which is responsible for 
policymaking, and the executive, which is responsible for implementing policies. In 
Ethiopia, this has been a major shift, as policies were made or changed at the 
discretion of the emperor for nearly a century, and then for a short time was in the 
hands of military dictators.  
The prevailing economic structure of the country has been under transformation 
from a centrally planned system of socialism towards a market economy. Since the 
early 1990s, the government of Ethiopia has placed emphasis on economic 
development, starting with agricultural development-led industrialization in 1992. 
For Ethiopia, agriculture accounts for about 40% of the real GDP, employs about 
77% of the population, and contributes about 84% of the export earnings (ATA 2015; 
World Bank 2016). Given the agrarian economy of Ethiopia, agriculture has been 
considered to be an engine of growth in this strategy, and it will continue to be so 
for some decades to come.  
Since 2001, the government has identified poverty as one of the major threats to the 
survival of Ethiopia as a sovereign country. It has become apparent that Ethiopia 
follows the ‘developmental state’ political economy (Gebresenbet 2014; Vaughan 
2011; Simon 2011; Veen 2015). As a result, the government prepared different 
policies, including the rural and agricultural development policy document of 2002 
to guide rural development. By following the developmental state approach, the 
government intensified its involvement in the economic sector. Massive 
development efforts were re-initiated across the country (Vaughan 2007). Over the 
last decade, reports indicate that the Ethiopian economy is one of the fastest-growing 
economies in the world (World Bank 2016).  
Despite the development efforts since the mid-1990s and reported rapid economic 
growth, food production still does not satisfy demand. In particular, the agricultural 
sector has not been able to withstand certain natural shocks. Most recently, the 
drought in 2015 and 2016 resulted in food shortage for over ten million people, 
showing the low level of surplus food production in the country (FAO 2016). This is 
partly the result of the limited use of agricultural technologies in Ethiopia, as in most 
other sub-Saharan African countries (Sheahan and Barrett 2017). One of the most 
important agricultural technologies in this respect is seed. Seed is in fact a carrier of 
Seed for Change 
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 many technologies, and is essential to increase production. Although the formal seed 
system (a system that follows seed certification procedures) has been operational 
since the end of the 1970s, the use of quality seed from formal sources is estimated 
at less than 10% (ATA 2015). The seed sector is facing different challenges: the 
development of the seed sector is not keeping pace with the growth in demand for 
seed. The demand for seed exceeds the supply. Shortage of seed in terms of amount 
and type is a critical issue (Bishaw, Sahlu and Simane 2008).  
To explain why the seed sector has not been able to respond adequately to the 
growing demand for seed in the country, many studies have identified technical 
gaps (Alemu and Tripp 2010; Bishaw 2004; Bishaw, Sahlu and Simane 2008; Sahlu, 
Alemu and Atilaw 2012). While discussing the challenges of developing a healthy 
seed system, McGuire (2005) highlighted that studies in Ethiopia do not consider 
policy issues, whereas these issues are critical in guiding seed sector development. 
However, in recent years many studies have tried to analyse the gaps in policy 
implementation in Ethiopia that are seed related (Alemu and Atilaw 2012; Alemu 
and Tripp 2010; Atilaw 2010; Atilaw and Korbu 2012; Lakew and Alemu, 2012; 
Spielman, Mekonnen and Alemu 2013; Sahlu 2012; Teklewold and Mekonen 2012).  
Some of the issues illustrated in these studies include the wide gap between policy 
on paper and in practice on the ground in terms of seed quality certification, as 
discussed by Alemu and Tripp (2010), indicating the malfunctioning of the seed 
certification system. Sahlu, Alemu and Atilaw (2012) elaborate that the problem of 
seed quality is related to the poor capacity of the laboratories to inspect seed 
production. They further state that the restructuring has affected the overall 
management of the seed sector. Other studies also show the limited participation of 
the private sector in the Ethiopian seed sector, although policies encourage private 
sector development (Alemu and Tripp 2010; Spielman, Mekonnen and Alemu 2013). 
Similarly, the plant variety protection law, which was enacted in 2006, was not 
implemented; and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)1has not been able to 
adequately facilitate the process of variety release (Teklewold. and Mekonen, 2012). 
Atilaw and Korbu (2012) indicate that seed marketing is the weakest link in the seed 
value chain. Spielman, Mekonnen and Alemu (2013) note that while the policy on 
paper indicates market liberalization, this is hardly implemented in Ethiopia. Others 
                                                 
1 The name of this ministry has changed several times. Initially, it was referred to as the 
Ministry of Agriculture; in 2004, it became the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development; in 2010, it was changed back to the Ministry of Agriculture; and recently it was 
renamed the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources. In this document, for 
consistency we refer to it as the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
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also emphasize the importance of tackling the seed marketing problem in Ethiopia 
(Alemu and Tripp 2010).  
1.2 Problem statement 
As discussed above, various studies have identified problems in the seed sector, 
including policy implementation gaps. However, these studies have not taken 
further steps to understand why there are all these gaps, or why certain policies have 
not been implemented. None of the studies in Ethiopia appear to have looked into 
the ways in which seed policies are made and implemented, or how actors and 
institutions have influenced the process and outcome. Most studies have rather 
focused on technical problems or policy implementation gaps, and at best some have 
tried to show the government’s interest in seed sector policy implementation (Alemu 
2011). Such studies have little to say about the reasons behind the gaps in policy 
making and implementation. This calls for an analysis of how the content of a policy 
document is shaped and determined, and how a policy is implemented.  
Given the dominant role of agriculture in the Ethiopian economy, the seed sector 
has always been a priority for many actors, for different motivations and interests. 
Some actors are eager to ensure that seed is made available to farmers, other actors 
want to make a business in the seed sector, while others may want to have better 
access to high-quality seed, others want to effectively engage in seed sector 
administration. These are important reasons for different actors to take part in the 
policy making and implementation process. Given these interests and motivations, 
actors try to influence the outcome of policy making and implementation. The extent 
to which different actors can influence the outcome is guided by formal and informal 
institutions (Ostrom 2007). As these institutions are both diverse and not equally 
visible, it is likewise unclear as to why actors choose a certain policy option, or avoid 
the implementation of another. Thus, although different challenges in the seed sector 
have been identified in many of the previous studies, knowledge is still lacking 
regarding the institutional dimensions or roots of these problems, limiting room for 
innovation and improvement of the seed sector.  
1.3 Objectives and research questions 
The objective of this research is twofold: to narrow the knowledge gap about policy 
making and implementation in the Ethiopian seed sector, and to contribute to the 
debate as to how to make the seed sector function better. To attain the objective, this 
study aims to unravel the institutions behind the challenges faced by the Ethiopian 
seed sector, covering the policy making and implementation continuum from 2008 
to 2016, and looking at how actors, and the environment in which they interact, 
influence the outcome. The overall research question is: how did actors and institutions 
Seed for Change 
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 influence the formulation and implementation of seed policy in Ethiopia from 2008 to 2016? 
This question comprises two processes: policy making and policy implementation. 
For each of these processes, two further questions were devised, resulting in four 
specific research questions, which are introduced below.  
By the end of 2008, the process of revising the 2000 seed law had begun, with the 
aim of mitigating problems in the seed sector. The revision was finalized at the 
beginning of 2013. Over the four years of the revision process, actors had to negotiate 
on different policy options. There were different rounds of revision and discussion. 
In addition to the actors, the arenas in which the negotiations and decisions took 
place were important in influencing the contents of the drafts. This is partly because 
not all the actors had access to all the arenas. Against this background, the first 
specific research question is: how did the seed policy actors and associated arenas influence 
the outcome of Ethiopian seed sector policy making during the period 2008–2013? While 
the actors had to negotiate on various issues, this study concentrates on two major 
themes: seed sector governance, and variety registration. 
Different actors have different perceptions of the problems and possible solutions 
that are the basis for these actors to negotiate on the content of the policy document. 
Actors frame each problem and solution differently based on their perceptions, 
experience, vision, and inevitably interests and values. In order to understand how 
actors frame seed sector problems, this study focuses on the governance of seed 
quality, which leads to the second specific research question: how have different actors 
framed the seed quality problem and its governance solutions, and how can these different 
frames and the decision making on the governance of seed quality be explained? These first 
two specific research questions help to understand how actors and institutions 
influence policymaking processes and outcomes in the formal policymaking 
process. It also helps to understand the institutions and interests behind an actor’s 
preference for a particular policy option.   
The influence of actors and institutions is not only limited to the policy making 
process, but it also extends to the policy implementation stage. This study considers 
the process of introducing and expanding a practice of seed marketing to overcome 
the problem of seed distribution inefficiency from 2010 to 2016. In Ethiopia, seed of 
major food crops is not exchanged formally in a free market, but is instead centrally 
allocated and distributed through a government controlled system to ensure that 
farmers across the country get equitable access to seed. Seed distribution includes 
the process of estimating demand and production, and allocating and supporting 
the entire disbursement process. As the volume of seed and geographical area to 
which the seed is distributed increases, the process becomes more cumbersome. As 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
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a result, the system became increasingly inefficient and the quality of the seed 
supplied to the farmers become increasingly poor, which is also related to change of 
ownership of the seed in the process (Sahlu, Alemu and Atilaw 2012).  
The process of introducing and expanding the practice of seed marketing was 
facilitated by regional seed core groups, a collaborative governance structure 
established in mid-2010 in four regional states– Amhara; Oromia; Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR); and Tigray2. The major seed sector 
stakeholders in the regions are members of the regional seed core groups. They were 
tasked with identifying critical challenges in the seed sector, and finding options to 
implement or recommend policy solutions for change if necessary. The collaborative 
governance structures in the different regional states have identified different 
challenges and implemented different activities. For this research, the issue of seed 
marketing was selected to study the process and outcome more closely.  
The regional seed core groups are operational under two constraining 
environments. The first is the top-down governance culture of Ethiopia, which 
focuses on a centralized planning approach where suggestion from below is 
generally only considered when it fits in with the interest of decision makers. The 
second constraining environment is related to the competing discourses about seed 
marketing: liberalization of seed marketing and centralized distribution. While seed 
distribution is promoted for equity, those who advocate seed marketing focus on the 
efficiency of seed supply and seed sector development. Under such conditions, the 
core groups introduced direct seed marketing (DSM) in 2011, and they have been 
implementing and expanding it over the years. By 2016, more than one-third of the 
hybrid maize seed in three regional states (Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR) was sold 
through DSM. This leads us to the third specific research question: how have the 
regional seed core groups introduced DSM from below in the top-down governance culture 
of Ethiopia; and how have they been able to expand DSM given the competing discourses?  
The potential of DSM to overcome seed supply inefficiency, coupled with the 
support of actors including government, helped to expand DSM in Ethiopia (Benson, 
Spielman and Kasa 2014). Despite the alleged benefit to and support of the 
government for its expansion, DSM has not been officially embraced by the 
government. However, actors in the seed distribution system expect the official 
decision of the government to fully switch to the new system, including investment 
                                                 
2Ethiopia is a federal state with nine regional states and two city administrations. Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray are considered as agriculturally important regional states of 
Ethiopia. 
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 in marketing infrastructure. The fourth specific research question is therefore why 
has the Ethiopian government still not formally endorsed the use of DSM despite the positive 
results of this pilot and the fact that the initiative falls squarely within Ethiopian seed policy? 
Specific research questions three and four help to understand how actors and 
institutions affect the implementation of policies on paper. In summary, the twofold 
objective of this study is to widen our understanding of the causes of the Ethiopian 
seed sector problems, looking into the policy making and implementation 
continuum, and to contribute to the debate on how to make the Ethiopian seed sector 
function better. 
1.4 Key theoretical concepts and analytical lenses 
Public policy is not something that experts alone can formulate to recommend to 
those in power the ‘best’ policy option to solve a societal problem. Public policy 
making and implementation is rather something that is constructed in a process 
(Ingram, Schneider and Deleon 2007). This is partly because, regardless of the 
rationality assumption of both the experts and those wielding power, the proposals 
of experts are not always accepted by those in power (Mead 2013). This reflects the 
fact that social problems are not always objectively verifiable, which forces those in 
power to accept the proposal of the expert. Rather, the ‘problem’ is subjectively 
defined by different actors based on an interpretation of a phenomenon (Ingram, 
Schneider and Deleon 2007). This subjective interpretation of a phenomenon as a 
‘problem’ raises questions regarding the extent to which the ‘problem’ and thus the 
policy thereof, reflects the problems of a society. This necessitates clarification of 
who defines societal problems, and whose interests and values a public policy 
reflects.  
Though government makes public policies, it is important to distinguish between 
society and government interests and values (Akindele and Olaopa 2004). Society’s 
interests may not necessarily all be the same as government’s interests and vice 
versa; however, regardless of the difference, a policy developed by a government is 
public policy. In formulating public policies, the government has different interests 
ranging from those that are self-serving to those that genuinely try to solve societal 
problems (ibid.). The vested interest in public policy making is not only limited to 
the government, but extends to all actors that take part in the process of public policy 
making and implementation. An actor wants to be included in the process to make 
sure that the policy includes his/her preferred option (Ostrom 2007; Sutton 1999). 
Thus, public policy is the result of interactions between actors, including 
government, to attain their interests (van der Zee 1997). Like the other actors, the 
government as a political group has its own interests, which include at least the 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
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interest to remain in power by satisfying the interests of its constituency, which 
otherwise will result in power loss (Rausser and Goodhue 2002). As such, actors 
taking part in policy making and implementation use all possible means and 
opportunities to influence the outcome to the best of their interests. Thus, public 
policy is not the business of policy makers alone, it is the outcome of interactions 
between different actors (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Ostrom 2007).  
Akindele and Olaopa (2004) illustrated the hierarchy of public policy, which 
includes technical, administrative, executive, and political policy. While technical 
policy concerns the details of how policy is translated into practice, the political 
policy is the overarching objective of the political group. The political policy 
provides underlying guidance to other policies. The government, as a political group 
holding power, puts its objectives at the political policy level so as to be used as a 
base for designing and implementing policies. The extent to which such objectives 
are included in the technical and administrative policies depends on the strength of 
the government relative to the other actors. It is thus the composition of actors, 
networks and rules, as well as policy-specific issues, that influence the outcome of 
the policy making process (Walt 1994). 
Similarly, influencing policy formulation does not mean that the policy will be 
implemented, or will be implemented as stipulated in the policy document. Policy 
implementation also depends on how the implementer of the final policy 
reconstructs and translates the policy into practice (Vaughan and Rafanell 2012). 
Policy reconstructions are related to the interests and values of the implementers: 
policies that negatively affect the interests and values of implementers are less likely 
to be implemented as stipulated in the policy document. Lipsky (1980) introduced 
the concept of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ and noted that what frontline staff 
implemented becomes policy, regardless of the initial intention put on paper. 
However, May and Winter (2009) elaborate how the political attention of the 
government and managerial guidance influence the actions of the ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’, showing the impact of different actors, in addition to the 
implementers, during the implementation of policies as well. As also discussed by 
Kjaer and Joughin (2012), a series of political decisions are required during the 
implementation of policies. This means that ‘street-level bureaucrats’ may not 
always have the leverage to change policy. Rather, the high-level political interests 
influence policies at the implementation stage, and the influence does not end at 
policy formulation level. Actors influence policy as far as its implementation 
through the institutions that facilitate the influence. 
Seed for Change 
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 To understand policy processes and implementation, this study focuses on 
institutions, especially informal ones, and how these institutions shape the way in 
which actors make and implement policies. According to Ostrom (2007), 
‘institutions are the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive situations 
organized by rules, norms and strategies’ (p. 23). Institutions organize the structured 
interaction of members, and thus determine what is perceived as right and wrong, 
and accordingly influence an actor to think in a certain way (Duffield 2007; Khan 
2013; Klein 1998). These institutions are both formal (constitutions, laws, regulations, 
official procedures) and informal (norms, values, taboos, beliefs, and conventions) 
(Duffield 2007; Geels 2004; Khan 2013; Mulé 1999; Strambach, 2010). It is important 
to note that these institutions are ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction’ (North 1990: p. 3), but also provide opportunities for societal change. 
Thus, institutions and actors presuppose each other. While institutions are shared 
concepts among members, some of them are tacitly shared, and are not clear from 
the outset, yet influencing human interaction and their outcome. The complex 
interactions of actors influenced by institutions determine the process as well as the 
outcome of policy making and implementation. 
To study policy processes and their outcomes, different theoretical concepts have 
been used in this research. Societal phenomena are complex and thus the analysis of 
these phenomena require the use of different theories that each help to conceptualize 
and explain them. There are a variety of theories that can be used to explain the 
complex process of policy making and implementation, but a theory may not 
necessarily explain the whole process, given the diversity of how, and the 
circumstances under which, public policy is developed and implemented. Different 
theories have to be used to complement each other and to better explain the 
complexity of public policy making and implementation. This is what scholars have 
coined as theoretical multiplicity (Dewulf et al. 2009; Karpouzoglou, Dewulf and 
Clark 2016). It is important to note that theoretical multiplicity is not just about 
putting different theoretical concepts together, but it is primarily about how the 
different theories complement each other and can create synergy to help 
conceptualize the process in its complete structure while maintaining their 
distinctiveness (Karpouzoglou, Dewulf and Clark 2016). In this thesis, the complex 
policy making and implementation process, influenced by the strategic nature of the 
seed sector in Ethiopia, is analysed. The use of different theoretical concepts under 
such circumstances becomes a necessity to explain the policy process. For these 
reasons, several theoretical concepts have been used and combined in this research: 
the theoretical concept of discourse analysis focusing on frame, the round model, 
policy arena, multi-level perspective on transition, transition management, non-
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decision making, and institutional lock-in. While using these analytical lenses to 
explain seed policy making and implementation, the concept of institutions, as 
discussed above, has remained a central concept.   
1.5 The organization of the research 
This research approaches policy making and implementation as something that is 
not a given, but as something that actors decide on during the process. It focuses on 
how actors select and/or implement a given policy, also looking into the underlying 
reasons behind the decisions. As such, it uses qualitative data to explain why actors 
favour certain policy options, while choosing not to implement others. Major data 
used in the study include descriptions of the processes of negotiation as well as the 
outcome of revising the 2000 Ethiopian seed law (2008 – 2013), and the process of 
implementing DSM (2011 – 2016). The fieldwork for this research was carried out 
from the end of 2013 to mid-2016, in two phases. During the first phase up until 2014, 
key data were collected to answer the first two specific research questions, basically 
focusing on the process of revising the 2000 Ethiopian seed law. In addition, major 
data were generated through interviews with 40 informants3, many of whom had 
participated in the revision process. Most of the informants were identified 
purposely because they were part of the process and therefore had better knowledge 
of the process and the outcomes. Moreover, different drafts, reports produced 
during the revision process (November 2008 to January 2013), and the final seed law, 
were used as data to answer specific research questions one and two.  
During the second phase, from 2015 to 2016, data were generated to answer research 
questions three and four. The data for these research questions focused on the 
activities of the regional seed core groups that were established in mid-2010 by the 
Integrated Seed Sector Development (ISSD) Ethiopia project. Different reports were 
reviewed and used as a starting point. Interviews were conducted with 47 
informants4, both at national and regional state levels, who had been involved in 
DSM piloting. Similar to phase one, these informants were also identified purposely 
because they had better knowledge of the process of initiating and implementing 
DSM. In addition, I was part of the design and implementation of the pilot, serving 
as a coach to the process facilitators at regional state level between 2010 and 2012. 
My affiliation to ISSD, and good working relationship with major actors in the seed 
                                                 
3 In this thesis, I refer to the interviewees as informants, because they were selected purposely, 
not randomly, because of their better knowledge of the subject under investigation.  
4 Some of the informants, particularly those from seed companies and actors at national level, 
are the same for the two data sets. Since the data sets are different and were not combined 
during data analysis, the number of informants remained at 40 and 47 for the two phases, 
and the total number (87) does not indicate the number of informants (80) interviewed.  
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 sector, created easy access to information, despite being based at a distance from the 
DSM activity owing to my PhD studies. Furthermore, knowledge of the process 
helped me to reflect on observations as an action researcher during data collection. 
Being part of the process also has some drawbacks. The first is the researcher’s 
possible bias towards achieving a particular outcome, and thus focusing on some 
parts but not others; the second is how the researcher is viewed by the respondents, 
which may affect their responses. Although total objectivity is unachievable, in most 
research, particularly in social sciences, knowing the problem and making the 
researcher’s perspective clear adds to transparency and accountability (Silverman 
2011). My preference for bottom-up processes and deliberation about change might 
have caused me to overlook some of the positive benefits of top-down decision 
making. Moreover, being part of the process may have also predisposed me to 
expect a positive outcome from the interventions. However, being aware of such 
challenges, I aimed to 1) work as an outsider trying to generate more information 
from the respondent; 2) focus on the processes and reasons behind them rather than 
the outcome; 3) stick to a checklist during the interviews, being careful not to skip 
any of the points with the assumption of prior knowledge; and 4) ensure that two-
thirds of the members of the regional core group were included in the interviews, to 
obtain a range of views from the actors in the process.  
Before starting to collect the data, I was concerned that respondents would only tell 
the positive parts of the story, or that they might withhold information they assumed 
that I already knew, owing to the fact that they knew that I was part of the team 
supporting the introduction of DSM. I used key terms, in addition to open-ended 
questions in the checklist, to elicit the information the interviewees might withhold. 
During the interviews, the interviewees were open to mentioning both the positive 
and negative aspects of the pilot. This may have been because they knew that I was 
familiar with all the processes and that I was now collecting data as a researcher. All 
the interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed and coded using Atlas.ti5.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis answers the abovementioned four specific research questions in the 
chapters that follow. Chapter 2 addresses research question number one. This 
chapter is aimed at understanding the process of revising the 2000 Ethiopian seed 
law, specifically looking into how different actors influenced the outcome in 
different arenas. A public policy decision is not a one-off event, rather it is an 
iterative process of negotiations among actors and decision making. The concept of 
                                                 
5Atlas.ti is a computer programme that is used in qualitative research data analysis. 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
12 
 
the rounds model proposed by Teisman (2000) and the concept of a policy arena 
(Hermans and Cunningham 2013; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994; Sabatier 1988) 
were combined to reconstruct the process and understand the influence of actors 
and arenas. This chapter elaborates how the disconnected arenas and the power of 
actors influenced the content of the seed policy document.  
Chapter 3 answers research question number two. The chapter starts with the 
concept that policy problems and solutions are not something that exist objectively, 
but rather are ‘constructed’ by actors. How actors define a problem tends to imply a 
preferred solution (Peters 2005; Coburn 2006). Discourse theory focusing on frame 
analysis is used to understand how and why actors frame seed quality problems and 
governance solutions in different ways. This chapter analyses how actors use a 
frame to structure the content of seed policy. Chapter 4 answers research question 
number three, and this is about how DSM is introduced and widely used in Ethiopia. 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: 1) to show that the existence of a policy on 
paper does not mean that the policy has been implemented; and 2) to highlight the 
influence of actors in translating the existing policy into practice. The concept of 
transition management and multi-level perspective (MLP) (de Haan and Rotmans 
2011; Geels and Schot 2007; Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt. 2001) are used to 
understand how the process of implementing policies that are not in line with the 
interests of influential actors is managed. This chapter discusses how the 
collaborative governance structure facilitated the process of introducing DSM, and 
examines the role of different actors in the process. It also elaborates how the 
strategic management of collaboration, including networking, helped to introduce 
and expand DSM. Chapter 5 answers research question number four, and is a 
continuation of Chapter 4. This chapter analyses why the widely used DSM is not 
officially endorsed by the government, using the concept of non-decision making 
and institutional lock-in (Bonal 2012; Cantarelli et al. 2010; Geels 2011). This chapter 
presents the different institutional lock-ins that hindered decision making on the 
future use of DSM. It discusses how actors used various institutions to create the 
lock-ins and influence decision making.  
Chapter 6 concludes the research by summarizing the answers to the specific 
research questions, providing an overall answer to the main research question. On 
the basis of the answers, the chapter discusses the major outcomes of the research 
and lessons learned. By focusing on the Ethiopian seed sector problems, and based 
on the experiences in this research, the chapter also suggests alternative ways of 
dealing with the seed sector challenges, and future research that is needed to 
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 strengthen the Ethiopian seed sector. Figure 1-1 provides a schematic overview of 
the structure of the thesis.   
 
Figure 1-1. Structure of the thesis 
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Chapter 2.  
Reconstructing policy decision-making in the 
Ethiopian seed sector: actors and arenas 
influencing the policy making process6 
 
 
Abstract 
In Ethiopia, new policy actors and arenas have emerged as a result of major changes that took 
place in the political and economic system in the early 1990s: the separation of state powers 
between the legislature and the executive, and the decision to move towards a market-oriented 
economic system. These are important bases that define the policy making processes. 
However, the mere separation of power and emergence of new actors do not necessarily 
guarantee effectiveness of the established system, and thus need analysis. Focusing on the 
four years of discussions on developing seed law, this chapter analyse show the emergence of 
new actors and new policy arenas has influenced the process and outcome of policy making 
in the Ethiopian seed sector. Furthermore, it sheds a new light on policy making processes in 
Ethiopia, considering policy making as a process involving multiple actors, arenas and 
interactions between policy actors. The analysis reveals that the new policy arenas provided 
opportunities for actors to place their preferred policy options on the agenda, and get them 
incorporated into the draft seed law. However, mainly because of a blurred separation of 
power between the executive and the legislature, decision making ultimately remained firmly 
in the hands of the executive.  
                                                 
6 This chapter is based on an article published in Public Policy and Administration Research, 6(2), as: 
Mohammed Hassena, Otto Hospes and Bram De Jonge (2016), ‘Reconstructing policy 
decision-making in the Ethiopian seed sector: actors and arenas influencing policy making 
process’. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Since the creation of modern Ethiopia in the second half of the 19th century, public 
policy making has been the domain of emperors, kings and palace courts, the 
nobility, military dictators, and civilian and bureaucratic elites (Abebe 2005). The 
historically authoritarian system of the country provides little room if any, for 
society to influence policy making. Rather, as in many other developing countries, 
society is ill informed about the policy making process, yet nevertheless affected by 
the resulting policies (Saasa 1985). Since 1974, the political regime of Ethiopia has 
dramatically changed twice. In 1974, the socialist regime replaced the age-old 
monarchical system, and in 1991, ‘revolutionary democracy’ replaced the socialist 
regime (Abebe 2005). Under the monarchy and socialist regime, the power of policy 
making was vested in the monarchy and the executive, respectively (ibid).  
The political shift of 1991 brought about two major changes in the policy making 
process in the country. The first is the separation of state power between the 
executive and the legislature, demarcating their respective roles in the policy making 
process (Dercon 2006; HoPRs 1995). After a four-year transitional period, the 
constitution that separates their powers was ratified in 1995. Accordingly, the House 
of Peoples’ Representatives (HoPRs) is the highest authority of federal government, 
retaining the legislative power over all matters of federal jurisdiction, while the 
executive, which is composed of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers (CoM), 
implements policies. Both the legislative and executive can draft policies. The 
drafting of policies by the executive is mainly conducted by sectoral agencies.  
The second change was the transformation of Ethiopia’s economic system from a 
command economy to a more market-oriented economy (Abebe 2005; Dercon 2006), 
which consequently led to changes in the landscape of policy actors in the 
agricultural sector. The change brought private sector and donor agencies into the 
policy making process. The involvement of new actors, including the HoPRs and the 
private sector, and increased participation of others, have introduced new arenas, 
such as public hearings, and have changed the dynamics in existing arenas. As a 
result, sectoral agencies often organize stakeholder workshops to improve the 
content of the draft policy document. The sectoral standing committee of the HoPRs 
may also organize public hearings to get the views of the public about a draft policy 
document.  
Until very recently, with a few exceptions of government companies, agriculture in 
Ethiopia was the domain of smallholder subsistence farmers. The government 
agencies were the only policy actors involved in developing policies that target these 
smallholder subsistence farmers. In recent years, although smallholders still 
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dominate, commercial farming has become part of the Ethiopian agricultural 
system, supported by different development programmes of the government. The 
first five-year development plan, the Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Reduction Program, which began in 2002, prioritized the private sector in its agenda, 
as did the second five-year development plan, the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustainable Development to End Poverty, which was initiated in 2006 (FDRE 2002; 
FDRE 2005). As a result, seed companies and other commercial companies operating 
in the agricultural sector, including export-oriented horticultural companies that 
have stakes in the seed sector, are taking part in agricultural policy making processes 
(Melese and Helmsing 2010). Moreover, the Development Assistance Group7 has 
been taking part in different development and policy making activities in Ethiopia, 
since 2001 (Young 2005).  
Actors in the seed sector have diverse interests, and in the context of the policy 
making process they may frame problems and solutions concerning the seed sector 
in different ways (Chapter 3). Seed8 is a strategic input for agricultural productivity, 
and the government has an interest in designing policies that ensure the equitable 
availability of seed to all farmers. Seed is also a commercial commodity, and it is in 
the interests of seed companies that policies be conducive to their business. 
Similarly, as seed users, the emerging horticultural companies want policies to 
ensure easy access to high quality seed. The experts in the ministry and research 
system who usually take part in policy making are concerned about the governance 
of the seed sector, and risks to the seed sector and agriculture in general. These 
underlying drivers are key to actors’ engagement in the policy making process of 
the seed sector. Actors use different venues or arenas to take part in the policy 
making process. The arenas create an opportunity for actors to table their preferred 
policy option and negotiate to include the option in the draft policy documents. 
Similarly, some arenas are used to enact policies according to the authority vested 
in the actors. 
Ethiopia revised the 2000 seed law after a policy making process that spanned four 
years, from late 2008 until early 2013. On close examination of the various drafts 
produced over those four years, it become clear that the policy options for variety 
                                                 
7 The Development Assistance Group was established in 2001 to foster information sharing 
and policy dialogue, and harmonize donor support to Ethiopia in order to support the 
country in its effort to meet the targets set in the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals. The group comprises 28 bilateral and multilateral development agencies. See 
http://dagethiopia.org/new/, accessed 30 May 2017. 
8In this study, the term ‘seed’ refers to true botanical seed, bulbs, tubers, cuttings, rhizomes, 
roots, seedlings or any other plant propagating material intended for planting. 
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registration and seed sector governance are the elements that change most often, 
showing that these were some of the most contentious issues in the process. The 
revised law was the result of interactions among actors, both new and existing, in 
the various arenas that were created in the process. As indicated above, a landscape 
of new seed sector policy actors has been emerging in Ethiopia over the last two 
decades. The appearance of these new actors has led not only to the emergence of 
new arenas (e.g. public hearings9) but has also changed the dynamics in existing 
arenas, affecting the policy making process and its outcome. The central research 
question is how did this new landscape of seed policy actors and associated arenas influence 
the process and outcome of Ethiopian seed sector policy making during the period 2008–
2013? 
To address this question, the chapter has been organized as follows: the next section 
provides a brief description of key concepts (rounds model and the policy arena) 
used to analyse decision-making processes (2.2). This is followed by reconstructing 
the process involved in developing the seed law, focusing on the different rounds of 
revision, the arenas used, the interaction between actors, and the main outcomes of 
the process (2.3). These is analysed in terms of how the different policy arenas and 
policy actors have influenced policy making in the context of seed (2.4). Based on 
the results of the study, the final section reflects on the extent to which the arenas 
and actors influence Ethiopian seed policy making (2.5).  
2.2 The policy making process 
Developing public policies is complex: they are often the result of complex 
interactions between various actors with different perceptions, values and resources, 
and varying levels of participation and influence, in a challenging administrative 
and legislative setting (Hermans and Cunningham 2013; Howlett 2007; Mintrom, 
2011). Moreover, policy making is never determined by one-off decisions, rather it 
is a technical and political process, extending over a period of time and involving 
many decisions, in which there is conflict, bargaining and negotiation among actors 
(Teisman 2000). Recognizing how policy actors navigate through this complex 
process helps to foster an understanding of how policies are made, and how 
challenges are identified in the process of policy making. Different models can 
support an understanding of the policy making process. This study considered the 
rounds model proposed by Teisman (2000) and the concept of the policy arena 
                                                 
9 The legislative is a new actor as a result of the separation of power, which uses public 
hearings (a new arena) as an important venue to get the views of the public about draft 
policies. 
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(Hermans and Cunningham 2013; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994; Sabatier 1988) 
for reconstructing and understanding the complex process of seed policy making. 
The rounds model emphasizes that decisions are made through interactions among 
purposeful actors in which they negotiate on acceptable combinations of problems 
and solutions (Teisman 2000). According to Teisman (2000), the decision-making 
process can be regarded as an indefinite number of decision-making rounds. 
Important decisions demarcate different rounds in the decision-making process in 
which there is a dynamic combination of problems and solutions, and a process of 
mutual adjustment. In the adjustment process, there could be cooperation whereby 
actors agree on certain issues, or there could be conflict, which may force one actor 
to adjust. Alternatively, there could be domination by one actor, leading to the 
adoption of a policy option presented by that actor without agreement. As pointed 
out by Carrozza (2011), the rounds model helps to deal with unpredictable chains of 
events, where identifying the round at which a central decision is made is difficult 
due to the incremental nature of the process itself. Hence, there are unpredictable 
numbers of rounds of discussions in which some decisions are made in each round, 
which may or may not affect the next round. In an ongoing policy making process, 
each decision can be considered a ‘temporarily-stable state of equilibrium in which 
streams of negotiation, deliberation and fact-finding are connected’ (Van Buuren 
and Gerrits 2008: p. 382). 
The participation of policy actors with different interests, resources and values 
makes public policy making processes dynamic and complex (Young 2005). In the 
policy making process, the decision of an actor is related to the value that an actor 
places on the usefulness of the decision, also showing the internal motivation of the 
actor. As there are multiple actors, such motivations make the process more chaotic, 
but there are rules, at least informal ones, that guide the policy making process. The 
rounds model does not identify the setting in which decision making takes place. 
This setting is named differently by different scholars: policy subsystems (Sabatier 
1988), action arenas (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994), constellations (Scharpf 
1997), and policy arenas (Hermans and Cunningham 2013). Arenas are venues in 
which actors negotiate or bargain with the purpose of influencing decision making; 
they determine how actors interact with formal and informal rules, and demarcate 
the boundaries in which actors operate (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994; Sabatier 
1988). In these venues, different discussions can result in different intermediate 
decisions, contributing towards a formal policy decision. The arenas determine the 
extent to which actors have access to and influence over the policy making process 
(Mayer, van Daalen and Bots 2013). Depending on the rules of the game, as well as 
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the participating actors, the game itself changes, and consequently changes the 
outcome (Van Buuren and Klijn 2006).  
2.3 Data generation and analysis 
Empirical data were generated from documents, and from semi-structured 
interviews conducted with informants comprising seed sector actors involved in the 
policy making process. The data generation focused mainly on the policy actors and 
policy arenas that guided the process of policy making. Different drafts, in addition 
to reports produced in the course of the revision process and minutes of a public 
hearing, were used as starting points to identify changes in the content of policy 
options over the full period of the process. The drafts and reports were obtained 
from experts and consultants involved in the drafting process. The minutes of the 
public hearing were obtained from the Agricultural Standing Committee (ASC) of 
the HoPRs. After scrutinizing drafts and reports, interviews were held with selected 
actors involved in the policy making process. The interviews were conducted to 
understand the process, the rules of the game, the level of interaction among 
different actors, and the extent to which the actors influenced changes in the content 
of the drafts and the final policy document. For the interviews, major emphasis was 
placed on experts, including external consultants that were involved in the drafting 
process; staff members of Plant Health Regulatory Directorate, the then Animal and 
Plant Health Regulatory Directorate (APHRD) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), 
which was leading the process; policy actors who took part in the drafting and 
negotiation workshops; experts in the Prime Minister’s office; and members of the 
ASC of the HoPRs. A total 40 informants were interviewed for the study, and all the 
interviews were transcribed and uploaded in Atlas.ti for analysis.  
In this study, policy making is considered not only as a process that involves 
multiple actors and different rounds of discussions, but also as a process that is 
shaped by policy arenas, operating according to different rules. The rounds model 
can be combined with the concept of policy arena to better understand the Ethiopian 
seed policy making process. The process of revising the 2000 seed law began at the 
end of 2008, and went through three rounds of drafting separated by interruptions 
until it was completed in 2013. Each round comprised arenas with specific settings 
in terms of actors, rules and boundaries. The arenas included drafting processes 
involving experts; different workshops and consultative meetings where drafts were 
discussed and options were negotiated among actors; and decision-making for a in 
the ministry, the CoM, and the HoPRs. 
The six drafts, including the final seed law, were compared to identify policy options 
that were frequently changing across the drafts. After uploading the transcribed 
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interview data into Atlas.ti software, the data were coded with two major objectives: 
the first was to reconstruct the drafting process to give a background to the changes 
in the content of policy options; the second objective was to understand why policy 
options regarding variety registration and seed sector governance changed 
throughout the revision process. After a thorough reading of the transcriptions, 
fragments of texts related to the objectives were coded. Since this was an inductive 
analysis of data, new codes were included as they emerged. These primary codes 
with all the quotations were reorganized into families to facilitate the description of 
the revision process as well as identify the reasons behind the changes of policy 
options. 
2.4 Reconstruction of the seed policy making process 
Sectoral agencies usually draft policy documents to be enacted by the HoPRs. The 
way in which a responsible sectoral agency drafts a policy document depends on the 
nature of the policy document and the capacity of the agency. In addition to experts 
within the agency, donors are increasingly involved in drafting policies. Regardless 
of who and how a draft policy is prepared, the respective sectoral agency is 
responsible for its content. The agency approves the draft and passes it to the Prime 
Minister’s office, to be endorsed by the CoM, and experts in the Prime Minister’s 
office review the document prior to its endorsement. Because of separation of power, 
the endorsed draft is sent to the HoPRs. To evaluate a draft document and come up 
with a recommendation, the HoPRs commonly directs a draft document to a 
parliamentary standing committee of a specific sector. Finally, the HoPRs enacts the 
policy document based on the recommendation of the standing committee. 
Throughout the entire approval process, the state agency, the CoM, and the HoPRs 
have to make sure that the draft does not conflict with the constitution, or with other 
policies that the country has ratified, including international laws (Alemu 2015). 
To understand the specific case of seed policy making, this study reconstructs the 
process from the beginning until the enactment of the policy that took place over the 
four-year period (2008-2013). As a sectoral agency, the MoA initiated and 
coordinated the process from its inception in the latter part of 2008 until the draft 
policy was submitted to the Prime Minister’s office towards the end of 2012. The 
whole process involved three rounds of drafting, with two drafts produced in each 
round. This section narrates the process of seed policy making in terms of the rounds 
and the arenas, focusing on variety registration and seed sector governance. The 
ministry initiated the first round by organizing a team of experts from the MoA, the 
Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research, the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE), 
the Institute of Biodiversity Conservation, and the Ethiopian Standards Authority. 
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These are public organizations that have a stake in the seed sector at the federal level. 
Being in charge of the seed sector regulation, the APHRD represented the ministry 
and guided the drafting process throughout.  
The expert team formed by the ministry produced the first draft (draft-1), mainly 
based on their experience in the seed sector and through reviewing the existing 
documents. The APHRD did not organize a stakeholders’ consultation in this round 
(informant 4, 5, 76). With regards to variety registration, the drafting team and the 
APHRD did not agree. During the drafting process, major emphasis was placed on 
food crops, whilst the issue of export crops (horticulture in particular) was not 
considered. As indicated by the former manager of the Ethiopian Horticulture 
Producer Exporters Association (EHPEA), for many experts, seed policy only 
concerns itself with smallholder agriculture. As a result, the issue of the export 
market is generally not considered (informant 34). The team strongly felt that in 
order to ‘protect smallholder agriculture’ from any risk related to the introduction 
of new varieties, all varieties need to be evaluated before registration10. Major risks 
expected were the introduction of new pests to the country and a risk of low yield 
(informant 4). The APHRD touched upon the issue by suggesting that the drafting 
team give the ministry an opportunity to allow the importation of some varieties 
without registration to encourage private sector investment in Ethiopia. Although 
the expert team did not fully agree with the idea of the APHRD, the team created an 
apparent ‘loophole’ in the draft by indicating that the exemption of any variety 
would be decided through ministerial directives in the future. The idea of the expert 
team was to minimize requirements for registration, rather than exempting from 
registration as suggested by the APHRD (informant 4).  
In the case of seed sector governance, the team suggested establishing two offices: 
one for variety registration and the other for seed quality control at national level. 
The proposal to establish a variety registration office was actually already under 
discussion in the ministry (informant 39; MoA/FAO 2008). In 2009, when the 
Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) commissioned a study on the formal seed 
system, there was a general understanding that the variety registration office would 
be established (AGP 2009). The team submitted draft-1 in February 2009 to the 
APHRD indicating that the draft was mainly technical and needed to be reviewed 
by legal experts in the ministry or Prime Minister’s office (informant 4, 5, 7). Before 
officially sending the draft to the Prime Minister’s office, the ministry sent the 
                                                 
10 Registration of new varieties is beyond inclusion in the national list. The varieties have to be 
evaluated through field trials before being registered. 
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document informally to experts in the Prime Minister’s office to obtain their 
comments (informant 39).  
Before obtaining comments from the experts, the ministry began a second round of 
drafting, as they wanted to ensure the law would allow Ethiopia to trade 
internationally (informant 14). An event that triggered this idea was the confiscation 
of Ethiopian flowers at Schiphol airport, in the Netherlands, at the end of 200811. The 
confiscation resulted from the failure of the Ethiopian exporter to complete the 
payment of royalties for intellectual property rights, and this was partly because 
Ethiopia had not implemented plant variety protection. This led to a discussion 
between the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Addis Ababa and the 
MoA on the subject of seed policy and intellectual property rights. The embassy 
presented different options to overcome problems related to the international trade 
of agricultural commodities (informant 3, 39)12. Furthermore, there was an ongoing 
request from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to 
harmonize seed policy across eastern and southern African countries to facilitate 
easier regional trade. The Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in 
Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA), together with COMESA, aims to foster the 
harmonization of seed policies in the region. Ethiopia is also interested in working 
towards this direction (Alemu 2011). Thus, the ministry realized that it was 
necessary to accommodate the issue of international markets in the process of 
revising the 2000 seed law. The ministry approached the Dutch Embassy in Addis 
Ababa and requested their support in drafting the new seed law (informant 3, 39). 
Moreover, the ministry also requested support from the International Development 
Law Organization (IDLO), which had been supporting the ministry in the livestock 
sector. Both IDLO and the embassy accepted the invitation and hired consultants to 
draft the seed law.  
Just before the start of the second round, the ministry received a revised draft (draft-
2) from the experts in the Prime Minister’s office; the comments made by the experts 
were important for the subsequent drafting. In the revised draft, the proposal to 
establish new offices for variety registration and quality control, and the loophole 
exempting varieties from registration were excluded. Although the comments were 
informal, their input was substantial and the APHRD advised the team of 
                                                 
11 See, for example, http://ip4all.com/increasing-number-of-illegal-flowers-are-expected-to-
enter-the-eu/ (accessed 30 May 2017). 
12 Since 2006, the Dutch Embassy has been supporting the seed sector in Ethiopia; Dutch 
companies are also involved in the horticultural sector. 
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consultants to follow the revised version, reflecting the power of the experts in the 
Prime Minister’s office (IDLO 2010). 
The second round of drafting took place during January and February 2010. In this 
round, the external consultants held discussions with a wide range of stakeholders 
in the seed sector. In the case of variety registration, the horticultural companies and 
their supporters (the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency and the EHPEA) 
were major actors. The challenges raised by companies and their supporters 
included the lack of appropriate varieties in the country for the export market and 
the lengthy process involved in registering imported varieties, which is not in 
keeping with the fast-changing demand for horticultural products (informant 34). 
Their interest in participating in the seed policy making process is to make sure that 
the new policy enables them to import seed easily. International companies in 
particular have little patience for lengthy procedures, and they often choose to work 
with other countries where they can more easily register and use their varieties. 
However, the government does not want to lose this investment opportunity 
(informant 33). Accordingly, the consultants proposed to exempt ‘export-only 
varieties’13 from registration, in opposition to draft-2.  
In the case of seed sector governance, the main issue is concerned with the 
deterioration of seed quality and poor coordination of activities in the seed sector. 
Similar to draft-1, but at odds with draft-2, the consultants recommended the 
establishment of a national office for seed sector governance, based on their 
discussions with different stakeholders. Parallel to the discussions with 
stakeholders, there were continuous consultations back and forth between the 
ministry and the consultants to make sure that the draft included the concerns of the 
ministry (informant 2, 14). The consultancy team produced the next draft (draft-3), 
and when submitting this draft to the ministry, the team requested the ministry to 
organize a stakeholders’ workshop to obtain more inputs (informant 1). Although 
the ministry did not support some of the issues, like establishing a national office for 
better coordinating activities in the seed sector, these unresolved issues remained on 
the table for discussion during the workshop.  
The workshop was organized in March 2010, and over the course of a long debate 
the issues of variety registration and seed sector governance became even more 
contentious (informant 2, 4, 33; IDLO 2010). With regards to the issue of governance, 
two camps of negotiators could be distinguished: the APHRD as the ministry 
                                                 
13 Export-only varieties are those varieties that are imported to be used as seed or planting 
material for which the product is fully exported.  
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representatives on the one side, and the experts from different offices and seed 
companies on the other. In the ministry, the idea of establishing an office for seed 
sector governance has been a discussion point for a long time. The APHRD was in 
favour of establishing a coordinating office and stimulated this idea in discussions 
within the ministry (informant 36). However, since the ministry officials were not in 
favour of establishing an office, the APHRD carefully positioned itself during the 
workshop, stating that the issue of establishing a new office should be left to the 
ministry (informant 14, 31). Experts and seed companies suggested that the main 
legislative document should at least indicate the general structure of seed sector 
governance. However, there was no room for the APHRD to negotiate, and thus an 
agreement could not be reached (informant 2, 14; IDLO 2010). Due to the firm stance 
of the ministry officials, the issue of establishing a national office remained an 
omission in the finalization of the draft following the workshop (informant 4, 11). 
In the case of exempting specific varieties from registration, the discussion was 
mainly between the EHPEA on the one side, and researchers and ministry experts 
on the other. Representatives from the EHPEA argued strongly that exemption 
would facilitate international trade and help to generate foreign currency. This is in 
line with the government policy of export promotion to generate foreign currency. 
An additional argument was that these varieties would only be used on company 
farmland, and would therefore not affect smallholder agriculture (informant 4, 14, 
34). Given the general policy that favours the export sector, the experts’ group could 
not strongly oppose the idea of exemption during the workshop. The consultants 
incorporated feedback from the workshop and, in consultation with the ministry, 
produced the next draft (draft-4) and submitted it to the ministry in April 2010. In 
this draft, the issue of establishing a national office was omitted, whilst the 
exemption of export-only varieties was included. Draft-4 was expected to be 
endorsed by the ministry and submitted to the Prime Minister’s office, but the draft 
was not submitted for more than a year. This is partly because 2010 was an election 
year and the seed law was not an urgent matter for the ministry officials (informant 
7). Moreover, following the election in May 2010, there were changes in the officials 
of the ministry, which also slowed down the policy making process. 
In December 2010, the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA)14 was 
established, and the seed sector was on its list of priorities. However, the MoA did 
not finalize the revision of the seed law, which could have been used to support the 
                                                 
14The ATA is a federal government agency that was established at the end of 2010 with the 
support of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to promote the development of 
agriculture in Ethiopia.  
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sector. Instead, the ATA was tasked with drafting the seed law. Therefore, the ATA 
initiated a third round of drafting in mid-2011. Initially, the ATA started from 
scratch, because it thought that not much progress had been made. However, the 
agency was informed that there had been progress and finally they decided to build 
upon draft-4 as the base of the final draft (informant 4). Only experts from the 
ministry, the ATA and researchers were involved in revising draft-4; ministry 
officials were consulted during the process, but there was no consultation with other 
stakeholders. Draft-4 was revised (draft 5) and presented at a workshop in October 
2011 (informant 5). The participants from the horticultural sector, who had earlier 
proposed the inclusion of an exemption clause, did not attend the workshop. 
Similarly, the Dutch Embassy, which works with the horticultural sector and was 
involved in the development of draft-3 and draft-4, learned at a very late stage that 
draft-4 had been withdrawn from the approval process, and they were not consulted 
during the revision of draft-4 (informant 33). The major participants in this 
workshop were experts from different government offices, and public and private 
seed companies, all of whom consider seed law mainly from the perspectives of 
smallholder farmers.  
In the absence of actors from the horticultural sector in particular, the participants 
of the October 2011 workshop who had been against the exemption of varieties from 
the very beginning of the drafting process, excluded that option from the draft. One 
major reason was a perceived risk of unregistered varieties ending up in the hands 
of farmers. Presentations by experts, which dominated different discussions, cited 
incidences of farmers obtaining unregistered varieties (informant 33, 34). Although 
there was suggestions to find other means of controlling unregistered varieties from 
ending up in the hands of farmers, the ministry officials preferred to exclude 
automatic exemption for export-only varieties from the draft (informant 14, 33, 34). 
As a result, exempting varieties from registration was excluded from subsequent 
drafts, including the draft submitted to the Prime Minister’s office. 
During the third round, efforts were made by the ATA and experts to convince the 
ministry to accept the establishment of a national office to coordinate activities in the 
seed sector. For example, presentations were made to the ministry officials to 
illustrate the practices of other countries (informant 29). Similarly, the same 
experience was presented during a national workshop of seed sector development 
in 2011 organized by the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) 
(Dessalegne, Sahalu and Mekbib 2012). Moreover, during the seed law revision 
workshop in 2011, one of the arguments made by participants was that if a national 
office is established, it could be easily aligned with the regional seed regulatory 
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offices that were in the process of being established15. There was not much resistance 
from the APHRD during the workshop, but the idea was simply ignored during the 
editing of the document. As indicated by one of the informants, the ministry officials 
only indicated that this was something that the ministry could do if necessary, which 
did not convince other actors in the process. Instead, the ministry rejected the 
proposal, because they ultimately had the power to decide (informant 31). Draft-6 
was finalized with the consent of the ministry officials. In this final draft, the issue 
of exempting varieties from registration was not included; neither was the provision 
to establish an office. The draft law was submitted to the Prime Minister’s office 
during the second half of 2012, accompanied by a letter summarizing the objectives 
of the draft and how the draft was developed, and highlighting major changes 
compared to the 2000 seed law. However, this letter did not include the perspectives 
of different stakeholders concerning the different policy options discussed during 
the preparation of the draft (informant 40). In the CoM, no major changes were 
proposed, as the draft also complied with the initial comments made by experts from 
the Prime Minister’s office.  
The draft was presented to the HoPRs in November 2012, and was passed to the 
ASC who evaluated the draft for its relevance. The ASC then organized a separate 
discussion with the ministry in December 2012 to have a better understanding of the 
objectives and the content of the draft. The purpose was to understand the objectives 
of the draft and to build consensus between the ministry and the committee. As 
indicated by one ASC member, the common ground for both the executive and the 
legislature is the policy and strategy set by the ruling party (informant 38). The 
discussion between the committee and the ministry was thus to make sure that the 
draft reflected this common policy. As noted by a parliamentary member, such 
discussions between the ASC and the ministry are usually in line with the 
discussions conducted between the ministry and the CoM (informant 35). The ASC 
also decided to conduct a public hearing session, to check if any issue had been left 
out, before passing the draft to the HoPRs for final endorsement (ASC 2012). The 
public hearing was open to the public, but participation was limited mainly to a 
representation of different governmental offices as well as the private sector, 
including the EHPEA. In the public hearing, the ministry was expected to clarify 
questions raised by the participants, and the issue of variety registration and seed 
sector governance were again the major focus of the discussion.  
                                                 
15 By this time, regional states were discussing the establishment of seed regulatory bodies, and 
discussions in Oromia regional state were at an advanced stage. 
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In the case of variety registration, EHPEA questioned why the issue of exemption 
had been excluded, also indicating that it had been discussed in different fora, and 
had been agreed upon in earlier drafts (ASC 2012). For EHPEA, which had not been 
involved in the previous negotiations in the third round, the omission of the 
exemption of ‘export-only varieties’ was unexpected. From the ministry’s side, the 
overall direction was registering all varieties, but it recognized the fact that capacity 
to provide the service was limited. As such, one informant acknowledged that the 
ministry had decided beforehand that if participants raised strong objections to the 
idea of registering all varieties during the public hearing, they would accept the 
exemption (informant 14). As soon as the EHPEA raised an objection, the ministry 
indicated that the case of export-only varieties would be dealt with separately. It was 
also pointed out that it would not be mandatory to register export-only varieties, 
referring to the existing directive, which the ministry released to allow the 
companies to import unregistered varieties before the revision of the seed law had 
begun (informant 7; ASC 2012). This was eventually indicated in the endorsed seed 
law under Article 17(2), which indicates that the ministry will issue a separate 
directive regarding the importation of unregistered varieties for exceptional cases 
(HoPRs 2013). 
Similarly, the issue of seed sector governance was raised by those participants who 
had previously proposed the establishment of a national office. However, it was 
concluded by the state minister that this issue should not be part of the seed law and 
presented to the HoPRs. If necessary, the ministry can establish the office despite its 
exclusion from the seed law (ASC 2012). As indicated by one of the ASC members, 
the issue of the national office was not included in the justification that the ministry 
presented along with the draft law. The ministry limited the purpose of the law to 
creating a clear demarcation of responsibilities between regional and federal 
governments; specifying the quality control systems for different seed types; 
establishing standards for emergency seed; and establishing integrated seed 
production planning (informant 35, 36; ASC 2012). When the draft law was 
submitted to the Prime Minister’s office, these objectives were listed in the official 
letter accompanying the draft. Since the ministry did not include the issue of 
establishing a national office in the objectives, the standing committee considered 
the issue to be outside the scope of the draft. As indicated by one of the senior experts 
in the ministry, even if the ASC accepted the idea of including a national office, in 
practice they cannot include it in the draft without the consent of the ministry. This 
is because, the ASC assumes that the ministry prepared the policy document based 
on the existing problem (informant 38). Thus, although theoretically the ASC has the 
right to make changes, they did not attempt to include the issue of establishing a 
Seed for Change 
29 
 
national office, as the ministry had not accepted the suggestion of the participants 
during the public hearing (informant 7). Taking into consideration all the reviews 
and suggestions, the ASC updated the document and requested the ministry to 
provide its final comments on the edited version, which the ministry then endorsed 
without contest. The standing committee presented the revised draft and their 
positive recommendation to the HoPRs, and in January 2013 it was endorsed as 
proclamation No. 782/2013, and officially gazetted in February 2013 (HoPRs 2013).  
2.5 Policy arenas and actors shaping seed policy making 
In this section, the process of seed policy making in Ethiopia is analysed according 
to how policy actors and associated arenas influenced the process of developing seed 
law and its outcome based on the results presented in section three. Different policy 
arenas are analysed to understand how they provide opportunities to generate 
alternative policy options, and the power of individual actors in influencing the 
ultimate policy decision-making is then discussed.  
2.5.1 Policy arenas and policy output 
As indicated by Mayer, van Daalen and Bots (2013), arenas determine the extent to 
which actors have access to and influence over the policy making process. The main 
focus of the arena in the first round was on the experts developing the document, 
regardless of the opinions of other actors in the seed sector. In addition to the experts 
who drafted the policy, the ministry consulted experts from the Prime Minister’s 
office to obtain comments before formally submitting the draft. There was no 
attempt to consult stakeholders about their perceived problems and solutions. As a 
result, the experts produced a draft document based only upon their knowledge and 
perspectives.  
The needs to accommodate international markets dominated the second round of 
drafting the seed law, which made it important to adjust the arenas accordingly. 
Although the setup of the arenas was still with the experts developing the document, 
international consultants led the process instead of national experts. However, the 
consultants, who did not have in-depth knowledge about the Ethiopian seed sector, 
wanted to consult different actors in the seed sector, thereby altering the setup of the 
arenas. This gave stakeholders the chance to express their ideas and perspectives in 
the drafting process. Although it was not the original intention, by holding a 
workshop to stimulate more stakeholder discussions, the arenas expanded not only 
in terms of number and types of actors involved, but also the dynamics of their 
interaction. The workshop created an opportunity for discussions and negotiations 
among actors with different perspectives.  
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The aim of the third round was to finalize and approve the draft. In order to prepare 
the final draft for submission to the ministry and the CoM, the arenas for finalizing 
the draft policy – i.e. revising the document and holding the workshop – were 
dominated by the MoA, regional bureaus of agriculture (BoAs), research institutes, 
the ATA, and seed companies. The domination of these actors in these arenas meant 
that the issue of exempting export-only varieties could be ignored, while the issue 
of seed sector governance could be brought back to the table. The CoM decision-
making arena was an internal discussion among experts in the Prime Minister’s 
office, members of the council and the ministry following the development of the 
draft policy. The final draft of the new seed law easily obtained the approval of the 
CoM: the experts in Prime Minister’s office had commented on draft-1, and the final 
draft (draft-6) was largely in accordance with their comments four years back.    
Before the HoPRs approves a draft policy, it has to pass through another important 
arena – evaluation by the standing committee. This arena comprises two rooms: the 
first is for the introduction of the draft document to the standing committee, and the 
second is for the public hearing. In the first room, the standing committee identifies 
any unclear issues, and requests the ministry to clarify. The purpose is to make sure 
that the committee understands why the ministry has proposed the policy, and to 
clarify any doubts that the committee may have. In fact, this room is where 
agreement between the standing committee and sectoral agency (in this case, the 
MoA) should be reached, and only if necessary is a public hearing called for. Public 
hearings organized by standing committees are open to anyone who wants to 
participate, and provide the last opportunity for different actors to express their 
views. In the case of seed law, the participants were limited to representatives of 
government offices, seed companies and the EHPEA. This arena provided the 
chance for actors to raise the issues of exempting ‘export-only varieties’ and 
establishing a national office, which were omitted in the preparation of the final draft 
by the ministry. However, the public hearing arena helped to get the exemption 
clause back into the new Ethiopian seed law.  
Informally, the scope of the standing committee’s evaluation of the draft is limited 
to maintaining the objectives set in the draft document, and identifying 
contradictions with any other policy or legal document. This is because the standing 
committee assumes that the executive has set the objectives based on the problems 
faced, and follows the policy direction of the ruling party. Comments are only 
considered if they help attain the objectives indicated in the draft, or if they concern 
potential contradictions with existing policy documents. However, the objectives in 
the draft are what the ministry intends to target, which may not necessarily address 
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all the challenges in the sector. This then limits the potential of the public hearing to 
a discussion of issues within the objectives of the draft, and contradictions with other 
policy documents. The two issues focused upon in this chapter – variety registration 
and seed sector governance – are good examples of this challenge. Although both 
issues were contentious throughout the whole discussion leading up to the public 
hearing, the state minister accepted the argument of exempting ‘export-only 
varieties’, because rejecting it would contradict the existing policy of supporting 
agricultural exports. Conversely, the ministry rejected the idea of establishing a 
national office, as it did not contradict any existing policy and the ministry did not 
consider it to be a problem that limited the seed sector. Whilst the existence of 
different arenas has created an opportunity for actors to put their policy options on 
the table, the informal institutions that give the power to the ministry in the critical 
arenas has limited the potential contribution of the arenas to policy making. 
2.5.2 The policy actors and their influence 
Different policy actors, with different interests, aims and perspectives, took part in 
the policy making process. These actors included executive officials and experts 
inside and outside the ministry, the EHPEA, seed companies, the APHRD and the 
HoPRs. The different policy options and configuration of actors reflected the role of 
actors in the process. During this policy process, it was observed that some issues 
attracted the interest of some actors but not others. While the issue of seed sector 
governance was the concern of seed companies, it was not the case for the EHPEA. 
The opposite was true concerning the exemption of ‘export-only varieties’ from 
registration. This is because the seed companies and the EHPEA have different 
objectives to attain. The EHPEA is not in seed business, but they are users of seed of 
imported varieties, and they want to import seed easily. In the case of seed sector 
governance, the debate took place between the executive, on the one side, and the 
experts and seed companies on the other. This debate was a domestic governance 
issue, concerned with how to make sure that the seed sector operates more 
efficiently. The malfunctioning of the seed sector after 2004 was partly the reason 
behind the initial push towards revising the 2000 seed law. As a result, the experts 
and seed companies strongly argued for the establishment of a national office, but 
both had little power to influence decisively the final policy decision. Despite some 
decision-making power, the APHRD did not strongly support the idea, as they knew 
the ministry officials were not in favour of it. In the end, the ministry officials did 
not agree with the establishment of a national office, showing the exclusive power 
of the ministry in making decisions.  
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Regarding the issue of variety registration, the experts inside and outside the 
ministry, and the EHPEA were the only two groups of actors that were negotiating 
on this topic, each with an opposing perspective on the policy, thereby making 
variety registration a contentious issue. Experts mainly see the issue of seed in 
relation to the smallholder farmers that dominate Ethiopian agriculture. For this 
group, the export sector is of minor importance and does not merit special privilege. 
However, the import of varieties without registration may pose ‘risks’ to 
smallholder agriculture, and the experts could also lose the possibility to oversee the 
import process in general. The experts dominated the process of drafting the new 
seed law, and therefore most drafts excluded the issue of exemption, except the first 
draft in which the APHRD asked the experts to include the issue, and the third draft, 
which involved external consultants. For actors from the horticultural sector, the 
export of horticultural products is in line with the government policy of export 
promotion, and they strongly pushed for the idea of exempting ‘export-only 
varieties’ from registration. Given the general policy privilege granted to the export 
sector, the ministry officials could not but accept the idea of exempting ‘export-only 
varieties’ from registration, as raised by the EHPEA during the public hearing. 
Regardless of the technical and administrative reasons behind the actors’ arguments, 
the configuration of policy actors differed for the two issues concerned. In the case 
of variety exemption, the major points of conflict were between the experts who 
wanted to control the system and the companies who did not want to be controlled. 
The horticultural companies had to play their political card – export promotion – to 
win the political interest of the officials that hold the actual decision-making power. 
In the case of seed sector governance, although the experts and the seed companies 
were aligned, their power of influence was not strong enough to convince the 
officials. As a bureaucratic department within the ministry, the APHRD, has a vested 
interest in the management of the seed sector at national level. This is also because 
experts in the APHRD are loosely connected to the activities in the regions, and they 
are interested in controlling the sector. However, this is not the direction of the 
ministry officials, and the APHRD had at times to play an internal mediatory role 
between the experts and the ministry officials. Yet, in the discussions outside the 
ministry, the APHRD only presented the position of the ministry officials, in order 
to be politically correct.  
The standing committee plays critical role in getting the HoPRs to reach a decision. 
The role of the standing committee is to provide recommendation to the HoPRs by 
carefully analysing the draft, inviting independent experts for consultation when 
necessary.  Unfortunately, the standing committee assessed the draft policy based 
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on the information from the MoA and the legal experts who support the HoPRs. 
Consequently, the standing committee only saw the perspectives of the ministry and 
did not consider the views of other stakeholders or any other independent body. 
This prevented the standing committee from evaluating the draft from different 
perspectives. The standing committee relied heavily on the ministry partly because 
of the shared policy direction of the ruling party.  
2.6 Discussion 
As indicated above, the new actors and associated arenas have contributed to the 
emergence of policy options from the perspectives of actors that took part in the 
process. While this is a positive step forward, the opportunity was not fully utilized 
in the Ethiopian policy making process mainly for two reasons. In the first place, the 
different arenas are not systematically linked to one another, and secondly, the 
separation of power between the executive and the legislature is blurred, with the 
executive dominating the policy making process. In the following sub-sections, the 
argument is elaborated in more detail.  
2.6.1 The loosely connected arenas 
Different arenas were used in developing and enacting the seed law. Some of the 
arenas focused on drafting, which also involved negotiations between actors with 
differing perspectives. During the second round for instance, there were clear 
differences among participants as to how the policy options for both variety 
registration and seed sector governance should be formulated. While participants 
from research institutions, experts in the ministry and seed company representatives 
argued for the establishment of a national office, the ministry, represented by the 
APHRD, argued that such a decision should be left to the ministry. The second 
round was concluded without coming to an agreement as to how to structure the 
governance of the seed sector. Similarly, in the case of variety registration, there was 
a difference of opinion between experts from the ministry and researchers on one 
side, and the EHPEA on the other side. This difference could be observed vividly in 
the third round, when the decision made in the second round was changed in the 
absence of the EHPEA. The differences in opinion were not resolved in either case. 
The CoM is where the policy document is practically approved: none of the 
documents submitted to the HoPRs have been rejected since the establishment of the 
parliament (Alemu 2015). Formally, the draft is sent from the ministry to the Prime 
Minister’s office, accompanied by a letter. However, the letter from the MoA does 
not explain the debates and the perspectives of different stakeholders, in terms of 
policy options and why the option in the draft has been chosen. Rather it presents 
the perspective of the ministry, and the ministry frames the problem and the 
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solutions included in the draft document based on its own perspective. For the CoM, 
what the ministry presents is sufficient, and the perspectives of other actors are not 
considered. Similarly, when the approved document was passed to the HoPRs, only 
a summary letter was written, which did not indicate any debate among actors. 
Thus, the critical decision-making arenas, the processes in the CoM and the HoPRs, 
were detached from the arenas where reflection and discussion on policy options 
among actors took place. In Article 50(8) of HoPRs regulation 3/2006, requirements 
for submitting draft laws are listed, but this list does not include information about 
prior negotiations (HoPRs 2006). This suggests that the HoPRs believe that there is 
no need to share discussions held in the earlier consultations. As will be discussed 
later, the policy formulation is based on the policy and strategy of the ruling party, 
which are shared equally by the legislature and the executive. Thus, the CoM and 
HoPRs accept the preceding decision neglecting any other idea that might have 
emerged in the process.  
2.6.2 The blurred separation of power 
The above analysis shows that although the actors and arenas influenced the process 
of policy making, the final policy decision remained firmly in the hands of the 
executive, which strongly resembles former regimes in Ethiopia. Two decades have 
passed since the constitution separated the powers of the executive and the 
legislature, and yet it is not clear from the outset why policy decision-making 
ultimately remains in the hands of the executive. This requires a close look at how 
the two are structured, and the extent of separation of power in policy making. One 
party dominates the Ethiopian HoPRs, and during the period of 2010-2015, 99.6% of 
members of the HoPRs were from the incumbent political party or its allies. 
Likewise, the executive is composed of ruling party members selected by the ruling 
party from among the HoPRs members. This is important for the ruling party to 
control both the executive and the legislative wings of government (Lefort 2013). 
Moreover, the party reserves executive positions for more capable and experienced 
members of the HoPRs, and thus they develop policies. The less experienced 
members remain in the HoPRs to evaluate and enact the draft policies (Abebe 2005). 
Such disparity in capacity between the ordinary members of the HoPRs who enact 
policies, and members of the executive who draft policies, increases the dependency 
of the legislature on the executive. Furthermore, compared to the ordinary members 
of the HoPRs, members of the executive are at a higher political position in the party, 
which is important for controlling junior members in the HoPRs. Abebe (2005) in his 
earlier research on policy making processes in Ethiopia also noted a heavy 
dependence of members of the legislature on the executive:  
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Having seen no difference between party and the executive leadership, some ruling 
party members of the HoPR have bestowed enormous trust on the executive, in 
terms of the capability to articulate policies and the competence to implement them. 
They are very strongly and candidly of the view that not only they have no objections 
to the executive presiding over or prevailing on the entire policy making process, 
but there is also nothing wrong for the executive to command an overwhelming 
influence, for many of the persons in the executive are members of the HoPR 
representing their positions. They further contended that officials in the executive 
are also in the political leadership (or are party leaders); thus, they are in a better 
position than the legislature to be able to articulate and forge policies along party 
lines (Abebe 2005: p. 218).  
Such dependency limits the role of the HoPRs in legitimizing the policy developed 
by the executive. Alemu (2015) noted that the executive proposed 100% of the bills 
during the government’s fourth term (2010-2013), and the HoPRs endorsed them all. 
The fact that all the policies were proposed by the executive, and that all were 
endorsed, shows the undisputed power of the executive in the policy making 
process. A decade after Abebe’s observations about the domination of the executive, 
and almost two decades after the instalment of parliament as the legislative body, 
the power of the executive in policy making remains the same. Alemu (2015) also 
confirms this in his recent research about policy making practices and challenges of 
the HoPRs:  
All of the responses of the MPs explicate that the reason they hold up to initiate law 
is, for one thing, they understand that the task of the legislature is to promulgate the 
policies proposed by the executive and to oversee their implementation; they rather 
mull over themselves only to approve detailed legislation/law than as formulators. 
Secondly, they believe the ability of the MPs’ is not as such competent compared 
with the executive to propose well-informed policy ideas (Alemu 2015: p. 148). 
Our findings suggest that the separation of power between the executive and the 
legislature in Ethiopia is orchestrated by the ruling party under which this 
separation has evolved as a mere division of activities within the government. The 
ruling party has assigned more power to the executive, making it difficult for the 
legislature to play a pro-active and meaningful role in the process. More 
importantly, the ordinary members of the legislature have accepted the supremacy 
of the party and the executive in terms of policy making, limiting their roles to just 
approving the policies designed by the executive (Alemu 2015). Such obedience is 
very much linked to the democratic centralism of the party system and the blurred 
boundaries between the executive and the ruling party. This centralism promotes 
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accountability to the party instead of to the legislative that is supposed to play a 
direct role in policy making (Aalen 2006; Lefort 2013). As such, the introduction of a 
formal government structure that separates power between the executive and the 
legislature does not define the policy making process in Ethiopia. In the Ethiopian 
context, the party system provides the underlying rules and values of formal 
structures in the policy making process. In principle, the executive has only the 
leverage to propose a policy option. In reality, the executive has much more power, 
and can enact policy options regardless of their acceptance by other actors. 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 3.  
Unpacking the paradox of governance 
solutions for seed quality in Ethiopia 
 
 
Abstract  
This chapter addresses one of the most controversial issues that arose during the revision of 
the 2000 Ethiopian seed law: the governance of the seed sector to improve seed quality. 
Whereas all actors agreed that seed quality is one of the major problems, divergent views 
existed on the main causes of the problem and its solution. The central question addressed in 
this chapter is how different actors framed the causes for, and solutions to, the problem, and 
how differences between the opposing frames might be explained. In this study, two opposing 
frames have been identified: the decentralization frame and the centralization frame. The 
chapter provides a two-layered explanation of the outcome of the policy making process: lack 
of reflexivity and deliberation in policy making, and structural features of the political 
regime. By doing so this chapter unpacks the paradox of governance solutions for seed 
quality.   
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3.1 Introduction 
Following the overthrow of the socialist regime in 1991, the Ethiopian government 
adopted a multitude of policies to guide the change from a centralized government 
to a federal state, and from a planned economy to a market economy. In 1991, the 
government created regional states that were constitutionally established in 1995. 
As indicated in Article 52(2b) of the constitution, the regional states are accorded the 
power to formulate and execute social and economic development policies, 
strategies and plans of the state (HoPRs 1995). In 1992, the government developed 
the agricultural development-led industrialization (ADLI) strategy. Several five-
year economic development and poverty reduction plans followed. Given its key 
role in economic growth, agriculture remains high on the priority list of economic 
policies and strategies (Teshome 2006). 
Ethiopia experienced high economic growth, albeit from a low base, averaging 
10.9% per year from 2004/05 to 2012/13, and this is high compared to the 5.3%  
average of sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2014). However, the government feels 
that there are still steps to be taken to improve agriculture, as development goals 
have not yet been reached (Spielman, Mekonnen and Alemu 2013). The government 
considers the development of the seed sector as a critical step to increasing 
agricultural productivity and food security. This has resulted in a series of 
programmes, laws and regulations directed at improving different dimensions of 
the seed sector. 
In 1992, the general seed policy was drafted; in 1997, the seed regulation was issued; 
and in 2000, the seed proclamation was declared (HoPRs 1997; HoPRs 2000). These 
policy documents emphasize the importance of improving seed quality, and provide 
the legal basis for ensuring this is achieved. However, full implementation of these 
policies is lacking partly due to the changing institutional setup. In 1993, a sector-
specific agency, the National Seed Industry Agency (NSIA), was launched to govern 
the seed sector. In 2003, the agency was merged with the National Fertilizer Industry 
Agency (NFIA) to form the National Agricultural Input Authority (NAIA); in 2004, 
this authority was dissolved and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) took over the 
governance of the seed sector. Though the government placed more emphasis on 
increasing seed production by setting various ambitious goals, the supply of seed is 
far from hitting the targets. During the period 2005-2008, the supply of maize and 
wheat seed, the major crops in formal seed production, was 47% and 26% of the 
planned level, respectively (Alemu and Tripp 2010). In 2009/10, the supply of maize 
seed comprised only 50% of the demand, showing a considerable gap between 
planned and actual seed production (Atilaw and Korbu 2012).  
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The shift in attention towards seed production, and the changing organizational 
structure governing the seed sector, also exacerbated the problem of seed quality. 
As a result, low quality seed, which is below the standard set for certification in 
terms of germination, moisture, and physical and genetic purity, has been 
distributed to farmers by seed producers, particularly since 2004 (AGP 2009; Alemu 
2011; Bishaw, Sahlu and Simane 2008; IDLO 2010; Sahlu 2012). Seed quality remains 
to this day one of the major problems of the seed sector. Seed quality is affected not 
only by the regulatory standards, but also by how these standards are implemented 
and governed, which needs to be specified in a policy. To overcome the seed quality 
problem and other challenges in the seed sector, the seed proclamation of 2000 was 
revised in 2013. However, not all actors working in the seed sector warmly 
applauded its release. This discontent did not just appear after the launch of the new 
seed law, but was prominent during preparations of various drafts of the new seed 
law. This chapter concerns one of the most controversial issues of the seed law: the 
governance of seed quality. The two central questions of this chapter are: how have 
different actors framed different governance solutions to the problem of seed quality; and how 
can these different frames and the decision-making on the governance of seed quality be 
explained? 
To address these questions, this chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
(3.2) explains why and how the analysis of frames can be helpful for understanding 
policy making processes. This is followed by a briefing on the methods of data 
generation and analysis (3.3). The challenges of the Ethiopian formal seed system, as 
linked to seed quality governance, are then revisited (3.4), followed by a discussion 
on how different actors have framed governance solutions to the problem of seed 
quality, and how these frames were used and challenged in the process of revising 
the 2000 seed law (3.5). A two-layered explanation of the nature and persistence of 
frames is presented to unpack the paradox of governance solutions for seed quality 
in Ethiopia (3.6). With this, the chapter concludes its contribution to a better 
understanding of the complex relationships between policy making and politics in 
Ethiopia as integral parts of governance issues (3.7).    
3.2 Frames and framing 
Frame analysis can help to analyse how actors involved in the policy making process 
use language to mobilize key stakeholders to win support for a course of action 
(Fletcher 2009). The use of language to win support links frame analysis to discourse 
theory, which in turn is based upon a social-constructivist epistemology that rejects 
the notion of universal truth and is sceptical about concepts such as objectivity, proof 
and knowledge (ibid). The concept of frame and associated framing processes has 
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thus drawn the attention of scholars in several areas of social sciences, including the 
study of public policy (White 2013). 
This chapter considers problem statements that are used to justify public policies not 
as something that exists as a fact that one has to discover, but rather as social 
constructions (Coburn 2006). Thus, the process of policy making can be 
characterized as a ‘wicked problem’ in which the finding and formulation of the 
problem is the problem (Head and Alford 2013; Rittel and Webber 1973). It all 
depends on how actors perceive a circumstance and frame that as a problem. In the 
process of framing, guided by value judgements, some aspects of a perceived reality 
are considered undesired and selected to be a problem. Then, some particular causes 
and effect are constructed to explain how a selected solution will solve the problem 
(Entman 2003).  
Whereas the framing of a solution can very much reflect the framing of a problem, 
their relationship is not self-evident. It is very common that during policy making 
processes different solutions are proposed to address a problem. The process of 
formulating solutions can refer to another typical characteristic of wicked problems, 
which is that every problem may be a symptom of a higher level or deeper problem. 
This means that different solutions to a shared problem may not simply reflect 
different ways to tackle this problem, but different ways to address a higher-level or 
deeper problem.  
Though frames are often not officially or explicitly referred to during complex and 
dynamic processes of policy making, they provide a structured narrative and 
discursive tool that can help to legitimize certain policy measures or governance 
solutions, and delegitimize and neglect others (Laws and Rein 2003). The way in 
which a particular policy problem is structured not only creates rationales that 
authorize some policy solutions and not others (Benford and Snow 2000), but also 
assigns responsibility (Schneider and Ingram 1993). At the same time, frames are 
often contested and challenged during policy making processes, possibly leading to 
the adjustment of a frame or the emergence of a counter frame (Hall 1993; Park, Daly 
and Guerra 2013). A frame can be used to control negotiations with particular actors, 
but also to evoke and restructure negotiations, possibly inviting new actors. 
However, this very much depends on the reflexivity and the extent to which the 
policy process is deliberative. Reflexivity refers to the ability to reconsider one’s 
frame and to appreciate different frames that are emerging in a policy making 
process. Similarly, deliberation focuses on the style and nature of problem solving 
through communication and collective consideration of relevant issues (Fineberg 
and Stern 1996). 
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3.3 Data generation and analysis 
Empirical data used in this study are based on semi-structured interviews with 40 
informants who were involved in the process of revising the 2000 seed law, as well 
as a desk study of documents related to the Ethiopian seed policy making process 
between 2008 and 2013. The interviewees include experts in government and non-
government offices, managers of seed companies, researchers, consultants, and 
members of parliament. Some of these actors were interviewed more than once. The 
semi-structured interviews focused on two related sets of issues: first, the perceived 
problems and solutions for the seed sector in general, and seed quality in particular; 
and second, negotiations to reach to the final policy document. In addition, different 
written documents, including reports and minutes of meetings, were used to analyse 
the policy making process. These interviews and written documents were used to 
reconstruct frames on governance solutions to address the problem of seed quality. 
All the interviews were transcribed and uploaded to Atlas.ti for analysis.  
Keeley and Scoones (2000) used discourse analysis to show how actors frame 
different problems and solutions in agriculture in Ethiopia. They indicated that 
discourses and frames are established through strong networks of actors, which 
ultimately guided policies in agricultural intensification and the environment in 
Ethiopia (ibid). Here, the concept of frame is used to show how actors define the 
cause of seed quality problems and governance solutions. Considering frame as a 
social construction that refers to a shared reasoning of actors, the languages that 
actors employ, consciously or unconsciously as a strategy to influence the outcome 
of the process, were analysed (Schön and Rein 1994; Weick 1995). These languages, 
consisting of rhetoric and storylines give meaning to the problem of and solution to 
seed quality in Ethiopia. Following Hardy, Lawrence and Grant (2005), interview 
transcripts that had rhetoric, sequentially linked in a particular context, were 
identified and coded in all the transcribed texts as a primary code, and any further 
explanations were used as a note attached to the primary codes. Since actors do not 
declare their expression as a frame, this is an interpretive frame analysis of 
transcriptions of interviews (Vink 2015). These primary codes with all their notes 
were grouped and regrouped into families, which helped to bring all primary codes 
with a similar context together. The regrouping continued by dropping less frequent 
rhetoric and by maintaining more frequent ones. Moreover, different reports were 
also cross-checked for the existence of these frames. Reflecting on the notion that 
frames can change and be changed, whether and how different actors adapted their 
frames during the policy making process were analysed. The different quotations 
linked to the primary codes and notes were further analysed to understand why 
actors use a particular frame to describe the problem of and solution to seed quality.  
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3.4 The challenges of seed quality governance in Ethiopia 
Over the last five decades, the Ethiopian formal seed system has passed through 
different types of governance systems. To better explain the development of the 
formal seed system and seed quality governance, the duration can be divided into 
three relatively homogeneous periods: before 1992, 1992-2004, and after 2004. The 
first is the period in which formal seed production began. Although there were some 
seed production activities with the establishment of the agricultural research system 
in 1960s, large-scale formal seed production started in 1979 with the establishment 
of the Ethiopian Seed Corporation. The Ethiopian Seed Corporation produced seed 
for state farms, and towards the 1990s the supply of seed was also extended to 
farmer producers’ cooperatives16. During the first period, the Ethiopian Seed 
Corporation was part of, and produced seed exclusively for, the state farms. There 
was no external regulation for seed production in this period.  
The beginning of the second period was marked by the establishment of a new 
political regime geared towards federalism and market economy. During the second 
period (1992-2004), the government laid the regulatory foundation for the formal 
seed system. In 1992, the first seed policy was drafted, which emphasized the 
coordination and regulation of the seed sector. Moreover, the Ethiopian Seed 
Corporation was reorganized to operate independently of the state farms as the 
Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE) in 1992, and it started catering for small farmers. 
In 1993, the government established the NSIA to govern the seed sector. The 
government enacted the first seed regulation in 1997, and replaced this regulation in 
2000 with seed law. The law was more comprehensive and clarified roles and 
responsibilities of the various actors in the seed sector. In this period, seed 
production increased because of a nationwide extension programme that began in 
1995, and which reached 3.8 million demonstration plots in 2000 (Spielman et al. 
2010). The extension programme triggered more seed demand, which led, for 
instance, to an increase in the production of seed by the ESE from 13.6 thousand 
tonnes in 1995 to 25.3 thousand tonnes in 2002 (AGP 2009). In addition, the 
government also initiated the Farmer-Based Seed Production and Marketing Scheme 
(FBSPMS) in 1997, and by 2001 seed production under this scheme had reached 14.8 
thousand tonnes (Sahlu 2012). Regardless of the expansion of seed production, there 
was no external seed quality control until early 2003/4 when the NSIA established 
                                                 
16 In this thesis, unless specified, the term ‘cooperative’ refers to a multipurpose association of 
farmers that is organized and registered by the government through a cooperative promotion 
agency; its business mainly involves supplying inputs required by farmers, and marketing 
agricultural products. 
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ten laboratories (Sahlu 2012). As such, seed sold by the ESE was not externally 
certified before this (McGuire 2005). In 2003, the NSIA was combined with the NFIA 
to form the NAIA. This authority took on the responsibility of governing both seed 
and fertilizer, but was dissolved by proclamation 380/2004, and all the roles and 
responsibilities of the authority were transferred to the MoA.  
The third period is characterized by increased seed production to satisfy the demand 
of the nationwide extension programme, and the start of external certification of 
seed. During the beginning of this period, almost all seed produced was for the 
agricultural extension programme (McGuire 2005). The increased seed demand 
forced the government to reinitiate the FBSPMS in 2004, which had been halted in 
2001, producing about 27 thousand tonnes in 2007, and about 17 thousand tonnes in 
2008 (AGP 2009). Moreover, in 2008 and 2009, the regional governments established 
three more public seed enterprises. As a result, the amount of certified seed 
produced by public seed enterprises increased from about 25.3 thousand tonnes in 
2002 to over 62.9 thousand tonnes in 2012 (ATA 2013). Furthermore, the number of 
private seed companies increased during this time from only one company in 2003 
to more than 30 in 2010. In the ministry, few experts were responsible for 
coordinating the seed sector. Moreover, the established laboratories and their 
coordination were transferred to the regional bureaus of agriculture, weakening the 
link between the ministry and the laboratories. 
The increased seed production and weak governance structure resulted in poor seed 
quality. Several studies and reports on the seed sector in Ethiopia conclude that the 
quality of seed supplied to farmers has deteriorated (AGP 2009; Alemu and Tripp 
2010; Bishaw 2008; IDLO 2010; Sahlu 2012). A 2010 report by IDLO clearly noted the 
difference between the actual quality of seed and the label. The report stated 
‘although all commercial seed in Ethiopia is labelled as certified, there is a 
disjuncture between certification and the actual quality for the majority of seed’ 
(IDLO 2010: p. 4).  
A study report on the formal seed system by the Agricultural Growth Program 
(AGP) described a similar situation, indicating that only a small proportion of seed 
supplied through the formal seed system is inspected as required to label it as 
certified (AGP 2009). Others also concluded that the major reason behind poor seed 
quality was related to the fact that although a policy already existed on paper, it had 
not been implemented properly (Alemu and Tripp 2010). However, different actors 
have different perceptions of the cause of the problem. The following section 
describes how different actors frame the causes of and solutions to the problem of 
poor seed quality in Ethiopia.  
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3.5 Frames and negotiating frames 
3.5.1 Frames of causes of the seed quality problem 
This study reveals two different frames that were utilized to explain the main causes 
of the seed quality problem during the process of revising the Seed Proclamation 
206/2000: the decentralization frame and the centralization frame. The 
decentralization frame is used by ministry officials, and the centralization frame is 
used by bureaucrats17, researchers, experts and the private sector, among other 
actors in the Ethiopian seed sector. Both frames share the same problem that seed 
quality has deteriorated in Ethiopia, but they differ on the causes of the problem and 
subsequent solutions. The users of the centralization frame focus on the lack of 
national level coordination of the seed sector as the major reason behind poor seed 
quality. Their proposed solution was the creation of a central coordination structure, 
details of which they sought to integrate into the new seed proclamation. The 
decentralization frame is an opposing frame that argues that the poor seed quality 
was caused by not implementing the decentralization policy of the government. The 
solution for the seed quality problem according to this frame is to formalize the 
division of responsibilities and fine tune the existing seed proclamation to the 
general process of decentralization. In the following sections, the details of both 
frames are presented. 
The centralization frame  
The users of this frame compare the ‘strong’ centralized seed governance system of 
the period 1993 – 2004 with the period that followed. They believe that a lack of 
coordination of the seed sector has affected seed quality. One seed company 
manager, for instance, attributed the deterioration of seed quality to the low 
emphasis placed on seed quality control by the government, and subsequently 
proposed the establishment of a centralized governance structure that will ensure 
seed quality. 
Now there is no owner for the seed sector. No one governs the seed sector. Because 
of this, quality of seed is declining. Those who work now [in the ministry and in the 
laboratories] are poorly staffed and facility is poor and thus, if we want to give 
                                                 
17 In this thesis, the term ‘bureaucrats’ refers to directors or department heads and section 
heads in the ministry or regional bureaus of agriculture, while ‘government officials’ refers to 
representatives of the government at different levels, including ministers, state ministers and 
regional bureau heads.  
Seed for Change 
45 
 
C
h
a
p
te
r 
3
 
attention to seed, a structure should be in place that is responsible for the overall 
governance of the seed sector (informant 11). 
The informant regarded the absence of coordination at national level and the poor 
service provision at lower level as the main reasons for poor seed quality. Some 
informants indicated that laboratories were lacking capacity by stating ‘it was just 
dead, and nobody was there’ (informant 5). When the regions made an inventory of 
the number of staff needed to fully capacitate the laboratories in 2012/13, the 
existing staff comprised only 22% and 17% of optimum requirements in Amhara and 
Oromia regional states respectively (ABoA 2013). The lack of capacity of the 
laboratories to provide adequate seed inspection services is explained as a 
consequence of the lack of coordination of the seed sector in general.   
One important feature of this frame is the use of the term ‘owner’ to question the 
existence and extent to which the coordinating system takes full responsibility. This 
is very much linked to the changes made to seed sector governance in 2004. From 
1993 to 2003, the NSIA (as the agency mandated to coordinate seed), and in 2003/04, 
the NAIA (as the authority mandated to coordinate seed and fertilizer), were 
responsible for the overall governance of the seed sector. According to the users of 
this frame, the seed sector was strong and well organized during this period. 
Through regulation 380/2004, the government dissolved the NAIA and transferred 
seed sector governance to the MoA, and the ministry decided to decentralize the 
governance of seed laboratories to the regions. Moreover, the other components of 
the seed sector (variety release and registration, seed production and marketing), 
remained at national level but were divided among two different directorates in the 
ministry. Users of the centralization frame consider this arrangement as unsuitable 
for providing the necessary services, and recommended the establishment of an 
alternative system of coordination: 
In case of seed, we have been talking for long to establish an independent body. The 
current arrangement is not suitable to get services. If there is an issue on seed, where 
will you go? ..... For seed issue, there is no focal point. You call it section, unit, 
whatever, there is nothing. We always raise this issue, but the government always 
says what is wrong with the current structure (informant 9). 
According to this informant, the suggestion to establish an independent body to 
coordinate the seed sector is not a new idea; however, the government is not 
convinced that the current arrangement does not work.  
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Although the ministry transferred the coordination of the laboratories to the regional 
states in 2004, the regions were not ready to take on this role. As one informant 
stated, ‘the laboratories were just given [to the regions]’ (informant 5), indicating 
that the transfer was not planned. For users of the centralization frame, seed sector 
coordination was neither established at the ministry level nor at the regional state 
levels after the NAIA was abolished. In the process of transferring some of the 
NAIA’s role from the ministry to the regions, the coordination system was 
overlooked. For instance, one informant who was in one of the laboratories during 
this period described the lack of planning and the challenges involved in the transfer 
process as follows:  
Because this is a sudden assignment [the transfer of the laboratories to the regional 
states], it was difficult for the regional bureau of agriculture to fit the laboratories 
into the existing structure of the bureau. Everyone [in the bureau] says we are not 
responsible for laboratory issues and we [the laboratory staff] suffered a lot. The 
regional bureau of agriculture was not prepared in advance and they didn’t know 
the work load of the laboratories and its complexity. As a result, they couldn’t 
support the laboratories with logistics and budget (informant 25). 
Thus, the laboratories did not receive proper attention from the government and 
lacked the necessary resources and capacity to ensure seed quality (informant 5, 14, 
25, 30). The solution for this problem as presented by this frame is to create an 
independent structure at national level, which would coordinate the seed sector and 
provide the necessary resources to ensure seed quality. 
The decentralization frame  
As described above, the NAIA was dissolved and the coordination of the seed sector 
became the ministry’s responsibility. However, according to one senior expert in the 
ministry, the ministry foresaw the difficulty of inspecting seed production with 
existing manpower in the ministry and, therefore, decentralized this role to the 
regions (informant 7). Although the management of the laboratories was 
decentralized to the regional states, this was not legalized, and there was no clear 
demarcation of roles and responsibilities between the ministry and the regional 
bureau of agriculture with respect to seed quality assurance. In late 2008, the 
ministry decided to start the process of revising Seed Proclamation 206/2000, and 
from the ministry side this was to demarcate the roles and formalize the 
decentralization. 
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The decision to revise the seed proclamation was further supported by the 
observation amongst officials that the proclamation no longer matched ‘the current 
developments of the country’ (informant 14). In 2000, when seed proclamation 
206/2000 was developed, regional states were not considered strong enough to 
assume all responsibilities as anticipated in the constitution that established the 
federal system in Ethiopia. As a result, no specific role regarding seed was given to 
the regional states in Seed Proclamation 206/2000. Since the establishment of the 
regional states in 1995, the regions gained experience and assumed more roles, and 
thus the ministry concluded that the role of quality assurance could be transferred 
to the regions. Given the increased strength of the regions and the fact that the 
ministry had already transferred the coordination of the laboratories to the regions, 
the 2000 seed law was considered outdated. The ministry had drawn experts from 
different government offices to draft a new proclamation in late 2008. The ministry 
explained to the drafting team that they needed to align the seed proclamation to 
the current development of the country. One of the experts who was in this team 
explained: 
[The ministry representative said] you [the drafting team] are all from the seed 
system and you know the problems of the seed sector. You have to see [the revision 
of the proclamation] in terms of government direction, and the current proclamation 
does not go with the government decentralization system. First, the federal system 
is now organized and the seed proclamation has to be fine-tuned to this development 
(informant 4). 
This idea was explained again by representatives of the ministry18 during the March 
2010 workshop that discussed the draft seed proclamation, and again by one of the 
state ministers of the MoA19 during the public hearing organized by the parliament’s 
ASC in 2012:  
When the floor is given [to the state minister] to give briefing, [the state minister 
said] under current stage of development of the country, the existing proclamation 
has to be changed..... The existing proclamation does not show clearly the relation 
between the federal and regional states. With this proclamation [referring to the 
revised draft], the roles and responsibilities are clearly demarcated.... (ASC, 21 
December 2012).  
                                                 
18 The director of the APHRD represents the ministry during the discussion about the drafts, 
with different actors and in different workshops.   
19 In Ethiopia, usually there is more than one state minister accountable to the minister in a 
given ministry. For instance, during the study there were four state ministers in the MoA. 
Chapter 3: Unpacking the paradox of governance solution 
48 
 
The public hearing took place towards the end of the revision process, four years 
after the process had been initiated. The original idea of the ministry, which was 
passed onto the drafting team, was indeed maintained throughout the whole 
revision process. The ministry officials wanted to make sure that the new law would 
be aligned to the federal structure, with roles and responsibilities clearly demarcated 
between the federal and regional states.  
3.5.2 The process of negotiating frames 
In the process of policy deliberation, where frames are contested and negotiated, 
actors may choose to reframe in an attempt to influence the course and outcome of 
the policy process. In this section, the process of negotiating the revision of the seed 
proclamation in Ethiopia is described. The users of both frames made some attempts 
to adjust their proposed solution to the seed quality problem in order to make it 
more acceptable to users of the opposing frame. However, the space for deliberation 
was narrow as the dominant frames were not openly reflected upon, and the 
willingness to negotiate towards alternative policy options was very limited.  
The drafting team of experts supported the idea of establishing an independent body 
responsible for seed sector governance. Though the ministry informed the drafting 
team beforehand that one of the major interests of the government is 
decentralization, the team proposed the establishment of an independent body at 
national level. However, the proposal of the team was rejected when experts in the 
office of the Prime Minister reviewed the draft, as indicated by one of the members 
of the drafting team: 
We [the initial team of experts involved in drafting the proclamation] were informed 
[by the Ministry of Agriculture] that there is feedback on the draft that we have 
submitted. We have seen the comment and it is far from what we have done. I think 
they [the government] have their own way of thinking since it deviates a lot from 
what we thought. The view that the government has a different perspective became 
clear now. Our major focus was on establishing an independent body. We thought 
about one window for the seed sector (informant 4). 
The drafting team, after realizing the difference, searched for a way to convince the 
ministry to create a structure to coordinate the seed sector. However, the ministry 
rejected the idea, partly because it felt that the proposal would not be in line with 
the government’s reform programme of business process re-engineering (BPR):   
We [the drafting team] told the ministry that the seed administration is the critical 
gap and we suggested a national forum to discuss on our proposal [creating an 
independent body]. Because our proposal was not in line with BPR, the ministry did 
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not agree. ... They said it is not possible to organize the seed sector independently..... 
We said, let us organize a national forum and let the stakeholders decide whether 
establishing an independent body is useful or not. If they [stakeholders] do say so, 
we have to include it in our proposal (informant 4). 
BPR is a national reform programme that started in 2003. BPR is considered by the 
government as a major vehicle to overcome the structural problem of providing 
efficient services in government offices. The BPR mainly focused on reducing 
lengthy processes of service delivery, and aimed to merge different departments and 
sections. The transfer of responsibilities from the NAIA to the MoA in 2004, and the 
minimum number of staff working on seed after the transfer, was considered to be 
in line with this reform programme. Therefore, the proposal of the centralization 
frame users to establish an independent body at the national level to coordinate the 
seed sector was considered to go against the reform programme and was not 
accepted by the ministry. 
Moreover, while no technical justification for the termination of the NAIA had ever 
been provided, the proposal to establish an independent unit was indirectly a 
request to reinstate the NAIA. The head of the NAIA found out that his institution 
was being dissolved only when the decision20 had already been made public 
(informant 37). None of the other informants, including those in the ministry, could 
or would explain the reasons why the NAIA had been dissolved. Below, one 
informant shares his experience:  
I remember once I asked the same [why the NAIA was dissolved] to the state minister 
and the state minister said ‘Yes, many raise the same question to me. Government 
analysed and decided this is good. Why you raise this? What is wrong [with the 
current structure]? We [the government] are doing a better job. ...... The 
government does what the government believes is right.’ I remember one of the state 
ministers said like that. He was very much disappointed by my question (informant 
9). 
In this case, the state minister did not explain why the NAIA had been dissolved but 
simply emphasized that the government has the authority to do what the 
government believes is right. The users of the centralization frame came to 
understand that due to a lack of political will, there was little chance that their plan 
to introduce a new organization similar to the NAIA would be accepted. According 
to another informant, there was no doubt about the importance of having an 
                                                 
20 Proclamation 380/2004. 
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independent body, but since there had been no justification for dissolving the NAIA, 
it would be difficult for the MoA to justify the establishment of a new structure with 
a similar mandate: 
The big challenge [of the seed sector] is the organizational setup. ....... With respect 
to the organizational setup, there is no political will to reinstate an organization that 
was abolished. Everybody believes in the first place the three [seed marketing, variety 
release and quality control] should be organized as one. But they [the ministry] 
abolished the agency and it was difficult to reinstate it (informant 13). 
Peculiarly, experts in the ministry also agreed to the need of having a separate 
organization to govern the seed sector (informant 15). The team responsible for 
drafting the new seed proclamation also included experts from the ministry, and 
they supported the idea of establishing a centralized governance structure to 
coordinate the seed sector. However, according to some informants, these experts 
could not officially or publicly sympathize with this view (informant 7, 31). 
In response to repeated calls to establish an independent body to coordinate the seed 
sector, ministry representatives suggested to include an article in the proclamation 
that would give the ministry the responsibility to define how the seed sector would 
be governed in the future (informant 4). Similarly, the users of the centralization 
frame started to propose different ideas, which included having a coordinating unit 
under the ministry, regardless of its status as indicated by one informant: “It does 
not matter whether it is an independent agency or within the ministry or something 
else, but someone has to coordinate the seed sector” (informant 13). In a presentation 
made at a national workshop on seed sector development in 2011, Gorfu et al. (2012) 
proposed the establishment of a seed inspection system at least to the level of the 
seed agency that used to govern the seed sector, with some levels of decentralization. 
Although it was hoped that these proposals would narrow the gap between the two 
frames, differences still remained on how to include the new proposal in the 
proclamation. While the ministry representatives proposed to only indicate that the 
ministry would decide how the seed sector would be governed in the future, the 
centralization frame users were not sure if the ministry would eventually establish 
such a structure, and voiced their opposition by saying: “no, this is not possible... we 
don’t leave that [the decision as to how the seed sector will be governed in the future] 
open” (informant 4). Instead, the users of the centralization frame wanted to specify 
the coordinating structure in the proclamation, to make sure that the ministry would 
establish it. As the users of the centralization frame were not able to agree with the 
proposal of the ministry representatives, they requested the ministry representative 
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to leave the final decision to the officials (informant 11). This strategy was explained 
by one of the drafting team members as: 
Since the ministry gave us the responsibility [to draft the seed proclamation], we 
have to suggest an efficient and effective institutional setup. We have to say this is 
the way the seed sector is governed in the world, and recommend what is good for 
Ethiopia. If they [the ministry officials] do not agree, they can cancel it, but you [the 
representatives] do not have the right to cancel our proposal (informant 4). 
When the proposal was eventually taken to the minister, however, users of the 
centralization frame got a negative response, as described by one informant:  
When it was taken to the minister, the minister said you take this idea out. When 
we asked why, the minster indicated that establishing such office is the authority of 
the ministry, and therefore it should not be included in the law (informant 15).  
According to the minister, the ministry already had the authority to establish such 
an office, and so it should not be included in the proclamation to be approved by the 
parliament. Furthermore, during a public hearing, the state minister also indicated 
that if it is necessary to establish a different organization, it will be treated separately 
from the proclamation:   
Although the seed quality inspection is done at both federal and regional levels, there 
was no time when we did not have the problem of seed quality. ..... Thus, it is difficult 
to say the ministry alone will handle all the seed farms and laboratories. At the same 
times, establishing branches [offices under the ministry] is not economical. Thus, it 
is important to link the quality inspection issue to the regions. ..... With respect to 
who will oversee the regions, under the existing condition, it is the ministry. If the 
question is to establish a different structure for this purpose, this will be an 
organizational issue to be treated differently (ASC, 21 December 2012). 
So, the state minister neither accepted the idea of establishing an independent body 
at national level, as supported by the users of the centralization frame, nor did he 
accept the counterproposal made by ministry representatives to include a provision 
in the new proclamation that would authorize the ministry to specify how the seed 
sector will be governed. Instead, he emphasized that it would be impossible to do 
either of these because of procedural reasons. However, one informant from the ASC 
of the parliament indicated that the structure of the seed sector could be part of the 
seed proclamation if it was included in the objectives of the draft (informant 34). So, 
the state minister’s rejection of the proposals of both the users of the centralization 
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frame and the ministry representatives, on the basis of procedural reasons, was 
probably merely an act of non-deliberation.  
3.6 Analysis 
A two-layered explanation can be used to describe the nature and persistence of the 
two frames. The first layer concerns the limitation of deliberation and reflexivity in 
policy making processes in Ethiopia. Whereas an analysis of this layer can explain 
the persistence of the two frames, it does not explain their nature, which forms the 
second layer and presents a paradox embedded in the two frames – namely that 
those holding power, and who are usually criticized for centralizing power, argue 
for decentralization, while those not holding power urge for centralization. A key 
organizing principle of policy making in contemporary Ethiopia is analysed in order 
to unpack this paradox.  
3.6.1 Lack of reflexivity and deliberation in policy making 
An analysis of the process of negotiating the revision of the 2000 seed proclamation 
shows that no consensus could be reached about the governance solution for the 
problem of seed quality. The users of the decentralization frame and the 
centralization frame were unable to convince each other of their rationale, and did 
not change their definition of the main cause and solution to the problem. The 
following characteristics of the negotiation process and actors involved explain why 
consensus could not be reached, and why the two frames were persistent. All these 
characteristics suggest limited deliberative policy making and reflexivity.  
Deliberation combines different forms of argumentation and communication, such 
as exchanging observations and viewpoints, weighing and balancing arguments, 
offering reflections and associations, and putting facts into a contextual perspective. 
The term ‘deliberation’ implies equality among the participants, the need to justify 
and argue for all types of claims, and an orientation towards mutual understanding 
and learning (Dryzek 1994; Habermas 1987). However, in this policy process very 
few opportunities were created for deliberative policy making involving the 
minister and state ministers, as well as actors working in the seed sector. Most of the 
discussions held during the revision process were organized between 
representatives of the ministry and other actors. The final and actual decision-
makers (minister and state minsters of the MoA) do not usually participate in such 
meetings; and if they do, this is to open a discussion and to give directions. More 
importantly, they do not organize opportunities to deliberate on issues that need 
further discussion.  
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Furthermore, the minister and state minister seemed reluctant to openly discuss 
their policy position, or reflect on alternative governance options. The rationale 
behind the direction set by the minster is not always clear to those who represent 
the ministry. For instance, the state minister finally explained that establishing a 
separate coordinating structure for the seed sector cannot be part of the seed 
proclamation because of procedural reasons. Instead, this should be done through a 
separate proclamation if necessary. Regardless of whether the justification provided 
by the state minister is right or wrong, during the four years of discussions, the 
representatives of the ministry did not mention this procedural reason. In fact, this 
was only made clear to experts in the MoA when they were preparing to submit the 
document to the CoM and the stakeholders during the public hearing at the end of 
the revision process.  
While the representatives were only presenting the position of the ministry, based 
on the information available to them, the state minister barely defended or explained 
the ministry’s strong preference for decentralization. The ministry set its preferred 
policy option in the beginning and maintained that position till the end. This process 
of only presenting and promoting its own policy position highlights the non-
deliberative nature of the policy making process in Ethiopia.  
Moreover, the process of policy making was not reflexive. Termeer et al. (2013) 
define reflexivity as “the capability to appreciate and deal with unstructured 
problems and multiple realities” (p. 6), which also includes one’s willingness to take 
a step back. Hendriks and Grin (2007) also indicate that to be reflexive is the capacity 
to turn or bend back, which can be achieved by reconsidering one’s practices and 
frames when ideas and opinions are exchanged and discussed. Reflexivity 
encourages actors to “loosen their grip on the desire to control problems” (p. 334). 
The lack of reflexivity limited the possibility of redefining the cause of the problem 
and the subsequent solution. In the drafting process, the drafting team 
(centralization frame users) suggested the establishment of a governing body at 
national level, without convincing the ministry officials, which had already decided 
to go for decentralization. Similarly, the ministry officials disregarded the proposal 
of the drafting team without discussing it with the team, or understanding why the 
team suggested the establishment of a governing body at national level. Thus, both 
groups were not willing to understand each other’s perspectives, or to look for an 
alternative option if necessary.  
Similarly, the ministry was not prepared to look back over past decisions, like the 
termination of the NAIA, and there was a firm belief that what had been decided 
was simply the right thing to do, without giving further explanation. This is partly 
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because major decisions are made politically within a small circle making it difficult 
to reconsider such decisions. For instance, none of the informants, including those 
in the ministry, could explain why the NAIA had been dissolved, even though some 
of them are responsible for advising the ministry officials. Similarly, the head of the 
NAIA at that time was not aware that the authority was going to be dissolved, 
showing that the decision making was not open. In addition, the decision to 
implement the BPR programme was another decision that the ministry was not 
willing to reconsider. While the proposals made by users of the centralization frame 
implied a reconsideration of these past decisions, the ministry considered the 
decisions as final. This blocked the possibility of observing the alternative frame 
positively.  
These observations are further confirmed by previous studies on governance and 
policy making processes in Ethiopia. Keeley and Scoones (2000), for example, 
observed government inflexibility with regards to reconsidering its policy option 
regardless of any rational argument that may come from other actors. As further 
noted by Halderman (2005), the government resists any arguments that do not 
support the pre-set policy, regardless of who makes the arguments. According to 
Lefort (2013), all decisions have to be made according to party interests, indicating 
the challenge to change or reverse previous decisions. Similarly, Wolde (2005) 
concludes that in Ethiopia public policy represents the interests of power holders. 
While the observations made here on the lack of reflexivity and deliberation in policy 
making processes in Ethiopia are confirmed in the existing literature, they are not 
well explained; the second layer of the analysis elaborates on the nature of the 
frames. 
3.6.2 The paradox and unpacking the paradox 
Whereas the lack of reflexivity of both groups of actors, and the practice of political 
leaders to avoid deliberative policy making explain the persistence of the two 
frames, a paradox remains: those holding power, who are criticized for strongly 
centralizing power, want to be less in control, and those not holding power want the 
power holders to be more in control. The decentralization frame of the federal 
government also seems to go against the political history of the Ethiopian state. 
Following the creation of modern Ethiopia towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, Ethiopia was a highly centralized unitary state (Dickovick and Gebre-
Egziabher 2010; Halderman 2005; Tewfik 2010; Zimmermann-Steinhart and Bekele 
2012). In the following paragraph, we unpack this paradox by identifying factors 
that could be seen as higher-level or deeper problems in current policy making in 
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Ethiopia, and as processes that constrain deliberations and reflexivity on governance 
solutions for the seed quality problem. 
Although Ethiopia is home to more than 80 ethnic groups, former governments of 
Ethiopia neglected this diversity, and focused solely on promoting the concept of a 
homogenous Ethiopia until 1991 (Aalen 2006; Tewfik 2010; Zimmermann-Steinhart 
and Bekele 2012). As noted by Green (2011), “[i]n contrast to previous governments, 
the Zenawi regime has focused its efforts on promoting rather than neglecting 
ethnicity, as it created a system of ethnic federalism enshrined in its 1995 
constitution” (p. 1095). The introduction of ethnic-based federalism not only meant 
to transfer powers from the national to the regional level, but was also a political 
strategy of the current government to disparage the political ambitions of those 
promoting the concept of a ‘homogenous Ethiopia’. Not surprisingly, the new 
political principle evoked strong resistance from different actors: 
Opposition groups and many of the country’s intellectuals have vehemently opposed 
EPRDF [Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, the ruling party 
since 1991] plans to devolve powers to ethnically based administrations because of 
concerns that these moves would bring about the dismemberment of Ethiopia, 
although the front argued that such criticisms represent a rear-guard attempt to 
protect Amhara hegemony (Young 1998: p. 194). 
Young’s explanation clearly shows the power struggle between the past and the 
present. The government adopted a contrary argument, saying that recognizing 
ethnic diversity would safeguard the country from disintegration. To accommodate 
ethnic diversity, Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) established other ethnic-
based political parties and founded the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) at national level as a coalition party. As a founder, TPLF 
provided ideological direction and leadership for the coalition (ibid). Thus, a de facto 
one-party system was established at regional and national level, which meant that 
the party officially transferred powers to regional level but without losing control at 
both levels (Chanie 2007).  
The frames of decentralization and centralization as governance solutions for the 
shared problem of seed quality mirror the political debate on ethnic-based 
decentralization that has taken place since 1991, and the power struggle of 
bureaucrats to have decision-making power at national level. The decentralization 
frame has its deepest roots in the political strategy of the ruling party. As a result, it 
cannot be expected that political leaders will easily adopt the centralization frame in 
the policy making process of the seed sector. Likewise, the promotion of the 
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centralization frame by bureaucrats, researchers and the private sector is part of the 
general opposition to decentralization, but also has to be approached through 
another perspective. Beyond addressing the problem of seed quality, this promotion 
may also be interpreted as an interest to hold power in the sector at national level, 
as indicated by Dickovick and Gebre-Egziabher: 
Bureaucratic politics at the ministerial level is an additional complicating factor, 
with some (though not all) ministries and central government officials resisting or 
otherwise hindering the decentralization process. This can be both a political 
incentive to retain power in some circumstances and a lack of capacity in other 
circumstances (Dickovick and Gebre-Egziabher 2010: p. 19).  
As explained by Gebre-Egziabher, the interest to hold power is also related to 
guiding the sector in which the bureaucrats in the ministries have no control: 
While the decentralization program in Ethiopia has elaborated the powers and duties 
of the national and regional executive bodies and ministries and bureaus, there is 
little guidance outlining the functional relationship that needs to exist between 
regional bureaus and national sector ministries. The latter are expected to design 
national policies and strategies regarding their particular sector. However, the 
absence of functional integrations with the regional bureaus will deny them 
knowledge of the regional operations that are needed for appropriate policy and 
strategy designing (Gebre-Egziabher 1998: p. 41).  
The paradox can be further unpacked by reconsidering what the ruling party 
considers to be the role of the state in governing the country. According to Young 
(1998), “the EPRDF continues to see the state as the best means to pursue its 
programme and maintain a dominant position in the largely fragmented Ethiopian 
society” (pp. 200-201). Similarly, the late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, firmly 
believed that Ethiopia needed a “capable state to lead development” (de Waal 2013: 
p. 152). Our findings match these earlier observations that there is a strong belief 
that the government has its policy direction, and thus will only consider input from 
other actors when these are in line with the set policy direction. This is also what 
Chanyalew (2015) refers to as ‘Ethiopian indigenous policy’. Regardless of the strong 
interest to control power, which is in line with the history of the country, the 
government’s policy of only accepting ideas that fit in with the pre-existing policy is 
part of the paradox. The NAIA was dissolved, and the BPR policy is already being 
implemented, and neither are in line with the centralization frame. Thus, there has 
been little interest from the government to open up for discussion, or to reflect on 
alternative policy options.  
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3.7 Discussion 
To better understand the complex relationships between policy making and politics 
in Ethiopia as an integral part of governance issues, two different levels of analysis 
can be distinguished, each followed by a different perspective on changing policy 
making processes and their outcomes.  
The first level distinguishes how different actors frame and challenge governance 
solutions to a shared problem in a more or less limited span of time; for instance, 
covering the process of drafting a proclamation. In this study, such analysis has not 
only revealed two opposing frames, but also the characteristics or mechanisms of 
the policy making process that explain why different groups of actors working in or 
for the seed sector were unable to openly discuss and to possibly reconcile these two 
frames, or to identify a shared, third frame. The perspective on changing the policy 
making processes and their outcome, which can be linked to frame analysis of a 
policy making process, is to explore how reflexivity of different actors could be 
strengthened and how deliberative decision-making can be organized. As indicated 
by Schön and Rein (1994), reflexivity can help to appreciate different perspectives 
that emerge in the process of policy making, to continuously reconsider dominant 
and less dominant frames, and to bring about a redefinition of solutions. If not 
coupled with deliberative decision-making, policy making processes can hardly 
benefit from reflexivity of actors and newly emerging ideas. Making room for 
reflexivity and deliberative decision-making, however, requires actors to try to give 
up their beliefs about the ‘best’ governance solution at the beginning of a policy 
making process, and to accept that a solution will be found through deliberation 
with other actors.  
The second level is to identify and study the organizing principle of a political 
system, and the ruling party in particular, over the course of a period – longer than 
that of a policy making process. In our study, such analysis has led to the 
identification of ethnic-based decentralization or federalism that is not only the 
organizing principle of the current political system of Ethiopia, but also a 
characteristic of politics, which explains why the government has framed its 
governance solution to seed quality in terms of decentralization. Moreover, the 
belief that Ethiopia needs a strong government that leads development is in line with 
the centralization frame, but against the organizing principle. This has limited the 
government in its openness to external ideas. The centralization frame can be seen 
as an expression of an alternative policy option, which shares the need to have a 
strong government. These show that policy making in Ethiopia can be a very 
complicated if not impossible task, certainly when all the actors working for or in 
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the seed sector show little reflexivity and cannot develop solutions through a 
deliberative policy making process. Deliberation in seed policy making is important 
to optimize the outcome of the policy making process, but there is no guarantee that 
a deliberative process will end up with different policy options than what is 
currently selected. It all depends on how well the actors convince each other.  
It can be concluded that the combination of the two levels of analysis can contribute 
to a better understanding of policy making processes and their outcomes under the 
current political system in Ethiopia. As for the two perspectives on changing the 
policy making processes and their outcomes, I cannot recommend that political 
leaders, or other actors engaged in policy making processes, follow one perspective, 
or even combine them; this is what they have to find out themselves, hopefully 
through deliberation. 
  
 
 
Chapter 4.  
Organizing changes in the centrally managed 
seed market system through collaborative 
governance: piloting direct seed marketing in 
Ethiopia 
 
 
Abstract 
Over the last two decades, the seed market system in Ethiopia has been centralized by the 
government. The system is rooted in the notion of the ‘developmental state’ and reflects the 
government’s belief in centralized planning. However, seed sector stakeholders generally 
agree that the system is inefficient. To overcome its limitations, regional seed core groups 
introduced direct seed marketing (DSM) in 2011 as a pilot. By 2016, over a third of hybrid 
maize seed in three regional states of Ethiopia was being sold through DSM. The two 
questions addressed in this chapter are: How did the regional seed core groups introduce 
DSM from below in the top-down governance culture of Ethiopia? And how have they been 
able to expand DSM given competing discourses about seed marketing? The analysis 
revealed that the regional seed core groups provided a ‘safe’ space to discuss policy issues and 
empowered the bureaucrats to influence decision makers. The role of the Integrated Seed 
Sector Development (ISSD) project as an external actor was critical for introducing the ‘new’ 
idea. The positive results of the pilot coupled with strategic management of the process helped 
the expansion of the pilot to wider areas.   
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4.1 Introduction 
The government of Ethiopia has developed various seed-related policies to ensure 
that farmers get the right seed at the right place and time (Simane 2008). However, 
the seed sector has not adequately addressed the country’s increasing demand for 
seed where shortage of seed is often cited as a common phenomenon (Lakew and 
Alemu 2012). The government is strongly involved in the seed sector and uses 
central planning and a central distribution system to fairly distribute the available 
seed across the country (Alemu 2011). The centralized distribution system has 
resulted in inefficiency,  seed left over despite farmers' demands not being met, poor 
quality seed, lack of accountability, more work for government offices and 
consequently high associated costs (Alemu and Tripp 2010; Astatke et al. 2012; 
Atilaw and Korbu 2012; Lakew and Alemu 2012). The centralized distribution 
system is related to a top-down governance culture and the government’s 
development approach, which considers that government involvement in the 
economic sector as a precondition for economic development. The government’s 
developmental state approach favours centralized planning and implementation to 
guide economic development. The top-down governance culture and hegemonic 
thinking on centralized planning and distribution of seed do not favour seed 
marketing and other ideas for improvement emanating from below. On the contrary, 
it focuses on the top-down implementation of the distribution plan. When an idea 
not in line with the centrally planned activities is put forward, the government often 
labels it as ‘anti-development’, thus narrowing the room for discussing the 
suggestions that come from below (Fantini 2013; Gebresenbet 2014).  
Despite the top-down governance culture and hegemonic thinking on centralized 
seed distribution, in 2010, the Integrated Seed Sector Development (ISSD) project21 
established regional seed core groups in the regional states of Amhara, Oromia, 
SNNPR and Tigray22 to create space for discussion among seed sector actors. The 
seed core groups can be considered as a collaborative type of governance structure. 
The regional seed core groups addressed the seed market problem by introducing 
and piloting DSM in 2011 (Hassena and Joep 2012). Over the years, the area in which 
seed is sold through DSM has steadily increased (Astatke et al. 2015; Benson, 
                                                 
21ISSD is a project run by a consortium of five Ethiopian organizations (four universities and 
the Oromia Seed Enterprise) and the Centre for Development Innovation (CDI) of 
Wageningen University and Research (WUR), with the main objective of creating a vibrant 
and pluralistic seed sector in Ethiopia. 
22 Ethiopia is a federal state with nine regional states and two city administrations. Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray are considered as agriculturally important regional states of 
Ethiopia. 
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Spielman and Kasa 2014; Getahun et al. 2014; Nefo et al. 2015). Seed marketing data 
from Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR shows that in 2016, on average 36% of the hybrid 
maize seed in these regional states was sold through DSM. This chapter sets out to 
answer two research questions: how have the regional seed core groups introduced DSM 
from below in the top-down governance culture of Ethiopia; and how have they been able to 
expand DSM even though the hegemonic discourse on the developmental state does not 
favour liberal seed marketing?  
Below, the theoretical concept used to organize the data is introduced (4.2), followed 
by the sources of data and how the data were analysed (4.3). The seed marketing 
system is then presented in terms of the theoretical concepts introduced (4.4). A 
description is given of how the regional seed core groups introduced and expanded 
DSM alongside the centrally planned distribution system widely operational in 
Ethiopia (4.5). The result of the data analysis is then provided with the help of the 
aforementioned theoretical concepts (4.6). In conclusion, the major outcomes of the 
process are summarized by answering the research questions, and some gaps 
worthy of future research are identified (4.7). 
4.2 Transition and transition management 
System change is the reconfiguration of elements of the system that function, which 
is an evolutionary process (Geels 2002). Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt (2001) used 
multi-level perspective (MLP) on transition to show how the introduction of a new 
idea changes the system. The MLP presents a system model of three inter-connected 
levels – niche, regime and landscape – to represent a socio-technical system, and 
transition is seen as the result of the development of alignments between these 
multiple levels as shown in Figure 4-1 (Geels 2011; Geels and Schot 2007). “The term 
‘socio-technical’ is used to accommodate both the humans and non-humans that 
create functional configurations that work” (Geels and Schot 2010: p. 45). In MLP, a 
regime is a dominant operational system that in practice serves the societal need; it 
is a semi-stable system that can be changed. “It refers to the semi-coherent set of 
rules that orient and coordinate the activities of the social groups that reproduce the 
various elements of socio-technical systems” (Geels 2011: p. 27). The regime is not 
only limited to the practice of serving the societal need but also extends to its 
structure and actors within it (Geels and Schot 2010; Haxeltine et al. 2008). A niche is 
a flexible and fluid idea that emerges in the system and may have the potential to 
solve a societal problem. It is a deviation from the regime’s rules of the game (Geels 
2004). A landscape is an exogenous environment to a regime, but provides the 
context for stability or change of a regime (Fischer and Newig 2016; Geels and Schot 
2007; Geels and Schot 2010). These are the social, political, economic and natural 
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environments on which niche and regime actors have less influence, but nonetheless 
operate within. The landscape is a slow-changing societal process, but sometimes a 
sudden change occurs, directly affecting both the niche and the regime (Geels and 
Schot 2010).  
 
Figure 4-1. Multi-level perspective on transition 
Adapted from Geels and Schot (2007: p. 401) 
 
To satisfy a societal need, the concept of MLP suggests focusing on regime change. 
Based on this concept, regime change comes about either by niche development 
from below, transformational agendas imposed from the top, or the interactions 
between these levels (Fischer and Newig 2016; Geels and Schot 2010; Jørgensen 2012; 
Kivimaa and Kern 2016). Actors within the regime may start a niche activity by 
deviating from the regime’s rules of the game to transform a regime, but often 
internal initiations do not materialize (Garud and Gehman 2012; Geels 2011). 
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Instead, external actors are important to initiate and develop a niche that has a 
potential to change a regime (Ceschin 2013; Jørgensen 2012).  
As the niche grows, and especially when powerful actors take part, the niche 
achieves more legitimacy and its internal momentum increases (Geels 2012; Geels 
and Schot 2007). Such processes also lead to a recognizable niche-regime 
constellation or empowered niche (de Haan and Rotmans 2011; Haxeltine et al. 2008). 
However, when there is no pressure from the landscape, the regime “remains 
dynamically stable and will reproduce itself” (Geels and Schot 2007: p. 406). Thus, 
the MLP concept suggests that regime change happens when fruitful coupling 
develops among the three levels; the changes differ, depending on the timing and 
nature of the coupling (ibid).  
The MLP concept on transition discussed above focuses on how an innovation at 
niche level leads to change in the regime and also influences the landscape. 
However, the concept treats transition as a ‘quasi-static’ process, although it takes 
account of the change over time (de Haan and Rotmans 2011: p. 91). Regime change 
is not a simple move from one constellation to the other: there are reactions against 
the niche and interactions within the regime that lead to change. MLP does not 
explain how these changes happen and how the different processes are managed 
towards change. To explain these dynamics, the concept of transition management 
is used.  
Although studies in transition management are typically linked to technological 
innovations, recent studies have also used the concept of transition management to 
study system innovation, which is much broader than technological innovation. A 
system is a functioning interaction among actors and structures intended to 
contribute to a societal need (de Haan and Rotmans 2011; Rotmans and Loorbach 
2010). System innovation is a co-evolutionary process which involves changes in the 
different elements of a system in order to respond better to the societal need leading 
to system change (Geels 2005; Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt 2001). Linking this 
concept to the MLP concept discussed above, transition management is about 
changing a regime that does not adequately respond to a societal need through niche 
development. It is an attempt to influence change by resolving the persistent 
problem (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010). 
The role of transition management is to make sure that intermediate outputs lead to 
the long-term objective while managing a sensitive dynamic process in the system. 
In this process, actors have the power to speed up or slow down the process, and 
transition management is about knowing the capacity of actors and managing the 
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dynamics (Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt 2001). The entire process of transition 
management is an interaction between three levels of management that operates at 
strategic, tactical and operational levels (Kemp, Loorbach and Rotmans 2007). At the 
strategic level, the focus is on creating a transition arena, defining the problem and 
developing a vision. Creating a transition arena helps to establish a venue in which 
problems are discussed and solutions are proposed without being limited by actors’ 
organizational setup. It also helps to create access to political power to influence 
policy (Cohen and Naor 2013). The need to create access to political power indicates 
that transition arenas or collaborative governance structures are not independent; 
rather, they depend on the vertical government structure to attain their vision 
(Agranoff 2006; Carboni and Milward 2012; Resh, Siddiki and McConnell 2014). The 
creation of a transition arena establishes a foundation for tactical and operational 
level management.  
The tactical level includes developing networks, compiling an agenda and deciding 
on transition paths. The operational level is about operationalizing the transition 
paths, where actors experiment with an innovation and learn from it (Kemp, 
Loorbach and Rotmans 2007; Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt 2001). However, the 
three management levels are not a stepwise process instead a given management is 
used whenever necessary, and the result of one level of management will be fed into 
another to attain the target vision. Implementing incremental steps through these 
different levels of management together with the interaction between these levels is 
how transition management is expected to bring about radical change. This is 
because immediate radical change will trigger maximum resistance from the regime, 
and what should be changed at a given step is determined by the capacity of the 
actors to absorb change (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010; Werbeloff, Brown and 
Loorbach 2016).  
4.3 Data generation and analysis 
Empirical data to answer the above research questions were generated through 
interviews and document reviews. Interviews were conducted at national and 
regional levels in Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPR regional states, where piloting had 
been going on for at least four years by the time of the data collection in 2015. 
Interviewees were seed sector actors involved in the piloting activities, as well as 
national actors who have stakes in the seed sector. At the regional level, interviews 
were conducted with representatives of regional seed core groups, bureaus of 
agriculture (BoAs), the cooperative promotion agencies (CPAs), ISSD, the 
Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA), cooperative unions, and state-owned 
and private seed companies. At the national level, interviews were conducted with 
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experts and bureaucrats in the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) input Directorate, the 
AGP, the ATA, and the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research. In addition to 
the interviews, a desk study was done in order to understand the problems of seed 
marketing and the practice of DSM. Different reports of ISSD, the ATA and a 
discussion paper produced by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) on DSM, in particular, were reviewed.   
Interview data were transcribed and uploaded into Atlas.ti for analysis. The data 
were coded focusing on the main research question of how the regional seed core 
groups introduced and expanded DSM. All texts that describe the process and 
strategies used were coded depending on how they were expressed. New codes 
were included whenever new ideas and reasons emerged. These primary codes were 
grouped and regrouped into families to make a structured and detailed description 
of the process of introducing and expanding DSM using the quotations attached to 
the codes. The process of change was further analysed using the concept of MLP and 
transition management introduced above.  
4.4 The seed market system 
Since the MLP concept discussed above is a general concept, and the term ‘system’ 
can refer to different levels of conceptualization (Geels and Schot 2007), it is 
important to explain the existing seed market system and the different levels 
(landscape, regime and niche) in the system, before going into the process of 
organizing change in the seed market system. This helps to visualize how the seed 
marketing operates, providing a context for the process of change.  
4.4.1 The seed market landscape 
In the case of the seed market, the landscape is the economic development approach 
plus the political system that influences seed market practices. Ethiopia is a federal 
government with autonomous regional states that have the power and authority to 
formulate and implement economic policies within the framework of national 
policies (HoPRs 1995). However, Ethiopia still tends to be a unitary government and 
development activities are designed at the centre and implemented by the regional 
states. Although there are regional state-owned seed companies, and these are 
managed by the regions, the policies that apply to the seed sector are all federal. 
Economic policies in Ethiopia generally promote private sector development. 
However, the volume of seed supply in the seed sector is currently dominated by 
state-owned seed companies. Four state-owned seed companies dominate seed 
production in the formal seed system of Ethiopia. They produce 60-70% of hybrid 
maize and over 90% of non-hybrid seed (Alemu and Tripp 2010; Spielman, 
Mekonnen and Alemu 2013). The remaining seed is produced by about three dozen 
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private companies and a few cooperative unions. The private companies mainly 
produce hybrid maize.  
The Ethiopian government follows a developmental state political economy 
approach to support economic development. Agriculture remains the top priority 
sector, as more than three-quarters of the population derive their livelihood from 
agriculture, and it contributes about 40% of the real GDP (World Bank 2016). Since 
seed is a critical input in agriculture, the developmental state approach gives 
leverage for the government to decide on the seed market system for major food 
crops. Moreover, setting development targets is common practice in Ethiopia and 
executives at different levels are responsible for achieving these targets. These 
responsibilities give the executives the leverage to frequently intervene in the 
implementation of policies. Actors in the landscape are government officials at both 
regional and national levels, who have the power to set the seed market landscape. 
Landscape actors of particular importance for the seed market system are the 
minister and state ministers of the MoA at the national level, and the heads of the 
BoAs at the regional state level.  
4.4.2 The seed market regime 
The centrally managed system commonly referred to as seed distribution is the seed 
marketing regime. It encompasses the process of estimating seed demand and 
production, allocating seed, guaranteeing credit, facilitating transport of seed to the 
store, selling seed and collecting credit repayment (Figure 4-2). To be precise, the 
seed that is allocated and disbursed through the centralized system is not provided 
free to farmers. Rather the seed is sold to farmers through a centralized process of 
allocation and disbursement. Regardless of the existence of different seed producers, 
the supply of seed of the main food crops in Ethiopia is managed by the MoA at the 
national level and the BoA at the regional level. In recent years, the MoA has only 
been allocating seed produced by the ESE and Pioneer Hi-Bred. In the regions, in 
addition to the BoAs who lead the process, CPAs, zonal and district23 offices of 
agriculture, cooperative unions, and primary cooperatives are active players in this 
seed market regime. 
Given the federal structure, the regional BoAs play the dominant role in this process. 
They collect seed demand data through their official structure (from village to the 
region), beginning at least six months before planting time. The BoAs submit the 
seed demand data to the MoA to be used as a basis for seed allocation. At the same 
time, both the BoAs and the MoA compile data on the amount of seed produced in 
                                                 
23 ‘District’ refers to an administrative unit that comprises a cluster of villages. 
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the country. Based on the demand from the regional states and the amount of seed 
available, the MoA allocates the seed to the regional states. In turn, the BoAs allocate 
seed to zones and then to districts (Atilaw and Korbu 2012; Lakew and Alemu 2012). 
Information on the allocation of seed is given to the district office of agriculture and 
seed producers, so as to facilitate the disbursement. Once the allocation of seed for 
different crops and varieties for each district is known, the district office of 
agriculture designates a primary cooperative or union to collect seed from 
companies. The representative of the district collects the seed from the companies 
based on the allocation (informant 77). If cooperatives are not active in the district, 
the district office of agriculture itself collects the seed from the companies and sells 
to farmers.  
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Figure 4-2. The seed market regime in the Ethiopian formal seed system 
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of the district transport the seed to the local store. The seed is then sold to farmers 
either for cash or on credit, depending on the arrangements made by the regional 
government (Alemu and Tripp 2010; Astatke et al. 2012; Atilaw and Korbu 2012; 
Lakew and Alemu 2012). In recent years, seed has mainly been sold for cash to avoid 
credit default. In the case of credit, the cooperative/union and district 
administration are jointly responsible for collecting the loan and repaying the bank. 
If there is a default, the Ministry of Finance transfers the amount from the regional 
budget to the bank (Admasu and Paul 2010). Thus, even if the seed is physically 
handled by a limited number of actors, other actors are involved in the allocation, 
approval and facilitation processes, making the process longer and blurring the 
accountability of the actors involved. 
Seed price is decided by the four state-owned seed companies through consensus at 
a meeting held annually before the planting season. At this meeting, each company 
proposes a price for the varieties the company has produced; and the agreed price 
is reported to the MoA for endorsement. Since all seed producers except for one 
multinational company use the same public varieties, the price endorsed by the MoA 
applies to all (Benson, Spielman and Kasa 2014). Pioneer Hi-Bred, the only 
multinational company in Ethiopia, determines the price of its seed. 
4.4.3 The niche in the seed market system 
DSM, the niche in the seed market system currently being piloted, involves the 
producers themselves selling seed to farmers directly or through their agents. As 
shown in Figure 4-3, DSM is basically a streamlined version of the long process of 
the seed market regime presented in Figure 4-2. Compared with the seed marketing 
regime, fewer actors are involved in DSM and the process is shorter, since the seed 
producers take on the major role of seed marketing. Once the core group has decided 
on the pilot district, companies identify and use commission-based sales agents to 
sell seed in villages. The sales agents include both private business people and 
cooperatives. Although companies obtain an indication of seed demand of a specific 
district from the BoA, they calculate their own estimates in consultation with their 
sales agents and make supply decisions accordingly. The companies also take into 
account the amount of seed supplied to the villages by other companies.  
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Figure 4-3. DSM – the niche in the Ethiopian seed market system 
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4.5 Organization of changes in the seed market system 
For the seed sector stakeholders, the inefficiency of seed distribution is a persistent 
problem, but for a long time it was not possible to change this scenario. The advent 
of support from the Dutch government in 2008 to strengthen the seed sector of 
Ethiopia provided an opportunity for rethinking the development of the seed sector. 
With this support, a local seed business project was initiated in 2009, which was 
redesigned as ISSD at the end of 2011 (CDI 2011). The project established a regional 
seed core group in four regional states – Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray – 
through which some ‘new’ ideas, including DSM, were introduced to the seed sector.  
4.5.1 Establishment of regional seed core groups 
In 2009, ISSD started to support farmers’ cooperatives in producing and selling seed 
to the neighbouring farmers. However, different challenges limited the 
cooperatives’ ability to operate as intended. Some of the major problems included 
limited access to basic seed, no seed inspection services and problems in accessing 
markets (Thijssen et al. 2011). These problems required the attention of stakeholders, 
but creating a coalition of actors to deliberate on and solve systemic problems of the 
seed sector was not easy for the ISSD project. ISSD is hosted by four universities and 
one state-owned seed company in Ethiopia. Universities have limited authority to 
coordinate the stakeholders in the seed sector. Thus, ISSD had to work carefully, 
step by step, to gain legitimacy and to establish a collaborative type of governance 
structure. ISSD requested seed sector supporters at district level to support seed 
producer’s cooperatives. However, these district-level supporters indicated that 
solving most of the challenges was beyond their capacity and referred to the regional 
offices to solve the problems. In response, ISSD organized regional workshops in 
which seed sector supporters at district level presented the problems of the 
cooperatives in their district and indicated problems that were beyond their ability 
to solve. These problems were similar across the districts, and reflected systemic 
seed sector problems within and across regions (Hassena and van den Broek 2012). 
The regional authorities, the head offices of these district-level supporters, 
acknowledged that addressing these systemic challenges was indeed the 
responsibility of the regional offices. This acknowledgment opened the door for 
discussions on the strategy of solving the seed system challenges with the regional 
authorities mandated for this purpose.  
In mid-2010, ISSD established four regional teams, composed of major stakeholders, 
in Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray. Unlike the committees, ISSD envisioned 
having a collaborative type of structure that would provide continuous support to 
seed sector development (Thijssen et al. 2011). The regional team is referred to as 
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regional seed core group, and is an institutional arrangement intended to overcome 
the persistent challenges of the seed sector in Ethiopia. The groups are comprised of 
members of organizations that have a stake in the seed sector. In each region, the 
core group includes the BoA, regional research institute, CPA, state-owned seed 
company, a representative of private seed companies, a representative of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in the seed sector, a university 
hosting ISSD, and an ISSD expert (Figure 4-4). Most of these actors – except ISSD, 
the NGOs and the universities – are active in the seed market regime. 
 
Figure 4-4. Regional seed core group and its link to the regional bureau of 
agriculture and ISSD 
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Given the coordinating role of the BoA in the seed sector, the deputy bureau head, 
who represents the BoA, was made chairperson of the seed core group. The deputy 
bureau head is expected to communicate the outcome of discussions of the core 
group to the head of the BoA, who is the vice president of the regional state. In each 
of the four regions, ISSD designated one expert to exclusively facilitate the process 
of establishing the regional seed core groups, with some coaching provided from the 
national level to back up the facilitation process. The overall goal of the core group 
was to solve systemic problems of the seed sector in the region. The major activities 
of the regional seed core group include identifying and prioritizing systemic 
bottlenecks in the seed sector; identifying ideas that help to overcome the 
bottlenecks and agreeing to implement them; asking relevant experts or 
organizations to design an activity plan; making sure the appropriate organization 
implements the activities; learning from the process; and providing 
recommendations if necessary to policy makers (Hassena and van den Broek. 2012). 
After the establishment of the regional seed core group, several problems were 
identified and prioritized in each region. The three most common problems across 
regions were seed quality, the supply of early generation seed, and inefficiencies in 
the seed market (ibid). The following analysis focuses on the issue of seed market. 
4.5.2 Introduction of DSM 
Steering towards seed marketing 
Initially, solutions that the core groups proposed to address the inefficiency of seed 
distribution focused on improving the existing distribution system, including better 
estimation of seed demand, improved capacities of cooperatives and better 
coordination (Hassena and van den Broek 2012). Although the suggestion to try seed 
marketing was tabled, it was not a top priority, since the distribution system was 
taken for granted. Many actors in the core group also believed that marketing is not 
in line with the government’s intention and so would not be accepted by the 
government. Thus, seed marketing was not the first option of the core groups in all 
regions. 
Since the solutions at the top of the priority list were not new and seed marketing 
was deemed unorthodox, it was dropped and the facilitators had to conduct bilateral 
discussions with core group members to try to convince them to use seed marketing. 
They proposed piloting DSM, with the understanding that they would abandon this 
if it did not solve the inefficiencies in the seed market. The bilateral discussions and 
negotiations succeeded in achieving a consensus to pilot seed marketing, which was 
subsequently endorsed in the core group meetings (ibid). Following this consensus, 
the BoA was asked to draft a concept note elaborating the details of implementing a 
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pilot for seed marketing. The concept note was mainly drafted by facilitators of the 
core groups. During the preparation of the concept note, the term ‘direct seed 
marketing’ was used intentionally, to emphasis the involvement of the producers 
themselves in the marketing of seed. This was based on the recognition that the 
government focused mainly on seed distribution and that government discourses 
are generally not in line with open seed marketing (Gebresenbet 2014).   
After the concept note had been drafted, there was renewed resistance from the seed 
companies and representatives of the BoA. Seed companies seemed to think that 
DSM would result in them being faced with all the marketing costs and challenges. 
The representatives of the BoA were also uncertain as to how the government would 
view DSM. However, as it was only a pilot, the core groups agreed to give it a try, 
but on condition that approval was obtained from the regional agricultural bureau 
head. Interestingly, other activities introduced by the core group, such as an early 
generation seed supply system, had been implemented without requiring such 
approval. In this case, the main reason to nevertheless ask approval was that DSM 
was expected to be out of line with the existing seed distribution system and 
approach of the government.  
Securing approval for piloting DSM 
Although agreement to pilot had been reached in each of the core groups, bringing 
the proposal to the attention of the bureau heads for approval was not easy for the 
groups. The difficulty was related to the reluctance of the chairpersons to present 
the concept note to the bureau heads (informant 57). However, in the three regional 
states, the processes and outcomes were different. In SNNPR, although the 
chairperson of the core group was expected to present the core group’s decision to 
the bureau head, the chairperson reopened the discussion about DSM, and the core 
group changed its decision. The major argument for changing the decision was that 
DSM would take the seed market out of the government’s control (informant 57). 
Some of the core group members believed that the government’s aim was to supply 
seed directly and to have total control over the entire process. They believed that 
leaving this activity to the seed companies would affect the government’s 
performance (informant 43, 57).  
Similarly, in Oromia the core group’s decision was not presented to the bureau head 
early on, as the chairperson was reluctant to do so. The regional core group facilitator 
used another opportunity to present the idea of the core group to the bureau head, 
and in the presence of the bureaucrats, it was unanimously agreed to start the pilot. 
However, the bureaucrats had a discussion with the bureau head in the absence of 
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the facilitator and decided not to start the pilot (informant 46). Moreover, the bureau 
head was transferred to a different bureau, making it difficult for the facilitator to 
follow-up on the case. Because of the reluctance of the bureaucrats and lack of time 
for discussion with the new bureau head, it was not possible to start piloting in 
Oromia in 2011 (informant 10).   
In Amhara, as soon as the core group had decided to pilot DSM, the facilitator took 
the initiative to present the decision of the core group to the bureau head. The bureau 
head agreed with the idea of piloting, and the result of the discussion was to prepare 
a memorandum of understanding (MoU) describing the responsibility of each actor 
taking part in the pilot (informant 79). Four relatively strong companies were 
identified to participate in the pilot, and an MoU was prepared. However, none of 
the companies nominated to be involved was ready to sign the MoU. The facilitator 
then took the MoU to the bureau head, who was the first to sign the MoU, and then 
the others followed suit. Finally, two companies implemented the pilot in two 
districts in 2011, and Amhara regional state became the trailblazer for DSM in 
Ethiopia.  
Although it was not possible to pilot DSM in 2011, in both Oromia and SNNPR, 
bilateral and multilateral discussions continued on how to start the pilot in 2012. In 
addition to the frequent discussions about DSM, the core group members were taken 
to visit Amhara regional state, where the pilot had started, and to other African 
countries (Kenya and Zambia) where seed marketing is commonplace (CDI 2012). 
During the familiarization visit in Amhara regional state, the core group members 
from Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray visited the two districts where the pilot was being 
implemented. They held discussions with the district office of agriculture, the 
district administrator, development agents and farmers. After these familiarization 
visits, the core groups in both Oromia and SNNPR decided to pilot seed marketing. 
The visit paved the way to obtaining the approval of the bureau heads without the 
involvement of facilitators.   
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4.5.3 Piloting and expansion of DSM 
Starting the pilot in the regional states 
The first DSM pilot was initiated in 2011, when two companies sold seed24 in two 
different districts of Amhara regional state. Each company was assigned to a 
different district, so as to be able to monitor company performance, and make the 
companies accountable for any problems encountered. Both the core group at the 
regional state level and the office of agriculture at district level supported the two 
companies by giving them access to the stores of cooperatives free of charge (CDI 
2012). Both companies temporarily deployed their staff to sell seed in the selected 
districts. The few staff members they deployed had to shuttle between the different 
selling points. This is indicative of the low level of preparedness and low marketing 
knowledge of the companies (Astatke et al. 2012). However, district-level actors and 
farmers were satisfied with the performance as, in comparison to their past 
experience, the farmers received their seed in time (Benson, Spielman and Kasa 
2014).  
During the 2012 planning process in SNNPR, some of the regional seed core group 
members had reservations about starting the pilot. However, in addition to the 
exposure visit, some actors such as the ESE, which is a federal state-owned company, 
strongly supported the initiation of the pilot. This was because large amounts of seed 
remained unsold in 2011 and there were indirect restrictions on the ESE selling seed 
in certain regional states (Benson, Spielman and Kasa 2014; Getahun et al. 2014; 
Sahlu, Alemu and Atlaw 2012). The opportunity created by this support was used 
to start DSM in SNNPR. To avoid the risk of hindering DSM in SNNPR, the district 
office of agriculture and ISSD assisted the South Seed Enterprise (SSE), a regional 
state-owned seed company, as much as possible. For the SSE, the main difference 
with their distribution system was that they themselves, instead of the district office 
of agriculture, transported the seed to the sale points. All other activities were done 
either by the district office of agriculture or ISSD. These included assigning staff to 
sell seed, renting the store, and collecting cash from farmers in advance and 
depositing it in the SSE’s bank account. Unlike the SSE, the ESE used its own staff 
and sold the seed to farmers on a cash basis; this was because the ESE wanted to sell 
seed that had been left unsold in 2011 (Benson, Spielman and Kasa 2014).  
                                                 
24 DSM was initially piloted in the sale of hybrid maize seed, one of the key crops of the private 
sector. This crop dominated throughout the pilot, although at a later stage other cereals 
mainly from state-owned companies were also sold through this marketing strategy. 
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Similarly, in Oromia, members of the core group had reservations about starting the 
piloting of DSM. The core group anticipated the need to have more follow-up, 
because the region lacks the regulatory capacity to ensure seed quality if companies 
have to sell seed by themselves. Finally, the group decided to pilot DSM in two 
districts, but taking extra care (informant 10). In Oromia, seven companies (one 
cooperative union, two state-owned companies, and four private companies) took 
part in the 2012 piloting activity. As opposed to SNNPR, in Oromia assistance for 
these companies was limited to helping them to get a sales agent if they were looking 
for one. Except for two of the companies, which used their staff to sell the seed, all 
the others used agents, either a primary cooperative or a private agent. The district 
office of agriculture assisted the companies to identify sales agents in their respective 
districts, and detailed arrangements were made between the companies and the 
agents. ISSD and the BoA provided training to the agents on post-harvest seed 
management and marketing.  
Expanding DSM  
The facilitators in the different regions organized different workshops and field 
visits in the districts where the pilots were implemented, to facilitate a learning 
process, starting from 2011. Evaluations were held to identify the extent to which 
the pilot had helped farmers by comparison with the existing delivery regime, and 
experiences were shared. The district-level workshops were followed-up by regional 
workshops, to share experience across districts and to create momentum to expand 
the pilot in each region. In all three regional states, the outcome of the pilot and 
experience sharing created some enthusiasm to continue (Astatke et al. 2015; Benson 
2014; Getahun et al. 2014; Nefo et al. 2015). As a result, the area covered by DSM has 
been increasing since 2013 (Map 4-1). 
In 2013, there were mixed feelings about DSM among actors, particularly in Amhara 
and Oromia regional states. On the one hand, the expert and district-level actors 
wanted DSM to continue, since they considered it would solve the challenges they 
had been facing. On the other hand, the regional core groups planned to implement 
DSM, but with some reservations. In Oromia regional state, the chairperson of the 
core group wanted to expand the pilot slowly to avoid any risks. This was partly 
because of the suspicion that companies might sell poor-quality seed as the region 
does not have a strong regulatory system (informant 46, 75). If this happened, it 
might backfire on the chairperson, as the government had not authorized the use of 
DSM except as a pilot (informant 41, 62). The idea of slowly expanding the pilot was 
also supported by the majority of the companies, as DSM burdened them with costs 
and work. In Amhara regional state, despite planning for ten districts, members of 
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the core group were not sure whether the government would restart the pilot in 
201325. The case of SNNPR was different: the chairperson of the core group was more 
interested in using DSM to make seed available to farmers. By contrast, the interest 
in some of the districts of SNNPR was low. Nevertheless, given the high interest of 
the chairperson, ten districts were planned for piloting DSM in SNNPR, increasing 
the total number of districts in the country planned for piloting in 2013 to twenty-
five.  
While reservations in Oromia and Amhara regional states were a concern for ISSD, 
the ATA26 was interested in expanding the two years of experience to more areas in 
2013. Since interest at regional level in 2013 was not encouraging, having the interest 
of the ATA was an opportunity for ISSD to reinvigorate DSM. Although ISSD shared 
the two years of experience with the ATA, it was too late for the ATA to start 
implementation in 2013. ISSD and the ATA therefore agreed that the ATA would 
ask the MoA to write to the regional BoA, explaining the need to continue the 
piloting. Accordingly, the MoA wrote a letter to the regional BoA. For bureaucrats 
in the regions, this provided an important backup, and they developed confidence 
because the letter implied that the federal government supported the pilot. Inspired 
by this, the pilot was implemented in twenty-one districts (seven in Amhara, five in 
Oromia and nine in SNNPR) with more confidence than in 2011 and 2012. Thus, the 
expansion of DSM is the outcome of both its potential to solve the problems of the 
seed market and strategic management of the process. 
In 2011 and 2012, the focus was on starting the pilot, and not the extent to which the 
companies had taken on the marketing roles. In 2013, more marketing roles were 
transferred to seed companies. The two companies in SNNPR changed their 
approach slightly in 2013 by making an agreement with staff at the office of 
agriculture to sell their seed. The district office of agriculture released staff from 
other work and the SSE paid for their service. Moreover, the SSE sold seed for cash, 
unlike in 2012 when farmers had paid cash before the seed was transported to the 
local store. In Oromia regional state, not much changed in the process when 
compared to 2012, mainly because Oromia had started off at a better level (Benson, 
Spielman and Kasa 2014). Amhara regional state restarted DSM in 2013, and five 
companies (one public and four private) joined the piloting. While the regional seed 
                                                 
25 In Amhara, the piloting of DSM was discontinued in 2012 because of the huge amount of 
leftover seed in 2011, which the regional government decided to dispose of at any cost, 
including free distribution. 
26 During its establishment, the ATA had proposed the use of DSM but using the concept of 
agro-dealer. The idea was rejected by the government at that time, on the grounds that 
cooperatives should be used to distribute inputs (informant 15) 
Seed for Change 
79 
 
C
h
a
p
te
r 
4
 
core group identified and informed the piloting districts, the districts linked the 
companies to the cooperatives in the districts that were to be used as sales agents. In 
Amhara, instead of using their staff, companies used cooperatives as sales agents in 
2013. Thus, in 2013, in addition to the increase in area covered, there were also 
changes in terms of roles. 
 
Map 4-1. Expansion of DSM districts in Ethiopia (2011 – 2016) 
Source: based on data from regional ISSD units 
In 2014, the ATA also invested in the piloting of DSM by assigning regional staff to 
augment the efforts made by ISSD; consequently, the number of districts increased 
to fifty-one. This is more than double the number of districts that were involved in 
2013, and it created an opportunity to disseminate the concept of DSM across a wider 
area. Companies that had not previously participated also joined the piloting 
activity in 2014. Amhara Seed Enterprise (ASE), a large state-owned company in the 
region, did not join the piloting until 2014. The regional BoA insisted that the 
regional state-owned seed companies participate in DSM. In 2014, companies also 
Chapter 4: Organizing changes in the centrally managed seed market 
80 
 
started selling the seed of crops other than maize. This accelerated the process of 
transferring marketing roles from government to companies.  
One other significant change made in 2014 was that companies in SNNPR moved 
away from their dependence on the government system to sell their seed. Both 
companies started to use agents instead of staff from the district office of agriculture. 
This change occurred mainly in response to pressure from the BoA (and thus from 
the core group chairperson) rather than as an initiative of the companies themselves 
(informant 18). Wearing two hats (as chairperson of the core group and 
representative of the BoA, which also implies representing the regional 
government), the chairperson has power to exert pressure on companies to 
participate. Thus, chairpersons have the power to influence the pace at which the 
pilot moves. Similar to the other regions, in SNNPR the district offices of agriculture 
helped the two companies to identify agents, and the regional BoA started checking 
the suitability of the store for seed. In all the regional states, the trend to certify 
agents started in 2014 and was intensified in 2015, which was also related to the 
establishment of regulatory authorities, at least in Amhara and SNNPR. The most 
important criteria for a company to be accepted as an agent are the availability of 
suitable storage for seed and trustworthiness. Starting in 2014, the core group in 
Amhara regional state decided on the number of districts to be included in the pilot 
mainly on the basis of the amount of seed produced by private companies, and it 
instructed the private companies to sell their seed solely through DSM in the pilot 
districts (informant 73).   
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Figure 4-5. Increase in number of districts and amount of maize seed sold  
                   through DSM across regional states (2011 – 2016) 
Source: based on data from regional ISSD units 
The number of districts covered by the DSM pilot in the three regional states reached 
seventy-seven in 2015, and ninety-three in 2016 (Figure 4-5). Over the years, in these 
regional states the types of crop seed sold through DSM increased from only maize 
in 2011 to four crops in 2016. By 2016, the amount of hybrid maize seed (the major 
crop in the pilot) sold through DSM had reached about 36% of the total hybrid maize 
seed sold in the three regional states. 
4.6 Analysis 
4.6.1 Transition management 
As indicated by Kemp, Loorbach and Rotmans (2007), transition is managed at three 
levels: strategic, tactical and operational, but they do not have a fixed sequence of 
implementation. Rather, transition is the result of interaction between these levels of 
management, where the output of one level of management is fed into the other 
levels that help to bring about change (ibid). The goal of transition management at 
the strategic level is to establish the appropriate arena, define the problem, and make 
sure that members in the arena focus on the same vision (ibid). In our case, 
establishing the regional seed core group as a form of transition arena was initially 
a challenge, mainly because of the relatively weak position of the Ethiopian 
universities to coordinate the seed sector stakeholders. However, once the regional 
core groups had been established, the universities were instrumental as a new actor 
Regional states: 
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in the arena to pull the discussion towards the systemic challenges facing the seed 
sector, rather than the operational problems the regime actors had been dealing with 
for so long. Such an arena is important to create a venue in which challenges are 
discussed and solutions are proposed without being limited by actors’ 
organizational setup. It also creates access, directly or indirectly, to political power 
to influence policy (Cohen and Naor 2013). Our analysis revealed that the regional 
seed core group created an opportunity for bureaucrats to express their ideas, which 
they could not do when they were immersed in the implementation of day-to-day 
activities. At the same time, it also created an opportunity for other actors in the seed 
sector to discuss issues related to seed policy with bureaucrats.  
Members of the core group defined seed market problems in terms of inefficiency. 
However, identifying the transition path was a challenge. Given the influence of the 
overarching government development approach, actors in the core group tended to 
limit the options to solve the seed market problems within the frame of the 
distribution system. To pull actors out of this frame, the facilitators used informal 
bilateral discussions with core group members, which helped many of the core 
group members to think outside the box. Being outside their organizational setup, it 
was possible to discuss among various actors and agree on an idea outside the 
existing frame, which otherwise might not have come into the picture. This is 
because, as indicated by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh. (2012), such an arena 
creates a ‘safe’ space for deliberation. In the deliberation, an unorthodox and 
possibly useful idea like DSM may also emerge. 
Given the reluctance of the core group chairpersons to present the idea of DSM to 
the bureau head, the processes followed to obtain approval from the regional bureau 
heads differed among the regional states. In Amhara, the long working experience 
of the facilitator in the BoA helped the facilitator to easily present the idea to the 
bureau head in 2011 and get approval. In Oromia and SNNPR, where the facilitators 
have not worked in/with the BoA before, it was not easy to present the idea and get 
approval in 2011, and the process had to be supported by experience sharing. This 
implies facilitators require not only the technical capacity but also a good network 
in the system to manage the process better. Moreover, the reluctance of the core 
group chairpersons implies that bureaucrats were not using the opportunity of 
having access to the bureau head to present policy options, particularly when the 
ideas were outside the frame of the government. However, through the core group, 
it was possible to present ‘new’ policy ideas to the bureau head, revealing the core 
group’s role in strengthening the power of the bureaucrats within their 
organizational setting. 
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Nonetheless, the need to obtain approval from the bureau head shows that the 
regional seed core group is not independent, but depends on the vertical structure 
of the government. This dependency affected the functioning of the core group in 
the ‘safe’ space created. This is because to obtain approval the core groups took into 
account the interest of the bureau head or the government at large in their discussion 
and decision. This is strongly related to the policy implementation frame of the 
government. As noted by Ohno (2009), in Ethiopia the notion of the developmental 
state is much more than a concept; it legitimizes and guides the government officials 
to formulate and implement public policies. Based on this guidance, government 
officials are preoccupied with the implementation of framed activities from the 
centre (Simon 2011). The core group members knew that DSM was not on the 
executives’ agenda. As a result, initially there was no interest in using DSM as a 
solution. Even after reconsidering it to be a solution, the bureaucrats were reluctant 
to present it to the bureau head to decide on. In SNNPR, the core group changed its 
plan of piloting DSM. This reflects how actors in the ‘safe’ space anticipate the 
interest of the vertical structure even if they are outside the organizational setup.  
In addition to the notion of the developmental state, which gives power to 
executives, the reluctance of actors in the core group is also related to the difference 
between policy rhetoric and policy practice in Ethiopia. Over the years, both the 
policies on paper and government rhetoric have been pro-private sector and have 
encouraged more private involvement in the agricultural sector. However, the 
government of Ethiopia has not significantly changed its position to actually involve 
the private sector in strategic sectors such as input supply (Berhanu and Poulton 
2014). Such a difference between the rhetoric and practice of policy has given rise to 
the perception that executives will not accept an idea that is not in line with the 
government’s plan. Regardless of the fact that policies on paper support seed 
marketing, such an attitude affected the confidence of the core group members. 
Despite starting the pilot with the permission of the bureau head, the uncertainty 
among core group members and bureaucrats continued during the expansion of the 
pilot in 2013. The bureaucrats at regional levels were not sure whether the bureau 
head and the government at large would accept the expansion. This indicates that 
discussions and decisions of the core groups about DSM faced uncertainty. The 
power of the core group was limited because they were not granted the authority 
from the bureau head to change a system. Rather, they were working as a technical 
group to solve problems. This is in line with many observations that horizontal 
governance structures are not independent, but depend on the vertical governance 
structure (Agranoff 2006; Carboni and Milward 2012; Resh, Siddiki and McConnell 
2014). 
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Experience-sharing activities, the alliance with the ATA, and getting a supporting 
letter from the MoA was important tactical management in the process. Linkage 
with these key actors was possible because of the positive outcome of the pilot in 
2011 and 2012. The results of this tactical management were used to influence the 
process in the regional states. It was only after observing the experience of Amhara 
that the other two regional core groups started piloting DSM. Given the top-down 
system of Ethiopia, and the role of the MoA in setting the seed sector landscape, the 
letter from the MoA changed the scenario with respect to implementing the pilot in 
the regional states. The facilitators fed the results at this level to the operational-
management level, to influence the pace of change. All achievements, whether inside 
or outside the regional process, were learned from and used to plan and implement 
the next step. Since the outcomes differed between regions, and the dynamics within 
the regional core group also differed, the planning and implementation of each step 
towards seed marketing varied across the regions. Oromia regional state started off 
in 2012 with a better level of marketing practice, where companies operated with 
minor support (Benson, Spielman and Kasa 2014). In SNNPR, initially there was a 
minor difference between the practice of the pilot and the distribution system, and 
so it was not until 2014 that the companies in SNNPR reached the stage at which 
Oromia regional state had started in 2012.  
The capacity of the companies and the dynamics of the core group determine what 
change must be implemented at a given time. In Amhara regional state, the 
companies were instructed to sell all their seed exclusively through DSM in 2014, 
but the other two regional states were still not at this level. Over the years, 
companies took on more and more responsibilities, while public actors stepped back 
into facilitation roles. These processes are in line with the concept that the role of 
transition management is to direct the process by implementing incremental steps 
to attain radical change (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010). Again, this incremental step 
is related to the concept of not going beyond what the actors can absorb at any one 
time, as otherwise strong resistance to change will emerge (Rotmans and Loorbach 
2010; Werbeloff, Brown and Loorbach 2016). The whole process discussed above 
confirms the overall concept of transition management. As indicated by Rotmans, 
Kemp and van Asselt (2001), managing transition is not about implementing 
predefined activities; rather it is about navigating through the dynamic current of 
actors’ behaviour and intermediate outputs in the process leading towards the 
vision.  
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4.6.2 Niche development and regime change 
Before the piloting of DSM, the formal seed market for major food crops was through 
the centralized distribution system. The description of data in section 4.5 illustrates 
how the scenario has changed over the years. In 2016, 36% of the hybrid maize seed 
sold in the three regional states was through DSM. This shows that the near absolute 
dominance of the centralized distribution system has changed to partial marketing, 
with all variabilities of marketing across the regional states. Section 4.6.1 above 
analysed how the process of change was managed using the concept of transition 
management. This section examines the development of the niche using the concept 
of MLP. To understand DSM development over time, the concepts of system 
transition of Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt (2001), and niche development of de 
Haan and Rotmans (2011), are used to categorize the changes into four phases: 
initiation (2010-11), take-off (2011–2012), acceleration (2013–2014), and empowered 
niche (2015-2016) (Figure 4-6).   
The initiation phase is the stage at which the most divergent ideas emerge from 
actors in support of, or against, a new initiative. Despite the persistent nature of the 
seed market problems, the idea of DSM only entered the picture because of the 
existence of the external actor – ISSD – in the coalition. Yet it was not easy for core 
group members to decide to use DSM to overcome the problems of the seed market 
because of the influence of the well-developed centralized distribution system, the 
signal emanating from the landscape, and the dynamics in the core group. The 
analysis of transition management discussed above shows how ideas about the use 
of DSM have been changing and how network management has been used to get 
actors to think beyond their current idea of seed distribution. This is grounded in 
the theoretical concept that actors in the regime are commonly stuck in the existing 
frame, and change initiated internally seldom works (Ceschin 2013; Geels 2011; 
Jørgensen 2012).  
It took different lengths of time for the different regions to transit to the take-off 
phase, the start of the pilot in the region. Only the regional core group in Amhara 
was able to overcome resistance against the new idea in the first year. The other two 
regions took longer to start the pilot. In addition to the actors’ resistance, this delay 
is partly related to the network of the facilitators within the BoA, which was 
relatively weak in Oromia and SNNPR. The outcome of the take-off phase inspired 
actors, particularly at lower levels. At this stage, the practical learning process and 
exchange of experience took place, which helped DSM expansion in the subsequent 
years. In the acceleration phase (2013 – 2014), the initial outcome in all regions 
attracted more actors to join the piloting. In addition to the companies that joined 
Chapter 4: Organizing changes in the centrally managed seed market 
86 
 
the process, influential actors like the ATA and MoA started giving support for the 
expansion of DSM. This was also followed by the regional bureau heads advising 
the regional state-owned seed companies to participate actively in the piloting. The 
support from the landscape actors (the MoA and BoA) increased the confidence of 
actors in the niche, and the pilot picked up momentum and expanded to more areas. 
By 2014, the pilot had reached a level at which it could be recognized nationally by 
covering 51 districts in the three regional states, and involving nearly all seed 
producers. The Tigray regional state also started piloting in 2014. The fast expansion 
was mainly because the ATA invested in the process to expand the pilot in more 
areas. This is in line with the point made by Geels (2012) that the involvement of 
influential actors in the process adds to the legitimacy of the niche and creates 
internal momentum for niche development.  
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Figure 4-6. Multi-level perspective on the transition process in Ethiopian seed 
marketing 
Source: adapted from Geels and Schot (2007; p. 401) 
 
While DSM is labelled as a pilot, more than a third of hybrid maize in Ethiopia has 
been sold through DSM since 2015. Although most of the public and private 
companies prefer to sell their seed in bulk through the central distribution system, 
they have been using DSM by default to overcome the problem of seed being left 
over. Private companies in particular do not rely on the government alone to sell 
their seed. State-owned seed companies, who also supply the bulk of their seed to 
the centralized distribution system, use DSM as an option. Whenever they feel that 
they have excess seed and the central distribution system might not able to collect 
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the seed in time, they sell directly, to minimize the amount of seed left over. The 
current use of DSM shows that in terms of leftover seed, DSM performs better than 
centralized distribution. This is what Haxeltine et al. (2008) and de Haan and 
Rotmans (2011) called an empowered niche: a niche that can already respond to the 
societal need.  
4.7 Conclusion 
This research set out to answer the research questions of how the regional seed core 
groups introduced DSM from below in the top-down governance culture of Ethiopia 
and how they have been able to expand DSM even though the dominant discourse 
of seed distribution does not favour liberal seed marketing. It can be concluded that 
the regional seed core group has created a venue for deliberating on different ideas 
from different actors. While it was possible to introduce the idea of DSM into this 
arena because of the presence of an external actor, the arena created the possibility 
to set the new idea as a vision. Yet the introduction and deliberation were carefully 
managed, starting from the framing of the concept of DSM as well as the approach 
used to implement DSM. DSM is used as a frame of the ‘new’ idea, distancing its 
connotation from that of liberal seed marketing, which is not in line with the 
distribution system. Instead, DSM has the connotation that the current seed 
producers sell their seed directly to farmers, but this does not entail seed market 
liberalization. Moreover, most of the seed is produced by state-owned seed 
companies, where the term ‘direct’ implies that the state-owned companies sell seed 
directly. Also, the decision was to pilot, and piloting could be abandoned if it did 
not help to overcome the problems of the seed market. These frames helped the 
actors in the core group to agree on the idea of piloting DSM. To introduce DSM into 
the seed market system, the autonomy of the regional state was used, and the head 
of the regional bureaus of agriculture authorized the start of the pilot.  
DSM has expanded as a result of the evidence of its potential to solve persistent 
problems, careful management of the process, and the interest of influential actors 
in supporting the pilot. The first effort was to start and demonstrate DSM’s potential, 
which helped to create interest among actors, thus facilitating the continuation of 
the pilot. The intermittent reservations were managed through tactical linkage at the 
national level, and that level supported the continuation of the process. Thus, it was 
the interplay of the different processes that led to the expansion of DSM in Ethiopia, 
regardless of the major discourse against liberal seed marketing. 
DSM has developed to the extent that it has demonstrated its potential, particularly 
for hybrid maize. For hybrid maize, where private companies are active, a significant 
proportion of seed is sold through DSM. If the government cannot or does not want 
Seed for Change 
89 
 
C
h
a
p
te
r 
4
 
to channel the produced seed through the centralized seed distribution system, 
companies can find a way to sell their seed to farmers as they now have much more 
experience than they had before the start of the pilot. DSM is now generally seen as 
an alternative channel that can be used by seed producers to market their seed 
directly to farmers. However, although the DSM pilot is mature and regime actors 
are using it, there is no realignment of the landscape to the changes at the other 
levels. According to Geels and Schot (2007), a regime changes when there is coupling 
between the three levels of the system. In the case of the seed market system, regime 
actors are unsure if their current use of DSM is a temporary activity or something 
that they have to continue for the future, and thus they expect the government to 
make a decision. So far, there has been no alignment of the three levels in this regard. 
In the absence of a decision by the government, the regime remains dynamically 
stable and will reproduce itself. This is because within the regime there is a 
perception that it has inherent potential to solve problems, and therefore the same 
system will continue. Given the current level of development of DSM and its role in 
the seed market system, the next logical question is: why has it so far been impossible 
for the Ethiopian government to formally decide on the future use of DSM? The next 
chapter answers this question. 
  
 
 
Chapter 5.  
The rise of seed marketing and its uncertain 
future in Ethiopia: facing ambiguous policy 
making and institutional lock-in27 
 
Abstract 
Although public policy promotes a market-based seed supply, in practice the Ethiopian 
government fosters a centralized seed distribution system. This system is characterized by 
several inefficiencies, resulting in untimely delivery of seed, seed left over even though 
demand has not been met, and supply of poor quality seed. Direct seed marketing (DSM) was 
introduced as a pilot in 2011 to overcome the inefficiencies of seed distribution, and the area 
covered by the pilot increased over the years. Despite support from executives to expand 
DSM, and the fact that market-based seed supply falls squarely within Ethiopian seed policy, 
it remains unclear as to why the government has not fully embraced this approach. This 
chapter analyses why decision making on the future of DSM has been excluded from the 
agenda of the executives, and discusses how the reasons for exclusion are linked to the 
strategy of the developmental state and to the political strategy of the ruling party. These 
linkages not only show the complexity of policy making but also create uncertainty about the 
future of seed marketing in Ethiopia.   
                                                 
27 This chapter is based on an article submitted to the Journal of Eastern African Studies as: 
Mohammed Hassena, Otto Hospes and Bram De Jonge, ‘The rise of seed marketing and its 
uncertain future in Ethiopia: facing ambiguous policy making and institutional lock-in’. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Since 1997, the seed-related legislative policies of Ethiopia have described seed of 
agricultural crops as a commercial commodity to be marketed by seed producers 
(CoM 1997; HoPRs 2000; HoRPs 2013). However, the marketing policy has never 
been fully implemented. On the contrary, seed production and supply have 
remained centrally designed, top-down and state-directed (Alemu 2011). The 
government uses a centralized seed distribution system to make sure that seed is 
made available at distribution centres. By means of centralized seed distribution, the 
government allocates seed produced by private and government-owned seed 
companies as well as by cooperative unions. The government purchases or facilitates 
the purchase of this seed and distributes it to farmers through primary cooperatives 
or cooperative unions, or through district offices of agriculture (Atilaw and Korbu 
2012). Although the cooperatives and unions physically handle the seed 
distribution, government offices facilitate the process of purchasing and distributing 
the seed, including arranging for credit (Spielman et al. 2010). In spite of the 
government’s unreserved efforts to make seed available to farmers through the 
distribution system, there are many challenges, including inefficient seed 
distribution and distribution of poor quality seed (Alemu and Tripp 2010; Astatke et 
al. 2012; Atilaw and Korbu 2012; Lakew and Alemu 2012). Common inefficiencies 
are the late delivery of seed, the mismatch between seed demand and supply, and 
seed being left over even though farmers’ demand has not been met. Another 
persistent problem in the Ethiopian seed sector has been poor seed quality 
(Spielman, Mekonnen and Alemu 2013).   
Different solutions to the challenges of centralized seed distribution have been 
proposed by different actors at various times at national and regional state levels. At 
the national level, the most common solutions proposed are improving the accuracy 
of seed demand estimation and giving cooperatives the capacity to distribute seed 
better (Gelaw 2012; Lakew and Alemu 2012). In addition, as discussed above in 
Chapter 4, DSM was proposed by the regional seed core groups in Amhara, Oromia, 
SNNPR and Tigray and has been piloted since 2011. Over the years, DSM has shown 
potential to overcome the persistent problems of inefficiency in seed distribution, 
and has also contributed to seed quality improvement (Benson, Spielman and Kasa 
2014). The results seem to be appreciated not only by those who directly supported 
the piloting, but also by executive leaders at both regional and national levels 
(Astatke et al. 2015; Benson, Spielman and Kasa 2014; Getahun et al. 2014; Nefo et al. 
2015). Currently, both seed distribution and DSM operate in parallel. As the pilot is 
now in its sixth year (2011-2016) and the share of DSM is about 36% for hybrid maize, 
actors in the seed sector expected the government to officially endorse DSM 
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(Chapter 4). However, the government has neither officially endorsed DSM nor 
rejected its use as an alternative system beyond piloting. This chapter examines why 
the Ethiopian government has still not formally endorsed the use of DSM in 
Ethiopia, despite the positive results of the pilot and the fact that the initiative falls 
within the government’s policies on seed. It describes the reception of DSM by 
relevant stakeholders and analyses the reasons for the Ethiopian government’s delay 
in making an official decision on the future of DSM after piloting. 
In the next section (5.2), the theoretical lens used to structure and analyse the data is 
presented. This is followed by a description of the methodology used for data 
generation and processing (5.3). Before presenting how DSM was introduced and 
expanded, the challenges of centralized seed distribution are detailed (5.4). Section 
5.5 discusses the perceived benefits of DSM. Two contrasting scenarios are then 
described (5.6): the first shows how the executive leaders at both regional and 
national levels supported the expansion of the pilot; the second identifies the signals 
of the rejection of DSM by the executives. Section 5.7 explains the reasons behind the 
non-decision of the executives at two levels:– the lock-ins and deep-rooted structural 
problems. The final section (5.8) concludes by reiterating how institutions influence 
public policy decisions, and how this is deeply embedded in the structure of the 
system. 
5.2 Institutional lock-in 
This research started with the point that public policy making is complex, non-
linear, dynamic, and sometimes chaotic and messy (Arts and Tatenhove 2004; 
Enserink, Koppenjian and Mayer 2013; Keeley and Scoones 2000; Young 2005). 
Decisions depend not only on rational arguments but are also subject to political 
deliberation and choices (Byerlee et al. 2007). Decision makers are also confronted 
with competing and even conflicting policy objectives, which make it difficult to 
choose one. When objectives are competing and/or conflicting, individuals tend to 
be ambiguity-averse and shy away from making a decision, not only because of 
ignorance of the outcome of a particular decision, but also to minimize risk (Camerer 
and Weber 1992; Ghosh and Ray 1997). Thus, decision making can be ignored when 
the decision maker is ambivalent about choices, leading to non-decision making. 
Non-decision making is commonly organized through institutions that 
systematically exclude the issue from the agenda (Bonal 2012; Burnell 2002). Thus, 
the decisions or non-decisions of those in power may be unclear or even ambiguous, 
as these are the outcome of a mix of visible and invisible institutions that guide the 
decision making (Duffield 2007; Geels 2004; Mulé 1999). Institutions are “the shared 
concepts used by humans in repetitive situations organized by rules, norms and 
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strategies” (Ostrom 2007: p. 23). They structure how members interact, and as such 
determine what is right and what is wrong, directing the actor to think and act in a 
certain way (Duffield 2007; Khan 2013; Klein 1998). These are both formal 
(constitutions, laws, regulations, official procedures) and informal (norms, values, 
taboos, beliefs, and conventions) institutions that guide the process of interaction 
(Khan 2013).  
Some of these institutions, such as norms and beliefs, may not be obvious from the 
outset but are important in defining other institutions (Duffield 2007; Schmidt 2010). 
This is because norms and beliefs are ideologically internalized by an individual, 
and thus sometimes remain tacit to the individual. By shaping the thinking and 
actions of an actor, institutions limit an actor to perform a particular set of actions 
and not another, or to think in a certain way (Duffield 2007; Geels 2004; Mulé 1999). 
Thus, institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions” 
(North 1990: p. 3). By default, institutions block actors from acting outside the 
existing sets of norms and rules (Cantarelli et al. 2010; Geels 2011; Klitkou et al. 2015). 
Coming from the standpoint of discursive institutionalism, Schmidt (2010) argues 
that institutions are not static and changes are not expected to occur through external 
pressure only. There could also be institutional change brought about by internal 
discursive interactions of actors to reform and transform the rules and norms, there 
by promoting the interests of members of a given institution (Geels 2004; Schmidt 
2010). Therefore, institutions also change, but at a given time they keep their 
restrictive nature, as the rules of the game and norms are fixed for some time, 
preventing actors from seeing beyond the frame. Institutional lock-in becomes an 
issue when an institution becomes inflexible and continues to restrict the 
consideration of other alternatives (Nordensvärd and Urban 2015). By limiting the 
consideration of other options, institutional lock-in leads to the use of sub-optimal 
policies even though alternative policies may be available (Cantarelli et al. 2010; 
Geels 2011; North 1990). Thus, actors continue to do the same without noticing the 
alternatives or without seeing their advantages. Cantarelli et al. (2010) distinguish 
over-commitment, self-justification, and inflexibility as indicators of institutional 
lock-in. Even if actors notice an alternative and acknowledge the benefits of a new 
system, they present the commitment already made to the existing system as a 
reason to continue the same. To justify remaining in the existing system, actors may 
also focus on specific outputs of the existing system that could not be attained by the 
new arrangement. Moreover, since actors maximize the short-term benefit, a 
symbiotic relationship between actors and the existing system over a longer period 
also favours the continuation of the same system (North 1990). These are the 
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different indicators of institutional lock-in that lead to the use of sub-optimal 
alternatives and cosmetic changes rather than to a fundamental shift in policy or 
system, as a result of actors’ inflexibility that blocks the opportunity for considering 
alternative ways to organize changes. 
While acknowledging the importance of the institutional lock-in to system change, 
it is also necessary to examine the root causes of lock-in, which involves unravelling 
how institutions function. As indicated by Geels (2004), a system does not exist 
without interacting with other systems, and thus it cannot change on its own. Rather, 
it is deeply interwoven with other systems as well as with the institutions that 
provide the background to the system (North 1990). Some of these institutions give 
meaning to the existing system, and also shape how actors view the existing and 
alternative systems, which becomes an important reason for the lock-in (Lee and 
Gloaguen 2015). For Lee and Gloaguen (2015), in addition to presenting the lock-in, 
it is also important to examine the causes of the lock-in, which are deeply embedded 
in the institutions that define societal structure.  
5.3 Data generation and analysis 
Empirical data to answer the current research question – why has the Ethiopian 
government still not formally endorsed the use of DSM? – were generated through semi-
structured interviews with informants (see section 4.3 above for the details) and 
document review. This research question is a continuation of the outcome of the 
research question discussed in Chapter 4 –  how have the regional seed core groups 
introduced DSM from below in the top-down governance culture of Ethiopia; and how have 
they been able to expand DSM? In addition to the interviews, a desk study was carried 
out in order to understand the problems of seed marketing and the practice of DSM. 
Different reports of ISSD, the ATA and a discussion paper produced by International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) on DSM, in particular, were reviewed.   
Interview data were transcribed and uploaded into Atlas.ti for analysis. Data were 
coded focusing on the main research question of why the Ethiopian government has 
still not formally endorsed DSM despite the support of its expansion. All texts that 
describe the reasons behind not endorsing the use of DSM were coded by reading 
the transcribed interviews. Whenever new ideas and reasons emerged, new codes 
were included. These primary codes were grouped and regrouped into families, and 
the quotations attached to the codes were used to make a structured description of 
the reasons for not endorsing DSM. Supported by the theoretical concepts 
introduced above, and also referring to the literature on decision making in Ethiopia, 
the description was further synthesized to illustrate the cause of non-decision 
making.  
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5.4 The challenges of the centralized seed distribution system 
For the Ethiopian government, agriculture remains a top priority, not only because 
agriculture plays an important role in economic development, but also because the 
government sees poverty and food insecurity as major threats and sources of conflict 
(Alemu and Scoones 2013; Diao and Pratt 2007). In 1993, an NGO called Sasakawa 
Global2000, piloted agricultural technology packages released by public research 
organizations. The government applauded the package, and the late Prime Minister 
Meles used his political power to promote the approach (Keeley and Scoones 2000). 
In 1995, the government decided to use the approach for its national agricultural 
extension system, calling it the National Agricultural Extension Intervention 
Programme (Spielman, Mekonnen and Alemu 2013). Under this system, the number 
of participating farmers in the extension programme increased from 32,000 in 1995 
to 3.8 million in 2000, and to 4.2 million in 2002 (Spielman et al. 2010). Executive 
leaders at all levels were given the responsibility of implementing these centrally 
planned activities of technology promotion (Alemu 2011; Gebremedhin, Hoekstra 
and Tegegne 2006a).  
The agricultural technology promotion activities dramatically increased the amount 
of seed required for the demonstration plots, as well as for supplying seed to farmers 
who had adopted the technology. However, the state-owned seed enterprise, the 
major seed producer, and the few private companies in existence at that time, were 
unable to satisfy the increasing demand for seed (Sahlu, Alemu and Atlaw 2012). 
The Ethiopian government initially started seed distribution to allocate available 
seed fairly. Under this system, seed producers sell their seed in bulk to a 
representative of a district (for details see Chapter 4). The regional government, in 
collaboration with the unions and cooperatives, arranges the logistics so that seed is 
made available for farmers (Gebremedhin, Hoekstra and Tegegne 2006a; Lakew and 
Alemu 2012). Towards the end of the 1990s, the government put effort into 
increasing seed production and significantly changed the scenario (Alemu 2011). 
However, the government remained involved in seed distribution and it has become 
clear that since 2001 the government of Ethiopia has been following a developmental 
state political economy model, which means that the government takes the lead in 
economic development (Simon 2011). The government continues to support seed 
production and to strengthen farmers’ cooperatives to be used as a channel for seed 
distribution. By 2006, cooperatives were distributing 70% of the inputs required by 
farmers, and the target is to reach 90% (Tefera, Bijman and Slingerl and 2016). The 
regional governments were also encouraged to coordinate the supply of agricultural 
inputs (Gebremedhin, Hoekstra and Tegegne 2006a). In some regional states where 
cooperatives are not well organized, the district office of agriculture buys the 
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allocated seed and sells it to farmers (Benson, Spielman and Kasa 2014; Chanyalew 
2015). Seed distributed under such a system is mainly for major food crops, chiefly 
cereals (maize, wheat, teff, barley), and limited amounts of pulses and oil crops.  
Despite the government’s efforts to distribute seed, there have been persistent 
challenges. The major challenge in this system is the inefficiency of seed distribution, 
which is attributable to untimely delivery of seed, and a mismatch between supply 
and demand, which results in seed being left over in the stores. Paradoxically, seed 
has commonly remained unsold even though farmers’ demand has not been met 
(Atilaw and Korbu 2012; Gelaw 2012). Data from Oromia regional state shows that 
while maize seed supply met only 29% of the demand in 2011/12, 38% of the maize 
seed supplied to this regional state was left unsold (Gelaw 2012). Similarly, in 
Amhara regional state, 63% of seed made available in 2011 was left unsold (Astatke 
et al. 2015). At the national level, half of the 28,493 tonnes of hybrid maize seed 
produced was left unsold in 2010/11 (Atilaw and Korbu 2012). The production of 
different classes of seed (pre-basic, basic and certified) is centrally planned, 
contributing to the mismatch between production and the actual demand, both in 
terms of volume and varieties (Lakew and Alemu 2012). 
Seed is left over because of the inaccuracy of demand estimation, poor timing, and 
above all the lack of accountability in the distribution system (Atilaw and Korbu 
2012; Gelaw 2012; Spielman, Mekonnen and Alemu 2013). The chain from demand 
estimation to final sale of seed is very long, and the entire process involves many 
actors, blurring the accountability. The major actors are the BoA including its district 
offices, the CPA and its branches, cooperative unions, and primary cooperatives 
(Chapter 4). An error in the chain made by one of the actors leads to seed being left 
over. Whenever necessary, different government officials at different levels 
intervene in the process, to ensure the transport of the seed to the stores. These 
interventions further complicate the distribution system.  
While the shortage of seed and late distribution are common challenges that force 
farmers to use grain as seed, the quality of the seed delivered is also poor. In addition 
to the low capacity of the regulatory system to ensure quality, this is also related to 
lack of accountability in the process of seed distribution (Alemu and Tripp 2010; 
Astatke et al. 2012; Lakew and Alemu 2012). In the first place, cooperatives are only 
asked to collect and distribute the seed, and thus it is not their responsibility to check 
the quality. Secondly, the involvement of many actors makes it difficult if not 
impossible to pinpoint the cause of the problem. In such cases, farmers may 
complain about the low quality of seed, and development agents and district offices 
of agriculture may do likewise, but specifying who along the supply chain created 
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the problem remains a challenge. Even if identification is possible, the actor 
responsible is rarely held accountable. As such, the poor seed quality remains a cost 
to the farmers. 
5.5 DSM and its benefits 
In DSM, producers supply seed to their agents at market centres; there is no lengthy 
process of seed allocation, and communications requiring approval from different 
government officials are no longer necessary. These improvements have helped 
reduce the delay in supply, and farmers now also buy directly without having to 
wait for approval. The results indicate that DSM has contributed in addressing the 
main challenges faced through the centralized seed distribution system. Since the 
start of DSM as a pilot in 2011, the area covered and seed sold through DSM have 
been steadily increasing. Nearly all the seed producers in the three regional states of 
Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR are taking part in the pilot, and DSM is now 
considered as an alternative channel of seed marketing (Chapter 4). In addition to 
using different opportunities and strategies that have contributed to its expansion, 
the advantages of DSM over the centralized distribution system have contributed to 
its expansion (Benson, Spielman and Kasa 2014; Getahun et al. 2014). Beyond 
changing the role of actors and the seed marketing system, there are other aspects 
that actors mention as benefits of DSM. Benson, Spielman and Kasa (2014) reported 
that farmers who planted hybrid maize in the districts where DSM was being piloted 
expressed high levels of satisfaction with the quality of seed and the process of 
accessing seed. They also noted that the timely delivery of seed reduced the amount 
of seed being left over, and they highlighted a reduction of public costs and 
workload as major advantages of DSM. Other studies not only confirmed these 
findings but have also added efficiency of service and accountability resulting in 
enhanced access to quality seed as important benefits of the pilot (Astatke et al. 2015; 
Getahun et al. 2014; Nefo et al. 2015). These benefits are further elaborated below. 
5.5.1 Reduction of leftover seed 
Companies try their best to supply seed in time, update estimates of seed demand 
frequently, and only transport the amount and type of seed that the agents are sure 
of selling (Astatke et al. 2015; Nefo et al. 2015). So, the companies replenish seed from 
time to time, taking account of changes in demand as well as of the amount of seed 
made available by other companies at the selling point. This process has helped the 
companies to reduce the amount of unsold seed left in the agents’ stores. According 
to the report of the ATA (2015), DSM reduced the unsold seed to “less than 5% in 
nearly all outlets compared to a historical average of almost 20% in other traditional 
seed distribution centres” (p. 46.) Moreover, the companies transport any seed left 
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unsold from the sales centre where there is no demand, to other centres where there 
is demand (Astatke et al. 2015; Nefo et al. 2015). This practice is virtually impossible 
under the centralized distribution system, as the seed allocated to a district is related 
to the district budget, which cannot be transferred to another district. In the case of 
credit default, the value of unsold seed is deducted from the district budget, which 
limits the transfer of unsold seed in one district to other districts (Astatke et al. 2015; 
Gebremedhin, Hoekstra and Tegegne 2006a).  
5.5.2 Enhanced access to quality seed 
Another major contribution of DSM is improved seed quality, as a result of the 
accountability embedded in DSM (Astatke et al. 2015; Getahun et al. 2014; Nefo et al. 
2015). As opposed to the centralized distribution system, in which companies are 
not accountable for a quality loss because of lack of practice, with DSM companies 
are directly responsible if the seed does not meet the required standard. This is 
because in DSM the seed is only handled by the seed producer and agent, making it 
is easy to identify the producer in cases where there are problems with quality. In 
the three regional states of Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR, there have been cases 
where poor quality seed has been traced back to specific companies, and the farmers 
have subsequently been compensated (Astatke et al. 2015; Getahun et al. 2014; Nefo 
et al. 2015). Learning from this experience, in 2014 a company that supplied low 
quality seed in Amhara, was made accountable under the centralized seed 
distribution system (Astatke et al. 2015). In the past, it might have been possible to 
identify a particular actor, but actors were not held accountable for supplying poor 
quality seed. In addition to the complexity of identifying the actor, this is very much 
related to the lack of putting policies in practice. The DSM forces producers to 
consider their production system, to make sure that they supply good quality seed. 
Moreover, all seed producers, except one international company (Pioneer Hi-Bred), 
produce the same varieties of maize28 released by public research institutes, and the 
government supplies basic seed to the seed producers. For these companies, the 
major competition factor is the quality of their seed. Thus, companies make all 
possible efforts to supply better quality seed, to attract more farmers. The embedded 
accountability has indirectly contributed to an improvement in seed quality when 
compared to the seed produced during the period when the companies were selling 
                                                 
28 Currently, maize dominates DSM activity, mainly because this is the only crop seed 
produced by different companies including private. The production of seed for other food 
crops is often limited to public companies (one at national level and one in each of the 
regional states).  
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in bulk to the central distribution system (Astatke et al. 2015; Getahun et al. 2014; 
Nefo et al. 2015). 
5.5.3 Reduction in public expenditure  
A final benefit of DSM is related to a reduction of public expenditure. DSM has a 
demonstrably clear financial advantage for the government over the central 
distribution system. Every year, the regional state governments allocate a budget for 
the purchase of seed, to be recouped by selling the seed. Oromia regional state, for 
instance, allocated about USD 22.95 million in 2010/11 and USD 32.17 million29 in 
2011/12 (Gelaw 2012). With DSM, it has not been necessary to allocate a budget for 
purchasing seed. Furthermore, DSM has helped the government save money 
previously lost because of unsold seed and unpaid loans30 (Astatke et al. 2015; 
Getahun et al. 2014). Regional governments underwrite seed and fertilizer credit, and 
they have paid out large sums of money annually because of loan defaults and 
unsold seed (Chinigò and Fantini 2015; Fantini 2013; Spielman et al. 2010). In 
addition to paying the value of unsold seed to the bank, the leftover seed could not 
be used because of poor storage, implying a loss of public resources. In 2014 and 
2015 in Amhara regional state alone, seed with a value of about USD 70 million, 
which was left unsold, was destroyed as it had spoiled as a result of being poorly 
stored for some years (informant 79). With DSM, the risk of unsold seed or unpaid 
credit is borne by the companies instead of by the government’s budget. Companies 
make all efforts to minimize these costs, but in the case of the government, there is 
hardly any effort to minimize the costs. Last but not least, DSM has reduced the 
workload of government offices involved in allocating seed, arranging credit, 
accessing seed, tracking its transportation and delivery to farmers, and arranging 
credit repayment if necessary (Benson, Spielman and Kasa 2014; Nefo et al. 2015). 
5.6 Dangling to institutionalize DSM 
The results of the analysis indicate that executive leaders at different levels recognize 
the stated benefits of DSM, which is evident in measures taken by these executives. 
Regional bureau heads in the three regional states have requested their regional seed 
enterprises to become actively involved in the piloting (informant 51, 54, 79). In 2013, 
the MoA wrote to the BoAs, requesting that the piloting be continued. When 
preparing the second five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (2016-2020),31 the 
                                                 
29 Figures converted from local currency to United States dollars (USD) using an average 
exchange rate for the period (1 USD = 17.34 Birr). 
30 Recently, some regions such as Oromia have stopped providing seed on credit, to minimize 
loan defaults. 
31 GTP II is the second five-year government plan for the period 2015/16 – 2019/20, with 
different development targets and means to achieve them. 
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MoA included seed marketing as one of the strategies for efficient seed distribution, 
and the plan was cascaded to the regional states (informant 65; FDRE 2015). At 
various meetings, the achievements obtained through DSM have been discussed and 
deemed a success by government officials, and the area covered by the pilot has 
expanded over the years (informant 59, 65). However, so far, no official approval has 
been given to using DSM beyond piloting. About 75% of the interviewees doubted 
whether DSM would be adopted as an official system in parallel with or to replace 
the existing seed distribution system. This doubt arose because of various reactions 
and actions of the executive leaders, and policy decisions that do not seem to support 
DSM.  
What is striking to some interviewees is that executive leaders have not reacted as 
proactively as they normally do when they observe the potential of a given pilot 
(informant 15, 29, 48, 61, 62). Experience shows that if the claimed benefits of a pilot 
attract the attention of the government, executive leaders exploit this to design a 
policy or an approach, and the pilot is then changed into full-scale implementation. 
One commonly cited example in Ethiopia is the change of extension system to the 
National Extension Intervention Programme after observing a scheme piloted in the 
1990s, as described earlier. In that case, the government adopted the system even 
before the pilot had ended. Using experience from elsewhere is still common 
practice in Ethiopia. Examples include adopting a developmental state approach, 
based on experiences from East Asian countries (Fantini 2013; Fourie 2013); 
developing an agro-industrial zone and establishing agricultural technical vocation 
education and training, based on experiences from China; restructuring the 
agricultural research system, based on experiences from India; and promoting a bio-
energy strategy, based on experiences from Brazil (Alemu and Scoones 2013). 
However, despite the support of executive leaders at regional and national levels to 
expand the pilot sites, the executive does not seem to be interested in adopting DSM 
as a system beyond piloting (informant 48, 61, 62).  
The actions of the executive leaders also reveal a lack of intention to use DSM in the 
future. BoA and MoA officials regularly monitor DSM activities. However, in this 
monitoring process, attention focuses on seasonal physical targets, (the amount of 
seed planned to be made available for farmers), and the discussions focus on 
whether this target has been achieved (informant 52, 59). This process misses a 
critical evaluation of the approaches used to make the seed available, and therefore 
there is no evaluation that could lead to the decision of whether or not to continue 
to use DSM (informant 56). Moreover, during the piloting of the last six years, the 
BoAs have not taken the initiative to plan and implement DSM. Instead, the BoAs 
Chapter 5: The rise of seed marketing and its uncertain future 
102 
 
only coordinate DSM activities with the initiation and support of ISSD and the ATA 
(informant 52, 57). This shows a lack of internal motivation in the BoAs to use the 
experience of the pilot to help in deciding whether to use DSM as an approach in the 
future. So far, the government’s interest in supporting the pilot has been limited to 
its contribution to achieving the annual seed delivery targets (informant 15, 47, 50).  
The government’s decision to exclude details about seed marketing from the seed 
regulation that was enacted in 2016 further confirms its lack of commitment to 
officially make DSM one of the marketing channels in the future. While the 
regulation deals in detail with variety registration and quality control, the issue of 
seed marketing is excluded. In fact, the only relevant article in the regulation, Article 
17, says “[t]he distribution of seed shall be carried out in accordance with the detail 
implementation directive to be issued by the ministry” (CoM 2016: p. 8843). Article 
17 of the regulation implies that the ministry intends to continue seed distribution, 
but there is no indication of using seed marketing. Given the experience from the 
pilot and the provisions of the seed law regarding seed marketing, the regulation 
could have included the regulatory details to facilitate the implementation of seed 
marketing. Moreover, Article 17 does not specify how seed distribution should be 
carried out; this is also left for a future directive, showing that issues related to seed 
marketing have been systematically excluded from the regulation. 
From the above, it is clear that the executive leaders support the DSM pilot, but are 
not interested in formally adopting DSM as one of the official approaches for seed 
marketing. There has been little interest from the executive to use the experience of 
the pilot for deciding whether to use DSM in the future. Similarly, the government 
has not included the issue of seed marketing in the new seed regulation to facilitate 
the smooth implementation of seed marketing. However, despite these signs of not 
adopting DSM beyond piloting, no decision has been made against the use of DSM 
either. Such ambiguity indicates that there are competing or even conflicting 
objectives regarding the use of DSM, leading to non-decision. The following section 
explains why a decision has not been made about DSM in Ethiopia.  
5.7 Non-decision explained 
Analysis of data generated in the interview shows that the non-decision making of 
the executive is related to both institutional lock-ins, whereby the issue of DSM was 
omitted from the decision-making agenda, and a deep structural issue, which 
guided the decision-making process. These two issues explain non-decision making 
at different layers of cause, and are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
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5.7.1 Three institutional lock-ins 
Over the last six years, except for the piloting, the issue of DSM has not been 
presented to the executives for decision. This is reminiscent of one of the theoretical 
concepts discussed above: non-decision making is organized through institutions 
that systematically exclude a particular issue from the agenda (Bonal 2012; Burnell 
2002). The analysis revealed three major reasons behind excluding the issue of DSM 
from the decision-making agenda, including the interest of bureaucrats to have a 
decision without their contribution; the symbiotic relationship between the existing 
system and actors; and the perception that distribution is the only way to achieve 
developmental targets. These reasons are further elaborated below. 
Bureaucrats want the decision to be made without their contribution   
According to many informants, the DSM pilot started with the objective of testing 
whether DSM serves the seed delivery objective better than seed distribution. 
Among the three quarters of interviewees who doubted DSM would be continued, 
58% expressed the need to have a directive for its implementation. Accordingly, the 
pilot needs to be concluded by presenting the pros and cons of the two seed 
marketing systems to the executives (informant 45, 57, 59, 61). The conclusion will 
help the executives to formally decide whether to use DSM or not. If the decision is 
‘yes’, a directive for its wider implementation will follow. To implement DSM 
beyond piloting, implementers in the regional states seem to be waiting for the 
official conclusion of the pilot and subsequently a written directive from the MoA. 
This indicates that at the regional level, DSM will remain a pilot until the ministry 
provides the regions with an implementation directive. However, the idea of having 
a directive was contested by a high-level bureaucrat from the ministry (informant 
12). According to this bureaucrat, although there is no regulatory detail, the existing 
policy does not restrict the implementation of DSM. The regional states can use DSM 
to improve the efficiency of seed supply without an additional policy directive.  
The arguments of the bureaucrats at both levels seem to avoid the issue of DSM at 
their level by pushing it to the other level: if the issue is handled at the other level, 
the bureaucrats are not required to provide the executive at their own level with a 
recommendation about the decision. Confirming this behaviour of the bureaucrats, 
many interviewees argue that the bureaucrats in the ministry and bureaus are not 
confident about presenting a clear recommendation to the executives (informant 57, 
62, 75). Instead, bureaucrats at all levels practice self-censorship, and only focus on 
the implementation of the given activities (informant 57, 77). The major lock-in is 
that bureaucrats expect a decision but do not wish to contribute to the decision, and 
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this has systematically limited the bureaucrats from presenting a recommendation 
for decision about DSM.  
There is a strong symbiotic relationship between actors and the seed distribution system 
Seed distribution is a well-established system that has also developed a symbiotic 
relationship with actors in the system, making it difficult to easily withdraw from it. 
The main functions of the MoA and BoAs, concern extension service and regulation. 
The primary objective of the extension service is the transfer of knowledge. 
However, experts and bureaucrats in these organizations tend to provide seed to 
farmers so as to see the outcome of their extension service (informant 46). As such, 
they have been providing farmers with agricultural inputs, including seed, for a long 
time (Belay 2002; Bishaw 2004; Kassa 2008). Thus, seed has been in the grip of the 
extension service, and the system has become well established. The current approach 
of the government, as a developmental state, has strengthened this already well-
developed culture of supplying seed through the government system. This approach 
added amount of seed to be distributed as a target, established a coordinated system 
for input distribution, and increased the numbers of agricultural extension workers, 
to the centralized seed distribution system.  
The target amount of seed to be distributed is set for each district annually, and this 
is coordinated by a structure established from district to national level. In turn, this 
is supported by extension workers in the village. With over 60,000 agricultural 
extension workers, Ethiopia has the lowest ratio of farmers to extension workers in 
the world (Alemu and Tripp 2010; Berhanu and Poulton 2014; Davis et al. 2010; 
World Bank 2016). This has routinized the process of the seed distribution system. 
For those involved in the system, it is a job for which they are employed, creating a 
symbiotic relationship between the actors in the extension structure and the 
distribution system (informant 51, 62, 78). This symbiotic relationship supports the 
continuation of the same system rather than adopting a system that will affect the 
jobs of these actors. As a result, the bureaucrats have not provided a 
recommendation to the executives to change the system. This means that although 
the bureaucrats recognize the increases in efficiency gained through DSM, and they 
have no objection to the use of DSM, it is hard for them to initiate a decision that 
would affect their job; consequently, they have not yet presented the executives with 
a recommendation to use DSM.  
The symbiotic relationship is not just limited to the bureaucratic structure but also 
extends to the seed companies, which hinders them from exerting pressure for 
change. Currently, the companies have neither the capacity nor internal motivation 
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to sell seed directly to farmers. This is because they have not developed a marketing 
capacity, as they are dependent on the government for the marketing of seed, to the 
extent that some of the state-owned seed companies see themselves as part of the 
regional BoA. Some private seed companies consider themselves as out-growers of 
the government. This is partly because in the distribution system, they take basic 
seed from the BoA and supply the certified seed through the distribution system. In 
the distribution system, seed companies, both state-owned and private, do not incur 
the cost of marketing (informant 73). The distribution system has put these 
companies in a comfort zone, as they transfer all marketing costs and risks to the 
government, and the companies have not developed the capacity for marketing 
(informant 19, 67, 72, 78). Moreover, at least in the short term, both state-owned and 
private companies do not see any economic incentive in being involved in seed 
marketing. Involvement in marketing increases their costs, workload and risks, but 
these have been shouldered by the government. For state-owned companies in 
particular, the distribution system guarantees they will make profit, as they have the 
leverage to decide on price through simple consensus among themselves (Benson, 
Spielman and Kasa 2014). Because of this economic incentive for the companies to 
remain in the distribution system, they do not put pressure on the government to 
change the existing system.  
Seed distribution is perceived as the only way to achieve development targets  
The government has different development targets to achieve. One is the amount of 
seed to be made available at distribution centres. Executive leaders at all levels are 
given these targets to attain, and their performance is evaluated accordingly (Alemu 
2011). The targets are cascaded throughout the structure, and the bureaucrats 
implement different activities to make sure that they are achieved. As opposed to 
this, DSM is perceived by bureaucrats as market liberalization. Moreover, although 
the major suppliers of seed in Ethiopia are state-owned companies, DSM is 
associated with private companies, which in turn are perceived as solely focused on 
profit. Because of these perceptions, DSM is expected to preclude direct involvement 
of the government bureaucracy in the seed supply process. If they have no direct 
control over the process, bureaucrats are not sure whether they will achieve the 
targets (informant 15, 75, 79). Instead, the government has established cooperatives 
in most parts of the country, which the bureaucrats can control. The ATA’s proposal 
to set up and strengthen an agro-dealer network during its establishment at the end 
of 2010 was rejected by the government on the grounds that there were already 
many cooperatives in the country that could be used for seed distribution (informant 
15).  
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Another target related to seed distribution is the issue of equity. Although Ethiopia 
is a federal state, the central government plays a major role in guiding economic 
development. Beyond economic development, the central government also wants to 
ensure that the available seed is fairly distributed across the different administrative 
units. This strategy started when ESE, a state-owned seed company under the 
national government, dominated seed production. With this strategy, the allocation 
of seed starts at the national level, to ensure that the regional states get their fair 
share of the available seed (informant 80). This avoids complaints at all 
administrative levels. The government continues to follow the same strategy despite 
the increase in seed production with the establishment of the regional seed 
enterprises. Bureaucrats consider that if seed marketing is left to the companies, it 
will be difficult to distribute seed fairly, not only among the regional states but also 
among districts within the regional states (informant 12, 43, 62, 63). Given the 
general shortage of seed, the bureaucrats expect that if companies were allowed to 
sell, they could sell all their seed in the accessible areas alone, and the inaccessible 
areas might not get any. To avoid such imbalances and the resultant complaints, the 
government allocates seed to all distribution centres, and according to these 
interviewees, DSM does not guarantee this output.  
The bureaucrats are committed to these targets, which are important for the 
government as a developmental state. The targets are critical outputs at all levels, 
and the implementers need to have control over the process. As long as the 
bureaucrats are given these targets to attain, they will continue to use the existing 
system over which they have control, rather than to rely on a system over which 
they have no or less control. The system of delivery is thus routinized and there are 
investments in the infrastructure, including the development of cooperatives at local 
level. Such a routinized system and commitment to attain targets through control 
will continue to prevent the bureaucrats from presenting a new idea for change.  
5.7.2 Deeply rooted structural challenges 
The above discussions show how the idea of DSM has been excluded from the 
decision-making agenda of the officials. As a result, the pilot has continued without 
an official decision being made about its use. But one could also ask whether the 
reasons used for excluding DSM from the agenda have something in common. 
Returning to the concept of non-decision making, if the lock-ins discussed above 
systematically omit the issue of DSM from the decision-making agenda, then they 
may have a common origin.  
During the initial stage of introducing DSM, the major topic of discussion was not 
whether or not DSM helps to overcome the problems of seed distribution 
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inefficiency, but whether or not DSM is in line with the government’s approach. 
Moreover, presenting the idea of DSM to the bureau head was difficult, mainly 
because it was assumed that the bureau head would not accept DSM, because DSM 
is perceived to be outside the government approach (Chapter 4). This shows the 
existence of underlying reasons at a more structural level from which the lock-ins 
emanated. Such underlying reasons, as indicated above, are not part of a specific 
policy on paper but rather form a general policy direction, which may not be equally 
clear for all. These are the economic development approach and political system, 
which together guide the making and implementation of economic policy in 
Ethiopia. That is why the regional core groups referred to the bureau heads for the 
approval of piloting DSM in 2011. 
Ethiopia follows two different economic development approaches simultaneously. 
The first, a market-oriented economic system, has been followed since 1991. As 
reported by de Waal (2013), the late Prime Minister Meles “clearly stated that there 
should be no confusion that the EPRDF’s mission is to build a capitalist state” (p. 
151). However, despite a series of proclamations that emphasize the importance of 
the private sector, control of the agricultural input market began when the private 
sector in the fertilizer market was crowded out by the ruling party holdings in 1998 
(Gebremedhin, Hoekstra and Tegegne 2006a; Hagmann and Abbink 2011; Rashid et 
al. 2013). Moreover, while vegetable seed is still sold under a liberal market system, 
as only a limited number of farmers use it, the government is heavily involved in the 
distribution of seed of major food crops (Hassena and Dessalegn 2011).  
By 2001, the Ethiopian government had declared itself as a developmental state to 
speed up economic development and eradicate poverty (Gebresenbet 2014; Hailu 
2014; Simon 2011). This is the second system currently followed that is critical 
particularly in policy making and implementation in Ethiopia. Theoretically, the 
developmental state concept places emphasis on the capacity of the state structure 
(organizational, technical, administrative and political) to effectively implement the 
hegemonic developmental project created by elites (Fantini 2013; Mkandawire 2001). 
To this end, it is important to have a competent bureaucracy based on merit and 
with long-term professional career prospects (Evans 1995; Fritz and Menocal 2007; 
Rauch and Evans 2000). However, as argued by Lefort (2012), the version of the 
developmental state in Ethiopia does not include this concept as a necessary 
condition. Lefort (2012) further explains that the executive leaders of Ethiopia 
believe that they can formulate policies on their own and guide their 
implementation. This policy making approach denies experts and bureaucrats the 
capacity and power to operationalize hegemonic development projects as well as to 
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give constructive suggestions in the decision-making process, particularly when the 
idea is outside the frame of the government. Instead, they are limited to 
implementing activities to achieve the given targets. The lock-ins are linked to the 
power relations between executives and bureaucrats in the system; and in the 
following paragraphs, the lock-ins are discussed against this background. 
Because they have limited power, there is a high level of self-censorship among the 
bureaucrats and experts at all levels, to ensure they do not stray outside the frame 
of the government (Kassaw and Weldselassie 2015). The bureaucrats know that seed 
marketing falls outside the seed distribution frame of the government. Promoting 
an idea that is outside the frame of the government brings the risk that the experts 
and bureaucrats will be labelled as ‘anti-development,' which is undesirable (Fantini 
2013; Gebresenbet 2014; Vaughan 2011). Thus, regardless of their capacity, 
bureaucrats do not want to make suggestions when technical issues are dominated 
by political imperatives (Alemu 2011). This is directly related to one of the lock-ins: 
bureaucrats at both regional and national levels expect a decision to be made 
without their contribution. While both the ministry and the regional state have been 
issuing different regulations and directives, bureaucrats at both levels have been 
pushing the issue of developing a directive for seed marketing to the other level, 
instead of drafting one and putting it on the table of their superiors. By doing so, 
they want the decision to be made at the other level without requiring them to 
contribute.  
Similarly, because of the power difference and the wish to remain within the frame, 
bureaucrats do not want to suggest different ways of attaining the targets. Different 
targets are set and cascaded to the lower levels as an approach to development, and 
bureaucrats at all levels are responsible for achieving them. These targets are given 
to the bureaucrats together with the means (extension and cooperative systems) to 
attain them. The use of the extension system for input delivery has long been 
criticized, as it influences the effectiveness of extension work (Belay 2002; 
Gebremedhin, Hoekstra and Tegegne 2006b; Kassa 2008). However, for bureaucrats, 
these are the structures over which they have control to implement development 
plans and attain the targets. Given the power relations they have with executives, 
the bureaucrats lack the courage to suggest different ways of achieving these targets.  
Another issue that is strongly linked to the distribution system is that of equity, 
where different administrative units have to receive a fair share of the available seed. 
This is related to one of the objectives of using the developmental state approach: 
poverty eradication, which officials are obsessed with. To achieve such an objective, 
the top officials wish to ensure that inputs are distributed fairly across the different 
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administrative units. This critical output can be achieved under their control 
through the distribution system, and bureaucrats have no confidence that it would 
be attained through DSM. The process of trying to achieve the targets (amount of 
seed and equity) leads to the other lock-in: the routinization of the input delivery 
system in the agricultural extension structure. In some cases, the extension structure 
distributes the seed, and in other cases it assists the cooperative structure to 
distribute the seed. Thus, the lock-ins are related to the developmental state 
approach used in Ethiopia. 
Currently, one of the concerns of government officials in relation to the equity of 
seed distribution is the potential of DSM to cover marginal areas and minor crops. 
This emanates from the view that DSM is a substitute for the current distribution 
system, which is standing at one end of the complex system, closing the door not 
only to the final decision to use DSM, but also to deliberation about reconfiguring 
the seed marketing constellation. Given its business orientation, DSM cannot 
address marginal areas and minor crops that have less economic return for the seed 
companies. This calls for reconfiguring the seed marketing constellation, and 
identifying a different marketing system that targets different geographical locations 
and crops. However, lack of interest from the bureaucrats to present a 
recommendation on the future of DSM closed the opportunity to deliberate on the 
future of the seed marketing constellation with the executives, resulting in no 
decision being made.  
To gain a comprehensive understanding, it is necessary to go one layer deeper and 
reveal the importance of seed as a political commodity. Although the government 
has decided to develop a market economy, this is through a selective partial 
liberalization process (Bach 2011; Chinigò and Fantini 2015). For the current ruling 
party, which emerged from a Marxist-Leninist background, marketing policies for 
strategic sectors are designed and implemented in recognition of the importance of 
neo-liberalism, to avoid being hostile to the ‘West’ (Alemu and Scoones 2013; Bach 
2011; Vaughan 2011). However, as will be discussed in the next paragraphs, seed for 
food crops is such an important commodity that it also has political value for the 
government and thus should remain under government control. Seed distribution is 
part of the government’s developmental state approach, which frames poverty as an 
avalanche. Such framing has much deeper implications in terms of the role of 
government in controlling economic activities. As reported by Ohno (2009), the 
developmental state in Ethiopia is not simply a concept, but entails “very pragmatic 
and action-oriented guidelines to inform the legitimacy and the policy formulation 
and implementation of the present Ethiopian government” (p. 2). The 
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developmental state gives power to the executive leaders to promote, drive and 
control the process of economic development, to address two goals at the same time: 
the attainment of economic development goals as discussed above, and political 
control (Chinigò and Fantini 2015; Fantini 2013).  
Chanyalew (2015) reported that the ruling party maintains core institutional units 
that are related to the farmers and uses them as politically influential segments of 
society, thus maximizing its political gain by creating a strong link with them. As 
also noted by Vaughan (2011), the direct coalition with the people is what the late 
Prime Minister Meles set as an important strategic direction. Moreover, according to 
de Waal (2013), the late prime minister believed that “the peasant is the bedrock of 
a stable developmental coalition” (p. 155), which is the cornerstone of the strategy 
of the ruling party. In the revolutionary democracy and the programme of the ruling 
party document, farmers are considered as important supporters of revolutionary 
democracy (EPRDF 2001). It is thus important for the ruling party to directly provide 
agricultural inputs, including seed, as one of the strategies for attaining and 
maintaining strong links with farmers. Prior studies in Ethiopia have shown that 
agricultural input and extension services are used as a means to favour a certain 
group of farmers, showing the government’s vested interest in remaining in the 
process of seed distribution (Berhanu and Poulton 2014; Chanie 2007; Chinigò and 
Fantini 2015; Lefort 2012). Thus, the distribution of seed of the major food crops is 
used as a strategy for creating a strong political link with the majority of the farmers, 
and for attaining economic growth. This is in line with the argument of Berhanu and 
Poulton (2014) about the extension service that investment in agricultural extension 
in Ethiopia is to attain two objectives: 
The formal objective has been to enhance the productivity and production capacity 
of smallholder farmers so as to stimulate broad-based growth. The unstated objective 
has been to extend the political control of the EPRDF throughout the country 
(Berhanu and Poulton 2014: p. 209).  
Therefore, the reason why no decision has been made about the use of DSM is 
related to the use of seed distribution for both economic development and political 
control. The above discussions also strengthen our starting point: that policy making 
is inherently complex, and that a given problem may be understood differently at 
different levels.  
 
Seed for Change 
111 
 
C
h
a
p
te
r 
5
 
5.8 Conclusion 
On the one hand, executives in the MoA and BoAs have seen the benefit of DSM and 
accordingly support the expansion of the pilot. The pilot has been implemented for 
six years, the area under the pilot has expanded, and seed producers in particular 
consider DSM as an alternative seed delivery channel. On the other hand, our 
analysis shows that various lock-ins have hindered the embracing of DSM as one of 
the channels or approaches to delivering the available seed to farmers. Defining the 
challenges behind the lack of a decision about seed marketing in Ethiopia is complex, 
as the observed lock-in at the operational level is the reflection of the deeper 
structure that created these challenges. Although this is a common phenomenon of 
complex societal challenges, in the Ethiopian case the inseparability of the 
government and the ruling party adds to the complexity.  
Many have observed that there is no separation between the government and the 
ruling party in Ethiopia (Bach 2011; Fantini 2013; Veen 2015). Fantini (2013) points 
out that “a single Amharic word, menghist, indicates at the same time the state, the 
government and the party in power” (p. 4). The government and the ruling party 
are closely related, as the government policies are a reflection of party objectives; as 
noted by Veen (2015), in Ethiopia “the state becomes partly an instrument of the 
party” (p. 23). Thus, the institutions reinforce each other, and in the context of this 
study, this is through the developmental state approach. The ruling party puts its 
political value into practice through the government bureaucratic structure, and the 
bureaucratic structure uses the values in the ruling party to strengthen its rules of 
the game. This is in line with the systems change concept of Geels (2004) that systems 
are not autonomous; rather they are the outcome of a co-evolutionary process of 
different systems and are deeply embedded in the structure of the society.  
This analysis also confirms that policy makers do not necessarily opt for everything 
that contributes to economic development. The policy decision is made not only 
because of the observable benefits that may be brought to society, or because of 
rational arguments, but also because of the political value and its implications 
(Byerlee et al. 2007). Thus, despite acknowledging the role of DSM in providing seed 
for farmers efficiently and contributing to economic development, no immediate 
official decision on the use of DSM has been forthcoming. The reason for this is if 
DSM is accepted because of its economic benefits, the political interest of the party 
(creating and maintaining strong ties with the majority of the farmers) is at stake. 
Regardless of the benefits they observe in using DSM, when deciding about DSM, 
the executive leaders are constrained by the interests of the ruling party. This shifts 
the decision about DSM from the government context to the party context. Although 
Chapter 5: The rise of seed marketing and its uncertain future 
112 
 
both are the same in the Ethiopian context, this adds to the complexity of the 
decision-making process. Therefore, the use of seed distribution for both economic 
development and political control, with competing objectives, has complicated the 
decision about seed marketing in Ethiopia. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Since its commencement in 1991, the current Ethiopian government has focused on 
agricultural development, and it has developed several policies both for agriculture 
in general and for the seed sector in particular. In the case of the seed sector, the first 
specific policy was the 1997 regulation; this was revised and enacted as a law in 2000, 
and revised again in 2013. Despite the policies, there have been persistent challenges 
in the Ethiopian seed sector, including a shortage of seed, the mismatch between 
demand and supply, seed left over despite not satisfying the demand of farmers, 
and poor seed quality. Different studies identified technical gaps that limited the 
performance of the seed sector. In Ethiopia, a limited number of studies have 
considered policy aspects of the seed sector. These studies have focused on the 
extent to which policy responds to existing problems, and the extent to which what 
is in the policy document is implemented. However, why the existing policies have 
not addressed some of the problems, and why some of the policies on paper were 
not implemented have seldom been discussed, limiting the full understanding of the 
challenges of the Ethiopian seed sector.  
Policy making and implementation are not value free. Policy options are not selected 
and implemented only to overcome the problem at hand. Actors in the process 
prefer to have policies that are in line with their values and interests, which are not 
necessarily in line with the values and interests of others. Thus, actors in a policy 
making process can include a certain policy option while excluding others, which 
from the view of other actors may not help to solve the problem at hand. If the 
problem persists after the implementation of the policy option selected, it implies 
that the policy either did not target the problem properly or the policy was meant to 
serve another, unfolding goal. Similarly, actors who are supposed to implement a 
policy may intentionally implement some parts of a policy on paper but not others, 
which others may interpret as policy implementation gap. Actors have different 
reasons as to why they prefer certain policies, both in the formulation and 
implementation, and not others. This study goes beyond the identification of ‘gaps’, 
and analyses how actors influenced by institutions include and exclude options in 
policy making and implementation. By analysing how actors and institutions 
influence policy making and implementation, this thesis contributes to the 
understanding of seed sector policy challenges in Ethiopia. The main research 
question focused on addressing how actors and institutions influenced the 
formulation and implementation of seed policy in Ethiopia from 2008 to 2016. 
The study covered both seed policy making and implementation. In relation to 
policy making, the research reconstructed the process of revising the 2000 seed law 
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from 2008 to 2013. The research reconstructed the policy making process, and 
examined how actors negotiated their preferred policy options and how these 
negotiations were influenced by the different arenas used in the process (Chapter 2). 
In this case, the study focused on seed sector governance and variety registration, 
conducting a detailed analysis. The rounds model and the concept of policy arenas 
were used to analyse the outcomes of a series of negotiations. To have a clear 
understanding of the institutions behind the negotiation process, the research 
further focused on one of the problems of the seed sector that the law aims to 
address, namely seed quality. The study analysed how actors defined the problem 
of seed quality in different ways and opted for different solutions (Chapter 3). Frame 
analysis was used to understand how actors defined the problem differently and 
preferred alternative solutions. The research also analysed the institutions that shape 
the frames of actors. These analyses helped to explain how actors influence policy 
making and the institutions that guided their influence.  
The other set of research questions focused on analysing how actors and institutions 
influenced policy implementation. The process of introducing and expanding direct 
seed marketing (DSM) in the country, from 2011 to 2016, to overcome the challenges 
of seed supply was investigated. The research on the implementation process 
comprised two parts. The first part of the research aimed at understanding the 
process of introducing and expanding DSM, under the top-down governance 
culture of Ethiopia and competing discourses on seed distribution versus seed 
marketing. The concepts of multi-level perspective on transition and transition 
management were used to understand the process and the outcome. Although the 
findings of this research indicated an increasing use of the DSM approach in the 
period 2011-2016 (Chapter 4), there has yet to be an official decision by the 
government on its future. The second part of the research was based on this finding, 
and involved analysing the reasons behind the lack of a decision on DSM. The 
concept of non-decision making and institutional lock-in were used to explain how 
institutions lead to non-decision (Chapter 5). The analysis of the change process and 
lack of decision were useful to understand how actors influence the implementation 
of the existing policies and the underlying institutions that shape this influence. 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to summarize the findings of the research by 
answering the main research question, and to discuss the overall outcome of the 
research. The main research question – how did actors and institutions influence the 
formulation and implementation of seed policy in Ethiopia from 2008 to 2016 – was broken 
down into four specific research questions (Chapter 1). Addressing the specific 
research questions also included uncovering the institutions that are important in 
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shaping actors’ influence in seed policy making and implementation. The findings 
help to broaden our understanding as to why some of the options were not included 
in the seed-related policy documents and why some policies specified in the 
documents were not implemented.  
Beyond answering the main research question and widening our knowledge, this 
concluding chapter also discusses the overall outcome of the research, focusing on 
the existing tension between seed distribution and seed marketing, and between top-
down decision making and stakeholders’ involvement in the policy making process. 
Based on the discussion and the understanding of the complex challenges in the seed 
sector of Ethiopia, this chapter finally provides some suggestions that may help to 
overcome the problems in seed sector policy making and implementation, and 
establish the seed sector on solid ground.  
6.2 Conclusion 
Different actors take part in policy making and implementation. However, not all 
actors have equal influence over what has to be included in or excluded from the 
policy document. Similarly, actors do not only define what has to be implemented, 
but also how it has to be implemented. The influence of actors in policy making and 
implementation depends on the roles and power of those actors as defined by 
institutions in the system. The following sub-sections discuss how actors and 
institutions together have influenced seed policy making and implementation in 
Ethiopia.  
6.2.1 Negotiation of policy options and frames 
The influence of actors on the content of a draft policy document depends on the 
composition of the actors, as well as the institutions shaping the process. This is 
mainly because public policy making is neither a one-off effort nor a one-actor role; 
rather it is a process that involves different actors at different times in different 
arenas. Not all actors are present in all arenas, and the composition of actors in a 
given arena determines the output of that particular event. The revision process of 
the 2000 seed law took about four years of negotiations, and different seed sector 
policy actors participated at different times. There were several rounds of revision 
in which drafts were produced and revised by actors in different arenas. The 
analysis revealed that different policy arenas provided opportunities for different 
actors to place their preferred policy options on the table, and to get these 
incorporated into the draft working document (Chapter 2). Focusing on variety 
registration and the governance of the seed sector, the analysis revealed that the 
content of the draft working document changed depending on who dominated a 
particular arena showing the opportunities that actors were using. When experts 
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from public organizations dominated the arena, exemption of ‘export-only’ varieties 
was excluded in favour of registering all varieties, and establishing a centralized 
governance system was included in the draft document. In the arenas where the 
EHPEA was present, exemption of ‘export-only’ varieties was included in the draft 
policy document. Similarly, in the arenas where the government officials were 
present, the establishment of a central governance structure was excluded in favour 
of decentralization. While such inclusion and exclusion processes are positive steps 
towards a deliberative policy making process, the final decision remained in the 
hands of the executive branch of the government. Policies are decided with little 
consideration of the outcomes of the policy drafting arenas. This is mainly related to 
the loose connection between the drafting arenas and the decision arenas, and the 
blurred separation of power between the executive and the legislature.  
Decision arenas are in the Council of Ministers (CoM) and the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives (HoPRs), where the draft policies from different agencies are 
presented and approved. During the negotiation process on the content of the 
revised seed policy, there was a lack of reflexivity among actors. All actors seemed 
to pursue their own idea to the end. None of them was willing to give up his/her 
stronghold and accept the ideas of others, nor agree to find a solution in a 
compromise. For the expert group, there was a ‘right’ policy to be followed to change 
the seed sector, and this was backed by the desire to manage the seed sector. For the 
government, non-reflexivity persisted because the executive branch of the 
government has the power to decide on policy by default, although this is formally 
the role of the parliament. This informal rule, which gives more power to the 
executive branch of the government, gives leverage to the executive branch not to 
accept views of others, affecting how policy decision is made. In the first place, there 
is no strategic link between the processes of the drafting arena and the decision 
arena. This disconnect blocked the critical decision-making arena from taking into 
account the views of different actors. The CoM, the arena where critical policy 
decisions are made, made its decision on the seed policy based only on the content 
of the draft and briefing provided by the ministry. The framing analysis showed that 
actors had different views of the problems and thus also suggested different 
solutions. The ministry was just one of the many actors with their own frames, and 
the ministry was not expected to present the perspectives of other policy actors, 
when presenting its policy option to the CoM. Thus, the system of decision making 
did not allow different actors to participate in the critical decision-making arena to 
present their preferred policy option, nor did it forces officials from the ministry to 
present views that had been contested in the drafting arenas. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion and discussion 
118 
 
Another reason that also explains the disconnect between arenas is related to the 
blurred separation of power between the executive and the legislative branches of 
government. The executive branch of the government is dominating the policy 
making processes. The informal rule is that the legislative branch accepts the 
exclusive power of the executive branch in policy making and does not critically 
review the decisions of the executive. This explains the dominant role of the 
executive and the lack of deliberation and reflexivity in the process. Under such 
conditions, the ideas of other actors are only considered if they are in line with the 
values and strategies of the executive branch of the government. Thus, the positive 
move towards deliberation during the policy-drafting process was not fully utilized 
by actors in the Ethiopian seed policy making process.  
Actors in the policy making process have different perceptions of the problems and 
accordingly frame the problems and solutions to fit their perceptions. Using a 
governance perspective, this study identified two dominant frames that describe the 
cause of poor seed quality, implying different governance solutions (Chapter 3). 
These frames are labelled as the centralization and decentralization frames, referring 
to the two main governance solutions favoured by actors. The centralization frame, 
which is used by experts and bureaucrats, inside and outside the ministry, indicated 
the lack of centralized seed sector governance as the main cause of poor seed quality 
in the country, providing the rationale for establishing a central governance 
structure. From the other side, the decentralization frame, which is used by 
government officials, emphasized the lack of alignment of seed sector governance 
with the regional government structure, implying the need to decentralize the 
governance structure of the seed sector.   
This study found that the frames persisted through the whole period of seed policy 
revision (2008–2013), reflecting a lack of deliberation and reflexivity during the 
process of seed policy making. The lack of deliberation and reflexivity was 
aggravated by the fact that the government was only interested in accepting ideas 
that fitted in with existing political policies. One major policy that the government 
did not want to overturn was the policy that dissolved the National Agricultural 
Input Authority, an authority that centrally coordinated the seed sector prior to 2005. 
The centralization frame of the experts and bureaucrats is, in fact, to have a similar 
coordinating structure at the national level, which is not in line with the decision 
made by the government. This closed off any possibility of negotiating for this 
option, and both groups continued using their initial frame. Therefore, in addition 
to the perception of the actors that their proposed option would solve the problem 
better, both frames were embedded in the overall interest and strategy of the actors 
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promoting the frames, which resulted in limited deliberation and absence of 
reflexivity during the process of policymaking. 
The frames linked to the problem of seed quality by both groups of actors seem a 
paradox from the outset. Those who are commonly blamed for centralizing power 
(the executives) proposed decentralization, while those who have no formal power 
(experts and bureaucrats) proposed centralization of the governance structure. 
Decentralization is the strategy of the government. The process started in 1991 and 
culminated in the constitution that ratified the establishment of regional states in 
1995. However, influenced by the long history of central government, the 
governance in Ethiopia still tends to be centralized. At both regional and national 
levels, the central government has control of the process, through its regional and 
national structures. Thus, although the executives at national level promote 
decentralization of seed sector governance, this does not necessarily means their 
intention is to give up power. Rather it is a strategy to manage the seed sector at the 
regional state level as opposed to the national level. The decentralization frame is 
thus embedded in the institution that created a federal structure in Ethiopia, which 
was formalized in 1995. Though the government structure has been decentralized, 
the central government controls activities in the regions through additional 
structures like the party system and the Command Post32.  
In the case of those who promoted centralization, this is related to an interest in 
leading the seed sector, as bureaucrats and experts based at federal structure 
currently have no control over seed sector activities in the regions. The bureaucrats 
at the centre have been detached from implementation activities in the seed sector 
since 2004 when the NAIA was dissolved, although there was a disconnect even 
before then, following the establishment of the regional states in 1991. Given the 
federal structure and general decentralization process, bureaucrats and experts in 
the centre have no control over the activities in the regions. Since the government 
follows the developmental state approach, the experts and bureaucrats in the centre 
are required to guide the sector over which they have little direct control. However, 
such roles of the experts support their efforts to regain the power to lead the seed 
sector. Thus, they valued the importance of their role in governing seed quality and 
proposed the centralization of the governance system that guarantees their control 
over the sector. The formal principle to follow the constitution, the principle to lead 
                                                 
32 Command Post is a parallel structure to government offices from district to the Prime 
Minister' s office delegated to get up-to-date information and make decisions on specific tasks. 
The structure is usually for specific sectors and is organized from the relevant government 
offices in those sectors.    
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economic development guided by the concept of developmental state, and the 
principle of state control over the seed sector are important institutions, which are 
critical in defining actors’ interest, and influencing how actors frame the seed quality 
problem and associated solutions. 
The framing of the problem of seed quality and its governance solution not only 
showed how different groups of actors viewed the problem of seed quality, but it is 
also a reflection of the political debate on (de)centralization in Ethiopia. Aligning 
government services to the regional state structure is important for the current 
government, which introduced and practiced federalism as a political institution in 
Ethiopia. Thus, in addition to the objective of solving seed quality problems, 
federalism as a formal institution shapes actors, in this case the government, to 
decentralize roles and responsibilities from federal to regional state level. However, 
this is against the old tradition of centralism in Ethiopia and also affects the power 
of bureaucrats and experts at the centre, leading to the use of the centralization frame 
by these actors. For the users of the centralization frame, this is not just about 
ensuring seed quality: it is about reproducing an old institution of centralism and 
also about their own empowerment at the federal level.  
6.2.2 Policy implementation through collaborative governance 
Influencing the content of a policy document is an important step, but may not 
necessarily imply actors’ influence on the policy outcome. Actors shape policies at 
all stages of policy making and implementation. This research analysed the process 
of initiating and implementing an existing policy to solve one of the persistent 
problems of the seed sector, namely the inefficiency of the seed supply. The result 
highlighted how seed sector actors and associated institutions influence policy 
implementation. On the one hand, the current seed supply regime (centralized seed 
distribution) is not mentioned in the seed-related policy documents, but it has been 
in use extensively at least since the end of the 1990s. On the other hand, free seed 
marketing, which has been provided for in the policy document since 1997, has not 
been facilitated. This is despite the fact that the sector faces problems of inefficiency 
in supplying seed to the farmer (Chapter 5).  
Since 2011, regional seed core groups, a collaborative governance structure, started 
piloting DSM at the regional state level and it is currently widely used (Chapter 4). 
Since 2015, more than a third of hybrid maize seed has been sold through DSM. This 
research showed that actors had to pass through a complex process to implement 
the seed marketing policy that had been in the policy document since 1997 (Chapter 
4). During the initial stage of introducing DSM, the main issue was not whether DSM 
would solve the problem of seed supply inefficiency or not. Rather, it was whether 
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the government would accept DSM or not. Such discussion indicates that DSM is 
not considered to be in line with government interests or strategy and thus could be 
rejected, suggesting that the government did not want to put seed marketing into 
practice. Consequently, the core groups needed to get approval from the BoA heads 
to implement DSM. However, the core group did not require such approval for other 
new ideas to strengthen the seed sector, like activities in seed quality improvement. 
Although both are formally in the policy documents, the BoA heads have the power 
to decide what has to be implemented. This requirement – what has (or has not) to 
be presented for approval – is not obvious for the stakeholders.  
Regardless of the complex institutions behind the seed policy implementation, this 
research showed the potential to implement policy through a collaborative type of 
governance that creates room for deliberation among different actors. The 
collaborative governance structure consists of actors from both inside and outside 
the seed distribution system. The presence of actors outside the distribution system 
helped to introduce the concept of DSM in Ethiopia. In addition to the demonstrated 
potential of DSM for improving the efficiency of the seed supply system, strategic 
management of the governance process helped to expand the approach. Over the 
years, a significant proportion of seed has been sold through DSM (Chapter 4). DSM 
is currently used by default in the districts designated for DSM, particularly by seed 
producers that aim to overcome the problem of carryover seed.  
The research also showed that government officials supported the expansion of 
DSM in the country (Chapter 5). However, while the top-down culture of Ethiopia 
calls for formal approval of a new system, this research identified some of the actions 
of the government that signalled the lack of intent to officially endorse DSM in the 
near future. The critical action of the government against the official endorsement of 
DSM was the exclusion of seed marketing from the 2016 seed regulation. Moreover, 
bureaucrats at both national and regional levels would not bring the issue of DSM 
for decision before government officials. The major reasons are: bureaucrats do not 
want to contribute to decision making on DSM because they assume that the 
government has a strong political interest to remain in the seed distribution system; 
bureaucrats need the seed distribution system to achieve the targets set by the 
government; and there is a symbiotic relationship between actors, the extension 
service as well as seed producers, and the seed distribution system, and thus actors 
want to maintain the distribution system (see Chapter 5 for further details). These 
perceptions and practices have created an institutional lock-in that prevents 
bureaucrats from presenting the recommendation to government officials, thereby 
leading to a non-decision about the future of DSM in the country. 
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6.3 Discussion 
The research has shed light on how different institutions have shaped actors’ 
influence on the processes of policy making and implementation and their outcome. 
As deeply rooted in cognitive and normative mind-sets, institutions shape actors’ 
views and day-to-day action. In the seed policy making and implementation, 
institutions affected the definition of problems, agenda-setting processes, 
identification and scope of solutions, and decision-making spaces and processes. As 
different institutions reflect different beliefs, values and lines of thinking that 
underlie policy processes, they can explain incomprehension, disappointment, 
conflict, and power struggles. This means that a major challenge in the making and 
implementation of policies is how to cope with these divergent institutions. In the 
following sub-section, the challenge of coping with divergent institutions in policy 
making and implementation in the seed sector is discussed.   
6.3.1 Divergent institutions 
The outcome of this research highlighted two conflicting sets of institutions in policy 
making and implementation in Ethiopia. The first set of conflicting institutions is 
about market-based thinking versus centralized planning as leading principles for 
economic development. These two institutionalized ways of thinking on economic 
development influence the thinking and action in the seed sector, and explain why 
policies on paper are not implemented and why new initiatives are not formally 
endorsed. Thus, these institutions are both a political belief to promote economic 
development, and institutionalized systems of operation. Government policies 
emphasize the importance of the market-based economy, and this is the case for 
many of the economic sectors. In recent years, the piloting activities of DSM 
contributed to the increased awareness of the value of marketing in the seed sector 
too, and currently seed marketing is practiced in the country. As opposed to the 
market-based economic development, the other approach is the central planning, 
and in the case of seed this is the centralized seed distribution system. With 
centralized seed distribution, the government centrally determines the amount of 
seed that has to be delivered to a given locality and how. This is an institution that 
has evolved over a long period and is deeply rooted in the political regime. The seed 
distribution system as an institution is supported by the developmental state 
concept, where the government plays the leading role in economic development. 
Although the developmental state concept is not used against market development 
in the other sectors in Ethiopia, in the seed sector it has been used as a pretext to 
continue the centralized seed distribution. Actors in the seed sector use these 
institutionalized systems and accordingly organize the delivery of seed to farmers. 
These two conflicting institutions – the marketing of seed and the centralized 
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distribution of seed– are functional in Ethiopia’s seed sector, and are competing for 
market share regardless of their current official status.  
The tension between these divergent institutions increased because of the dual use 
of seed by the government: the government has used the seed to both promote 
economic development and at the same time to maintain strong political ties with 
farmers. Similar to other studies – e.g. Berhanu and Poulton (2014), Chanie (2007), 
Chanyalew (2015), Chinigò and Fantini (2015), and Lefort (2012) – this study 
revealed that a major reason behind the status quo of centralized seed distribution, 
regardless of improvements made in seed supply efficiency through DSM, or the 
government’s commitment to market-based policy, is that the government considers 
it to be of fundamental importance to maintain strong political ties with the farmers. 
For the government, seed distribution ‘guarantees’ the link with farmers, whereas 
DSM is expected to result in the opposite. The government has used seed 
distribution as a political means, making the competition between seed distribution 
and seed marketing complex.  
The second set of conflicting institutions relates to authoritarian versus participatory 
decision making. These are the authoritative decision-making process of the 
government, in particular the executive branch, and the stakeholders’ role in making 
and implementing policies. The authoritative decision in policy making and 
implementation of the executives is rooted in both the old Ethiopian culture of 
hierarchy and the developmental state concept currently used by the government. 
Given such a background, the executives ‘legitimized’ their authority to decide on 
policy as well as to direct its implementation, with less emphasis on the views of 
others. At the same time, it has become common practice that stakeholders are 
organized to contribute to the policy making and implementation. The process of 
revising the 2000 seed law and the regional seed core groups are good example of 
the roles of stakeholders in the seed policy making and implementation process. 
However, the contribution of stakeholders is only considered by the executive as 
long as it fits in the 'frame' of the decision makers. For instance, when the draft seed 
law was presented to the CoM for their decision, the content of the draft was only 
based on the frame of the ministry with respect to those contested issues.  
Similarly, regardless of policy on paper, the permission to pilot DSM has to come 
from the BoA heads. At the same time, after piloting, the final decision to widely use 
DSM is not expected from the government despite its positive result. Thus, while the 
contribution of stakeholders to policy making and implementation is required, and 
is currently practiced in the seed sector, the acceptance of the outcome of the 
stakeholder process is not as expected. The input of stakeholders is only accepted 
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when the contribution is in line with the existing policy direction. Considering the 
policy input of others only when it matches the policy direction of the decision 
makers, forces other partners to accept only the frame of the decision maker. This 
creates a sense of being forced, leading to tension between how the government 
decides and the role of other stakeholders in the policy making and implementation 
process. When decisions have a political element, stakeholders for instance will not 
risk treading on such sensitive issues, but rather stay away from it, affecting their 
contribution to policy making and implementation. Thus, in the policy making and 
implementation process the stakeholders are not contributing to the decision of the 
government as one would expect. As a result, policy implementation is affected 
because of lack of ownership of the policy option.  
6.3.2 Relaxing of the tensions 
The above discussions showed the existence of two sets of divergent institutions that 
shape how actors view the challenges in the seed sector and subsequently identify 
solutions. In case of the first set of divergent institutions, on the one hand, there is a 
strong belief in the developmental state, and thus centralized seed distribution is 
preferred as the modus to equitably distribute seed across the country. On the other 
hand, centralized distribution is viewed by others as an inefficient system, and they 
propose seed marketing. Currently, these two systems are operational in Ethiopia, 
but the question remains as to whether to go for efficiency gain by adopting DSM, 
or equity by continuing seed distribution. Currently, DSM is viewed by some actors 
as a substitute to the distribution system. Such a view frames DSM as a binary option 
of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. However, it is important to note that DSM cannot replace the existing 
distribution system in Ethiopia for the foreseeable future for at least two important 
reasons. Firstly, subsistence farming dominates Ethiopian agriculture, and there are 
crops that are not economically attractive both for private and state-owned 
companies. Secondly, there are locations that demand smaller amounts of seed, 
which are again not attractive for business, and such areas can be better served with 
more government intervention. Such a diverse agricultural sector requires a 
combination of distribution and marketing for some time to come. Given the diverse 
contexts and demands, a one-size-fits-all solution does not serve the interests of 
Ethiopian agriculture and the seed sector, but rather a mixed constellation serves the 
purpose. 
In case of the second set of divergent institutions, which are related to decision 
making, there are again two different options. The first option is to make decisions 
authoritatively and only consider the contributions of stakeholders when the inputs 
are in line with the policy direction of the authority. The second option is that the 
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government remains the facilitator of the process and promulgates the agreement of 
stakeholders. While the government believes in its policy direction to achieve a 
target and prefers to decide authoritatively, stakeholders may also have different, 
possibly better, policy ideas to achieve the same target. At the same time, there is 
also no guarantee that both policies will not lead to a worsening of the seed sector. 
Under such cases, the choice of one system of decision making over another is less 
likely to benefit the sector.  
It is important to note that societal problems are not something that exists 
objectively, which is equally visible for all actors (Coburn 2006). This study showed 
how different actors view the same problem differently, implying different 
constructions of cause and effect relationships. Thus, societal problems are a social 
construction of cause and effect relationships, and different actors construct the 
problems differently, leading to different solutions being proposed (Benford and 
Snow 2000; Entman 2003). Although one solution may be better than another, it may 
not be shared equally by other actors affecting its implementation. Therefore, using 
authoritative decision making will not help, not because the policy choice is not 
appropriate, but because the decision may not be equally shared by others. At the 
same time, stakeholders’ contributions should be goal-oriented and managed 
properly. It is important to note that actors may have dual objectives to identify a 
given policy option. Consequently, it makes sense to treat decision making as a 
process of co-creation, leading to joint and agreed formulation of solutions for the 
shared problem of the seed sector. This calls for deliberation and reflexivity of the 
process of policy making and implementation (Fineberg and Stern 1996). Though 
there is no guarantee that deliberative policy making and reflexivity will result in a 
different policy option, a policy that is shared by policy actors is better owned and 
implemented than an imposed policy. 
In addition to the tensions, the long tradition of top-down governance coupled with 
the focus on attaining the developmental targets (amount of seed to be supplied) are 
the important challenges to sustainable seed sector development in Ethiopia. 
Current government support for the seed sector focused on the physical production 
of seed to attain the short-term physical targets overlooking long-term seed sector 
development. The current increasing demand for seed in Ethiopia requires a seed 
sector that has been developed on solid ground, and that will able to shoulder the 
pressure. Current support of the Ethiopian government to the seed sector for 
attaining the annual seed supply target needs to be entwined with strategic support 
that also targets the long-term development of the seed sector. The experience of 
regional seed core groups can be used as an example, as these groups focused on 
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solving the systematic challenges of the seed sector rather than simply increasing 
seed production. One of the outcomes of this process was the introduction and 
expansion of seed marketing, which many considered as impossible. Regardless of 
its official status, DSM demonstrated its potential to solve the inefficiency of seed 
supply. Similarly, the core groups have been able to establish a seed regulatory 
system, which is intended to ensure seed quality independent of the interest to 
increase seed production. 
Focusing on the long-term development of the seed sector, those institutions that 
have limited the development of the seed sector may need to be reconsidered. Such 
transformation requires strategic management of the change process, which helps to 
unlock the different institutional lock-ins in the sector. This leads to and requires the 
shaping and reshaping of institutions, enabling the smooth functioning of the seed 
sector. The experience of the regional seed core groups can be used as a stepping 
stone to gradually create a stronger seed sector in Ethiopia. The basic thinking in the 
regional seed core groups is the focus on systematic challenges and co-development 
of solutions. This co-development also includes the catalytic role of external actors 
in the design and start of the regional groups. Based on these experiences, a national 
process of transformation could be envisioned, up-scaling the experiences at 
regional level. This process could generate a self-governing seed sector that 
adequately responds to the increasing demand for seed without depending on the 
day-to-day management of the government. To work on this, actors from both inside 
and outside the seed sector could bring their expertise and insights to foster change. 
Actors external to the current seed system operations can facilitate the process of 
change towards creating a stronger seed sector. 
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Appendix-A. Date and place of interview of anonymous informants 
Informant number Date interviewed Place interviewed 
Informant 1 14-5-2013 Wageningen 
Informant 2 17-5-2013 Wageningen, skype 
Informant 3 25-5-2013 The Hague 
Informant 4 12-6-2013, 29-10-2013, 2-
7-2014 
Addis Ababa 
Informant 5 13-6-2013, 28-6-2013, 
11,7-2014 
Addis Ababa 
Informant 6 24-6-2013 Addis Ababa 
Informant 7 25-6-2013, 4-8-2013 Addis Ababa 
Informant 8 2-7-2013 Hawassa 
Informant 9 20-7-2013 Addis Ababa 
Informant 10 24-7-2013, 12-12-2013, 
19-6-2015 
Addis Ababa 
Informant 11 27-7-2013 Addis Ababa 
Informant 12 30-7-2013, 14-7-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 13 2-8-2013 Addis Ababa 
Informant 14 2-8-2013, 4-8-2013, 18-8-
2016 
Addis Ababa 
Informant 15 25-10-2013, 10-7-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 16 25-10-2013 Addis Ababa 
Informant 17 12-12-2013 Addis Ababa 
Informant 18 21-12-2013, 15-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 19 25-12-2013, 26-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 20 3-1-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 21 6-1-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 22 6-1-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 23 8-1-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 24 8-1-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 25 9-1-2014 Hawassa 
Informant 26 9-1-2013 Asella 
Informant 27 10-1-2014 Hawassa 
Informant 28 10-1-2014 Hawassa 
Informant 29 15-1-2014, 17-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 30 23-1-2014 Bahir Dar 
Informant 31 10-5-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 32 3-7-2014 Addis Ababa 
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Appendix-A. Continued 
Informant number Date interviewed Place interviewed 
Informant 33 7-7-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 34 18-7-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 35 18-8-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 36 28-8-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 37 30-9-2014 Addis Ababa 
Informant 38 30-4-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 39 15-5-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 40 6-5-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 41 4-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 42 5-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 43 5-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 44 5-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 45 6-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 46 6-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 47 7-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 48 7-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 49 14-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 50 14-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 51 14-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 52 14-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 53 15-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 54 15-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 55 5-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 56 13-7-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 57 16-6-2015, 6-3-2016 Hawassa 
Informant 58 16-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 59 16-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 60 16-6-2015 Hawassa 
Informant 61 13-7-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 62 18-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 63 18-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 64 19-6-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 65 16-7-2015 Addis Ababa 
Informant 66 24-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 67 24-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 68 24-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
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Appendix-A. Continued 
Informant number Date interviewed Place interviewed 
Informant 69 25-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 70 25-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 71 25-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 72 25-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 73 25-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 74 25-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 75 26-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 76 26-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 77 6-3-2016 Hawassa 
Informant 78 26-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 79 27-6-2015 Bahir Dar 
Informant 80 10-7-2015 Addis Ababa 
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Ethiopia is an agrarian country where agriculture dominates the economy, and thus 
agriculture is considered as an engine of growth by the government. Seed as one of 
the agricultural technologies, in fact, a carrier of many technologies, is critical to 
increasing production, but the use of quality seed from formal sources in Ethiopia is 
very limited. The current Ethiopian government has focused on agricultural 
development and has developed different policies both for agriculture in general 
and for the seed sector in particular. Following the developmental state approach, 
the government intensified its involvement in the seed sector to enhance agricultural 
development. Despite the policies and efforts of the government, a shortage of seed, 
a mismatch between demand and supply, the carryover of seed despite not 
satisfying the demand of farmers, and poor seed quality have been persistent 
challenges to the Ethiopian seed sector. Many studies have identified technical gaps 
that limit the development of the seed sector, and some of the studies have also 
discussed the extent to which policy responds to existing problems, and the extent 
to which what is in the policy documents is implemented. However, the causes of 
these ‘gaps’ are seldom discussed. The lack of such knowledge limits the 
understanding of the challenges, making it difficult to properly support the seed 
sector. For these reasons, this research has gone beyond the mere identification of 
‘gaps’, aiming to analyse how actors and institutions influence seed policy making 
and implementation in Ethiopia.  
The goal of this research is twofold: to narrow the knowledge gap about policy 
making and implementation in the Ethiopian seed sector, and to contribute to the 
debate concerning how to make the seed sector function better. The central research 
question is: how did actors and institutions influence the formulation and 
implementation of seed policies in Ethiopia from 2008 to 2016? The empirical 
research to answer this overall research question addresses two processes: policy 
making and policy implementation. These include the process of revising the 2000 
Ethiopian seed law and the process of implementing direct seed marketing. By 
analysing these two processes, the thesis unravels how actors and associated 
institutions have influenced seed policy making and implementation in Ethiopia. 
The major sources of data were interviews of actors in the seed sector, and desk 
research of different reports. Guided by theoretical concepts, the research used 
qualitative methods to generate and analyse data.  
Given the complexity of societal phenomenon, several analytical lenses have been 
used to examine the data in this research. In order to explain how actors negotiate 
the content of a policy document, including defining the problem and solution, the 
concept of discourse analysis is used, focusing on frame, the rounds model, and the 
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policy arena. Similarly, to explain the process of implementing the existing policy 
and the outcome, the concepts of multi-level perspective on transition, transition 
management, non-decision making, and institutional lock-in are used. While using 
these analytical lenses to explain seed policy making and implementation, the 
concept of institutions has remained a central concept.   
Chapter 2 analyses the negotiation process, looking into the topics of seed sector 
governance and variety registration. The analysis reveals that different policy arenas 
provide opportunities for different actors to place their preferred policy options on 
the table, and to get them incorporated into the draft working document. While this 
is a positive step towards a deliberative policy making, the final decision is made by 
the executive branch of the government. Such a process can be explained by two 
informal institutions. These are the loose connection between the drafting arenas 
and the decision-making arenas, and the blurred separation of power between the 
executive and the legislature. At the Council of Ministers (CoM), where the critical 
decisions are made, the ministry presents its perspective, particularly on issues 
where disagreement exists between the ministry and other actors. The council uses 
the content of the draft and the justification of the ministry for endorsing the draft 
policy document. Moreover, the parliament can change the content of the draft 
policy document only if the ministry agrees with the change, regardless of the 
arguments and justifications provided by other stakeholders. Thus, the inputs of 
stakeholders are considered as long as the ministry agrees with the suggestions, and 
the policy decision remains in the hands of the ministry.  
Chapter 3 presents the different frames used by different actors to describe the 
problem of seed quality. While government officials attribute the problem of seed 
quality to the lack of alignment between the seed sector governance and the regional 
government structure, experts and bureaucrats attribute the problem to the lack of 
coordination at national level. As a result, they respectively suggest the 
decentralization and centralization of seed sector governance. These frames are 
embedded in the overall interest and strategy of the actors promoting the frames. 
The centralization frame reflects the interest of experts and bureaucrats to have a say 
with regards to the seed sector. They have lost this power because of the federal 
structure that was established formally in 1995. On the contrary, the decentralization 
frame is embedded in the government’s aim to implement the constitution that 
established the federal structure in 1995. Despite the fact that the process of revising 
the seed law took about four years, these actors could not agree on either of the 
options or find an alternative. This shows a lack of deliberation and reflexivity 
during the process of revising the seed law, reflecting the fact that seed policy 
Summary 
150 
 
discussion has been part of a larger debate about (de)centralization in Ethiopia since 
1991. Thus, in addition to the issue of seed quality, the frames of centralization and 
decentralization are shaped by the old (unitary) and the new (federal) institutions of 
the Ethiopian government system.    
Chapter 4 focuses on the process of introducing and expanding direct seed 
marketing (DSM) in Ethiopia. Despite the fact that seed marketing is included in the 
policies on paper, the seed of major food crops is distributed through government 
channels resulting in inefficiency of seed distribution. The regional seed core groups 
introduced DSM in 2011, and by 2016 about one-third of the hybrid maize seed, the 
main seed marketed in Ethiopia, in Amhara, Oromia and the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ region (SNNPR), was sold through DSM. The presence of 
actors outside the seed distribution system was instrumental for introducing the 
concept of DSM. To start the piloting of this existing policy, the core group needed 
to get approval from the heads of the bureaus of agriculture (BoAs). However, such 
approval was not required for other new ideas, like establishing an independent 
regulatory body, showing how the informal institutions guide what has to be 
approved by bureau heads, regardless of the formal policy. In addition to the 
demonstrated potential of DSM to overcome the problem of seed distribution 
inefficiency, strategic management of the stakeholders' process was critical in 
expanding the area under the pilot. Many actors, including the executives, 
supported the expansion of DSM to many areas.  
Despite the expansion of DSM, its demonstrated potential to overcome the problem 
of seed supply inefficiency, the support it received from the government officials, 
and the general policy of market-based approach, the government has not endorsed 
the use of DSM beyond the pilot. Chapter 5 points out that the government excluded 
the issue of seed marketing from the seed regulation enacted in 2016, showing that 
the government has no intention to make seed marketing one of the seed delivery 
channels in the near future. The major reasons for this are: bureaucrats do not want 
to contribute to the decision making of DSM because they assume that the 
government has a strong political interest to remain in seed distribution; bureaucrats 
need the seed distribution system to achieve the targets set by the government; there 
is a symbiotic relationship between actors, the extension service as well as seed 
producers, and the seed distribution system, and so actors want to maintain the 
distribution system Such institutionalized thinking and practices have created an 
institutional lock-in that prevents bureaucrats from presenting the recommendation 
to government officials, thereby leading to non-decision about the future of DSM. 
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Chapter 6 summarizes the action of actors in affecting policy making and 
implementation as influenced by two conflicting sets of institutions. The first set 
relates to market-based thinking versus centralized planning as leading principles 
for economic development. Both are used as a discourse for promoting economic 
development and its operationalization, which are shaping how actors view and 
overcome the problems of the seed sector. This also explains why policies on paper 
are not implemented and why new initiatives are not formally endorsed. The tension 
between these divergent institutions has increased because of the dual use of seed 
by the government: the government has used the seed to both promote economic 
development and maintain strong political ties with farmers. The second set of 
conflicting institutions relates to authoritarian versus participatory decision making. 
On the one hand, is the government practice of authoritative decision-making, 
where only the input of stakeholders is considered when it fits in with the existing 
policy direction of the executives. On the other hand, it is common practice to 
organize stakeholders to contribute to policy making and implementation. The 
practice of considering the policy input of others only when it fits in with the policy 
direction of the decision-makers, creates a sense of being forced to accept, increasing 
the tension between how the government decides and the role of stakeholders.  
Given the tension between the conflicting institutions, and circumstances in 
Ethiopia, this research suggested that choosing one approach over the other will not 
guarantee the development of the seed sector. There is no guarantee that the 
outcome of a deliberative policy making process will be a different policy option 
than the one opted for by one of the actors. However, the co-development of a 
solution for the shared seed sector problem will guarantee better ownership and 
thus better implementation than an imposed policy. It is also important to note that 
deliberative policy making and implementation is not an easy task given the current 
stakeholders’ landscape and the culture of authoritative decision making. Thus, the 
change towards deliberative policy making and implementation is not something 
that emerges overnight: it is a process that matures over time. This calls for the 
strategic management of a process of change that leads to the transformation of the 
seed sector into a self-reliant and resilient sector. By identifying the underlying 
institutions behind the challenges of the seed sector and suggesting options for 
improvement, this thesis contributes to the debate on how to make the seed sector 
function better. At a higher level, it also contributes to the debate on policy making 
and implementation processes in Ethiopia
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